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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the limits to Anglo-German antagonism and the sources of 
rapprochement between Britain and Germany, during the approximate period 1905-1914. It 
thus explores Anglo-German relations before the First World War from a perspective which 
has up to now been largely neglected, and serves as a corrective to the emphasis on the 
sources of antagonism which prevails in the English-language historical literature.
The study probes Germanophilism among British non-governmental elites, focusing 
on the commercial, financial and academic communities, as well as cooperative links 
between the two countries at the non-governmental level before the war. The topics 
examined include the Anglo-German friendship movement in Britain, ties between British 
and German commercial interests and Anglo-German economic interdependence, and 
Anglo-German links in education.
The thesis also studies attitudes, including a discussion of British stereotypical 
images of Germany based on travel accounts. British textbooks on German history that 
were published before the war are analysed as well as a means of assessing the prewar 
attitude of British academics, in particular historians, towards Germany. This investigation 
reveals the strength of the idea of Anglo-German racial kinship, and demonstrates that 
British historians tended to view Germany favourably before the war. Their attitude, 
however, changed after the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914.
In conclusion, the thesis reappraises the ultimate failure of the 'pro-German' forces 
in Britain to prevent the outbreak of Anglo-German hostilities in 1914. Its primary aim, 
nevertheless, is not to argue that the limits to the Anglo-German antagonism could have 
prevented the First World War, but to demonstrate that they existed and were important.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Anglo-German relations before the First World War have been the subject of 
numerous historical works. Paul Kennedy's The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism. 
1860-19141 probably stands as the most comprehensive study of the Anglo-German 
relationship in the half-century before 1914, touching on virtually all aspects of the 
countries' bilateral relations. His book traces the origins of the antagonism and views the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914 mostly as the culmination of a long-term pattern 
of growing and intractable Anglo-German tensions. Other works, approaching the prewar 
period coloured by the knowledge that war did break out in 1914, have similarly stressed 
the prewar sources of discord and forces contributing to an Anglo-German conflict, such as 
the growth of the German navy after 1898 and the Anglo-German naval race, the rise of 
German economic power in the late nineteenth century and the Anglo-German commercial 
rivalry, war scares and spy fevers, and the rise of militarism and right-wing movements.
E.L. Woodward's Great Britain and the German Navy (1935), for example, views 
the growth of the German navy and the Anglo-German naval rivalry as the primary causes 
of the First World War.2 Richard Langhome's article in the Historical Journal (1971), 'The 
Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914', similarly focuses on the naval race 
in pre-1914 Anglo-German relations.3 Other works analysing the Anglo-German 
relationship from the standpoint of its diplomatic and naval aspects include Zara Steiner's 
Britain and the Origins of the First World War (1977),4 and a series of essays in F.H. 
Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grev (1977).5
Ross J.S. Hoffman's Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry (1933),6 is an 
exponent par excellence of the economic interpretation of the Anglo-German antagonism.
It views the prewar rise of German commercial competitiveness as the chief cause of
Anglo-German friction. Other works that deal with the German 'threat' to British industrial 
supremacy in the prewar period include The Development of British Industry and Foreign 
Competition. 1875-1914 (1968), edited by Derek Aldcroft.7
Emphasis on the prewar climate of Germanophobia and invasion scares in Britain 
can be found in I.F. Clarke's Voices Prophesying War. 1763-1984 (1966).8 In his article 
'Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915' (Historical Journal. 1978), David French examines the 
growth of German-spy paranoia in prewar Britain, treating that phenomenon as an 
expression of Germanophobia which came to a climax at the start of war.9 'In August 
1914 this mutual distrust became mutual hatred,' French argues.10 Approaching Anglo- 
German relations as well from the standpoint of stressing discord and forces contributing to 
an Anglo-German conflict, M.E. Humble's 'The Breakdown of a Consensus: British Writers 
and Anglo-German Relations, 1900-1920' (Journal of European Studies. 1977) examines the 
prewar proliferation of sensational invasion novels which contributed to the estrangement 
between Britain and Germany.11 In Humble's view, 'fear and hatred of Germany had been 
encouraged from an early date by a series of crude alarmist novels',12 suggesting that these 
books were indirectly a cause of the war of 1914.
The rise of racialist and nationalist ideologies and movements as sources of Anglo- 
German friction has also been emphasized by some of the secondary literature. A fine 
example is Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914 
(1981), a collection of essays edited by Paul Kennedy and Anthony J. Nicholls.13 
'Rethinking the Radical Right in Germany and Britain before 1914' (Journalof 
Contemporary History. 1986), by Frans and Marilyn Shevin Coetzee, also focuses on the 
development of right-wing movements in the prewar period.14 Anne Summers's 'Militarism 
in Britain before the Great War' (History Workshop. 1976), concentrating on 'popular' 
militarism and the working classes, traces the growth of militarist modes of thinking in 
prewar Britain as a way of explaining the British population's readiness for war in 1914.15
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In an essay in War and Society, edited by Brian Bond and Ian Roy, John Gooch similarly 
delves into British society's conditioning for war during the pre-1914 period.16
This brief overview of the English-language literature suggests that the prevailing 
trend in the English-language historiography has been to stress the sources of Anglo- 
German antagonism, giving them in my view a disproportionate amount of attention. The 
result has been a tendency to emphasize mainly Germanophobic forces in Britain and, 
conversely, Anglophobic trends in Germany before 1914. As J.A.S. Grenville has pointed 
out: 'The bankers, industrialists, politicians and ordinary people who did not share the 
strident Germanophobia and Anglophobia have tended to be neglected by historians whose 
perceptions are foreshortened by the knowledge of what was to happen in 1914.'17
There is, nonetheless, a body of secondary literature concerning itself with the 
relaxation of Anglo-German tension during the few years before 1914. One example is 
R.J. Crampton's The Hollow Detente (1980), which examines Anglo-German cooperative 
efforts in the Balkans from 1911 to 1914, particularly during the Balkan wars of 1912-13.18 
Richard Langhome's article, 'Anglo-German Negotiations Concerning the Future of the 
Portuguese Colonies' (Historical Journal. 1973) brings to light the Anglo-German 
negotiations between 1911 and 1913 which resulted in an agreement on the future 
disposition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.19 Anglo-German attempts at political 
cooperation are also examined by P.H.S. Hatton in 'Harcourt and Solf: The Search for an 
Anglo-German Understanding through Africa, 1912-14' (European Studies Review. 1971).20 
These episodes in Anglo-German collaboration, however, are analysed primarily from the 
diplomatic standpoint, leaving the non-political sources of prewar Anglo-German detente 
still in need of further examination.
This thesis aims to provide a balance to the literature on prewar Anglo-German 
relations by examining the forces seeking rapprochement between Britain and Germany. It 
analyses Germanophile tendencies and attitudes of non-govemmental elites in Britain, as
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well as cooperative links between these elites and their German counterparts, in the 
approximate period from 1905 to 1914. Its purpose is not to argue that these 'limits to the 
antagonism' could have prevented the outbreak of war in 1914. They did exist nonetheless, 
and by examining them as well as approaching the Anglo-German relationship from the
perspective of the British Germanophiles who have up to now been wholly neglected by
s
historians, this thesis expect^to make an important contribution to the historiography.
Roger Chickering's Imperial Germany and a World without War is an instructive 
source.21 As his work argues, the peace movement did exist in prewar Germany but was 
stymied by structural forces in German society. In similar vein, one could examine how 
the Anglo-German linkages and cooperative forces were frustrated and why they were 
ultimately unable to prevent the outbreak of war in 1914.
This thesis suggests that the July crisis of 1914, which triggered the First World 
War, can be understood as a short-term stimulus quite divorced from anything having to do 
directly with long-term Anglo-German relations. The First World War stemmed largely 
from a Balkan crisis and began as the 'Third Balkan War'.22 Even though Britain and 
Germany had by 4 August 1914 entered the war on opposing sides, this conflict did not 
originate as a quarrel between Britain and Germany. Arguably, the British and German 
governments went to war only as a result of the particular set of circumstances confronting 
them which had been created by the crisis at hand. Even if there had been a growing 
antagonism between the two powers during the previous fifty years, the circumstances 
which led to their intervention in the European conflict in 1914 did not issue directly from 
that antagonism.
It would be reasonable to contend, nevertheless, that Britain's decision to intervene 
was influenced by the background of Anglo-German relations prior to 1914. The prewar 
climate generated by the intense naval race and the German eclipse of British industrial 
supremacy certainly had an effect on the attitudes and assumptions of the British leadership
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during the July crisis, particularly those of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the 
Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. That background, along with Germany's position as the 
strongest military power in Europe, no doubt rendered her more likely to be viewed as a 
serious threat and the one country which would upset the European balance of power, 
thereby infringing on a centuries-old precept of British foreign policy.23 The maintenance 
of a power equilibrium in Europe was indeed regarded as a 'historical truism' of British 
policy.24 Even in 1909 Grey had warned that 'the domination of Germany in Europe' 
would mean war.25 Moreover, by invading Belgium on 4 August 1914 and thereby 
violating the neutrality of one of the Low Countries, Germany threatened yet another vital 
and centuries-old British interest and thus made Britain even more predisposed to go to war 
against her. Keeping the Low Countries from falling into the hands of a potentially hostile 
Great Power was, as Lord Palmerston had stated in 1838, the 'antient and hereditary Policy 
of England'.26
Properly understood, however, Germany's invasion of Belgium was less important 
in providing the British government with a casus belli than in rallying public opinion and 
giving the waverers in the cabinet a justification for entering the conflict. As Kennedy 
points out, 'by 2 August the majority of the Cabinet felt committed to joining the war even 
if Belgium ranged herself on the side of the Germans' (emphasis in the original).27 Vital as 
Belgian neutrality was to Britain's security interests, one may have to speculate whether 
Britain would have readily considered Belgium a worthy cause for intervention had the 
French been the ones to march through that country.
The diplomatic crisis of July 1914 also should not overshadow the complexity of 
non-political factors in the Anglo-German relationship during and before the July crisis. 
Why, for instance, were financial interests in the City of London, along with a substantial 
portion of the British business classes, opposed to intervention even as late as 1 August - 
not least against a long-standing economic 'rival' which had for many years been widely
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regarded as Britain's main commercial threat? Might Germany's prewar economic 
ascendancy have, in fact, been a source of material benefit to certain British commercial 
and financial interests? Why also were the German Emperor Wilhelm II and the 
Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, during the diplomatic crisis of July 1914, 
willing to calculate on Britain's remaining neutral, at least for the early duration of the 
anticipated war?28 Were they perhaps guided by a set of attitudes, beliefs and 'unspoken 
assumptions' which led them to think that their Teutonic cousins somehow would not have 
the gall to go to war with Germany?
*  *  *  *
This thesis will consist of two parts. Part One is 'empirical'; it analyses 'pro- 
German' and Germanophile forces at work in Britain during that period. Part Two, being 
'interpretive', analyses Germanophilism in a mentalites framework, with a focus on the 
study of stereotypical images and elite attitudes. This analytical framework is influenced 
by imagology.
In Part One I will first examine, in Chapter 2, the founding of the Anglo-German 
Friendship Committee in 1905 as well as subsequent developments in the Anglo-German 
friendship movement in Britain up to 1914. Particular attention will be paid to the social 
elites spearheading this movement, as well as their motives and objectives.
Another area analysed is business. My investigation, in Chapter 3, will concern 
itself with Anglo-German economic ties, examining linkage in the strategic sectors of 
industry - namely, explosives and armaments - as evidenced by the high level of British 
and German collaboration in prewar trusts and cartels. This chapter will also probe aspects 
of economic interdependence between the two countries. As will be shown, numerous 
British and German commercial interests were indeed engaged in mutually beneficial 
relationships which ran counter to the tide of the political antagonism. Cooperative forces
were certainly discernible between the two countries on the private, business level.
Chapter 4 will examine Anglo-German links in education, focusing on the Imperial 
College of Science and Technology as a symbol of the German connection in British 
education in the prewar period. Modelled on the German Technische Hochschule. Imperial, 
founded in 1907, was hailed as the 'London Charlottenburg'. The usefulness and 
shortcomings of German technical education as a model for emulation in Britain have 
already been examined at length.29 My aim is not to duplicate research but to concentrate 
on the German element in Imperial's founding which was manifested not just by the 
relevance of the German model, but also by the influence of the German philosophy 
towards education, and more importantly, by the private funding for the college which 
came largely from German business interests in Britain.
In this chapter, the thesis will also study the King Edward VII British-German 
Foundation, established in 1911 by Sir Ernest Cassel, a German-born British financier who 
responded to the rising Anglo-German tension by promoting educational and cultural 
exchange between Britain and Germany. Another area examined will be the Rhodes 
Scholarships, a scheme conceived by Cecil Rhodes which took effect in 1903 after his 
death. The focus will be on the German scholarships, which Rhodes set aside as a tribute 
to his friendship with the German Emperor.
The reception of German thought in British intellectual and cultural life in the 
nineteenth century, as well as in the social reform movement, has been dealt with at length 
by the secondary literature.30 The broad influence of German ideas and trends in British 
culture in the nineteenth century certainly cannot be overlooked. The founding of the 
English Goethe Society in 1886, for instance, no doubt attested to the strength and appeal 
of German literature in British educated circles.31 Advocates of educational reform in 
Britain, Matthew Arnold being a notable example, indeed drew their inspiration largely 
from German methods and organization. German Idealism also had a tremendous impact
on the development of philosophy in Britain in the nineteenth century, Hegelianism being 
in effect the foundation for British Idealism. Centred at Oxford, Idealism was the 
prevailing school of philosophical thought in prewar Britain, and dominated that university 
up to the outbreak of war in 1914. The names of the Oxford Idealists are legion: Edward 
Caird, T.H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley, among others.32 While recognizing 
these German contributions to British academic developments in the nineteenth century, this 
thesis will not deal with them directly as they fall outside the time frame and scope of this 
study.
The examination of Anglo-German educational links will mark the end of the first 
part of the thesis. Part Two, being the interpretive section, will follow, centred around the 
study of mental ites. This part will provide an analytical framework devoted to the analysis 
of stereotypes and Germanophile attitudes in prewar Britain. It should be mentioned from 
the outset that this thesis is not concerned with theory or theoretical approaches to the 
study of elites or attitudes, though it is influenced to some extent by structuralist theory and 
the Annales school. A theory-based approach to analysing the images of Germany in 
British attitudes has already been offered elsewhere33 and needs no duplicating here.
Chapter 5 will examine British stereotypical images of Germany and Germans, 
based on memoirs, journals and first-hand accounts written by Britons travelling or residing 
in Germany in the approximate 1905-14 period. This investigation derives its method and 
approach from imagology, defined as 'the study of national, ethnic and racial stereotypes as 
they appear in all literary contexts'.34 A field of literary studies, imagology has become an 
important tool in comparative literature and 'stresses that all kinds of texts can and indeed 
should be examined'.35 The primary texts examined in this chapter, being of both literary 
and historical value, are certainly relevant. Unfortunately, imagology is far less developed 
in the English-language literature than in the German. The study of the image of Germans 
in British literature, for instance, has been much more extensively undertaken in German
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than in English.36
Chapter 6 will examine imagery of Germany utilizing a different type of text: the 
history textbook. A source of images, the textbook can be treated also as a primary text 
from the period. Having a historical context of their own, history textbooks provide 
insights into the attitudes and viewpoints of their authors and of the historical profession as 
a whole. They can thus aid in one’s attempt to probe the attitudes of the prewar British 
academic establishment, a very important segment of Britain's 'intellectual aristocracy’.
The historians are especially pertinent to this study because they were active in 
disseminating opinion on Germany before the war and, furthermore, played a major role in 
the anti-German propaganda campaign after the start of hostilities in August 1914. This 
chapter will demonstrate that the British historians, at least as seen through their textbook 
writings, tended to be pro-German before the war. In examining the pamphlets and other 
propagandists works which they issued after Britain's entry in the war on 4 August 1914, 
one can discern a marked change in their attitude towards Germany. Once mobilized into 
the war effort, they adopted a distinctly anti-German stance. As my analysis will show, in 
assessing their public pronouncements on Germany one can indeed draw a line through 
August 1914. The tone of the 'anti-German' works put out after the start of hostilities 
should not detract from the Germanophile attitudes exhibited by a considerable section of 
the British academic community before the war. This investigation, I believe, will 
contribute to a greater understanding of the mentalite of the British academic establishment 
in the prewar period.
Chapter 7 will complement this study further by examining the limits to the 
historians' anti-Germanism even after the outbreak of war. It will discuss the origins and 
rise of racial Anglo-Saxonism in Britain in the nineteenth century, and analyse the 
importance of racial Anglo-Saxonist ideas in the prewar assumptions and attitudes of the 
British intellectual elite. As this chapter will demonstrate, the prestige enjoyed by German
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universities and scholarship within the British academic establishment must be duly taken 
into account. Respect for German learning was truly a deep thread in Britain's prewar 
intellectual circles. Lastly, this chapter will undertake case studies of three Britons from 
different backgrounds who had a strong personal German connection and who sought to 
improve Anglo-German relations before 1914. The purpose here will be to assess the 
limits to their ability to prevent the Anglo-German rupture in 1914. This study will be 
important in helping one understand the limitations of the British non-governmental elites' 
influence on official policy-making.
A dominant theme which emerges from the analysis in Part Two is the idea of 
Anglo-German racial kinship in prewar Britain. In my examination of stereotypes and elite 
attitudes, the notion that Britons and Germans were descended from common roots and 
belonged to the same Teutonic family resurfaces over and over again. One must indeed 
appreciate the strength of the idea of shared Anglo-German heritage in pre-1914 British 
attitudes. Racialist ideas were certainly important as a mainstay of Germanophilism in 
Britain, not least among the academic elite as well as the commercial and clerical groups 
that spearheaded the Anglo-German friendship movement.
In the concluding chapter I will examine Britain's response to war in August 1914, 
paying close attention to the cabinet's decision as well as the response of the business and 
financial interests that constituted an important segment of the British non-governmental 
elites. An evaluation will be made of the institutional framework in which they operated, 
and of the weaknesses of the 'pro-German' forces in Britain in general.
Lastly, an explanation should be given as to why the thesis has chosen to 
concentrate on non-governmental elites, notably the commercial and financial and the 
academic elites. In seeking to probe Germanophilism in Britain, this project had as its 
starting point the aim of examining forces which went counter to, or could be seen as off­
setting, the Anglo-German political antagonism. Consequently, I decided to move away
18
from governments and official policy and focus instead on the social and cultural aspects of 
the Anglo-German relationship. This move towards the non-political and non-governmental 
sector was also prompted by a desire to explore the attitudes and actions of private interests 
in Britain that did not share the Germanophobia often associated with the prewar period. 
From the standpoint of methodology, this approach has certainly been vindicated, for there 
is undeniably a substantial amount of material into which I have been able to tap to study 
the activities and attitudes of these elites. But more importantly, these interests also 
evinced identifiable manifestations of Germanophilism, thus making themselves a very 
suitable subject for this study.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP 
MOVEMENT, 1905-1914
'On the other side of the water we see the United States; 
we should like to see on this side the United States of 
Europe.'
Lord Avebury
The year was 1905. It was neither the best nor the worst of times in Anglo- 
German relations. Britain and Germany were at peace. The Great War was to come only 
almost a decade later. Yet the two powers were not exactly on the most cordial of terms. 
Much of 1905 witnessed a relentless spate of 'press wars' between them, exacerbating a 
tension already luelled by strained relations between London and Berlin.
In 1905 the Anglo-German 'antagonism' was already well established. One could 
trace its beginnings to the very birth of the Second German Empire in January 1871, itself 
the result of a quick and convincing military conquest of France. Emerging as a new, 
unified power at the heart of Europe, Germany now had the potential to establish her 
hegemony over the continent. Even though Britain had not intervened in the Franco- 
Prussian War, the spectre of German territorial aggrandizement, resulting from Berlin's 
annexation of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, already caused apprehension in 
London. During the 'war-in-sight' crisis of 1875, when a renewed Franco-German war 
loomed on the horizon, the possible annihilation of France as a Great Power and the 
prospect of a German dominance of western Europe, caused alarm again in Britain. On 
this occasion, London promptly intervened to avert a German attack on France.1
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Germany's bid for colonies in Africa in the mid-1880s further contributed to the 
'antagonism' with Britain. London may not, in principle, have been strongly averse to 
Germany's participation in the 'Scramble for Africa'. However, the manner of German 
diplomacy - characterized by Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's hard-bargaining and 
'blackmailing' methods - in pressing Berlin's colonial claims and wringing concessions from 
Britain could not but arouse London's suspicions about German goodwill and 
trustworthiness.2 It was largely because of Bismarck's Realpolitik that German approaches 
in the late 1880s for an alliance with Britain met with little success. As Kennedy explains: 
'What "Bismarckism" had done was to make every British government from the 1860s to 
the 1880s, ... so distrustful of Berlin's real motives in its external policy, ... that a firm, 
public and binding Anglo-German alliance was out of the question.'3 Moreover, during the 
1880s also Germany's growing economic power and competitiveness, subsequent to the 
introduction of her 1879 tariff increases, began to attract notice in Britain, thereby 
threatening further the British sense of security.
Kaiser Wilhelm II's incompetence as a statesman no doubt contributed to a large 
degree to the worsening of Anglo-German relations. Noted for his bombastic outbursts, 
erratic behaviour and unstable temperament, the German monarch came to earn such 
appellations as 'Wilhelm the Sudden' and 'His Impulsive Majesty'.4 There is little denying 
that the Kaiser's 'impulsiveness, which often amounts to tactlessness',5heightened and in 
some instances confirmed British distrust of Germany's intentions. One manifestation of 
his tactlessness, which created a great stir in Britain, came in the 'Kruger telegram' episode. 
In late December 1895 Leander Starr Jameson, friend and agent of Cecil Rhodes, Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony, launched an ill-conceived and ill-fated incursion into the 
Transvaal which has since become known as the Jameson Raid. Planned with the object of 
inciting an Uitlander revolt in Johannesburg against Boer rule, Jameson's poorly executed
venture was promptly put down in January 1896. In a telegram to Paul Kruger, President
\
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of the Transvaal, Wilhelm congratulated him on his success in smashing the raid. The 
publication of this dispatch, inevitably offending British sensitivities, led to a 'passionate 
denunciation' of the Kaiser in the British press and heightened Anglo-German tension.6
The late 1890s were certainly pivotal in contributing to the growth of the Anglo- 
German 'antagonism'. The year 1897 marked a turning point in German foreign policy as a 
decision was made by the Kaiser to embark on Weltpolitik and seek world-power status for 
Germany. In that year Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz became State Secretary of the 
Reichsmarineamt- an appointment heralding the start of Germany's naval buildup.
Beginning with her first Navy Law of 1898, which provided for the construction of a 
modem battleship fleet, Germany was to present a direct challenge to the Royal Navy for 
over the next decade.7 The naval arms race, indeed, was to remain the thorniest issue in 
Anglo-German diplomatic relations during the decade before 1914, especially between 1908 
and 1912. Berlin's determination to carry out its naval programme 'touched the British 
nerve at its most sensitive poinf .8
The militant tone of the German press campaign against Britain, as well as the 
heightened Anglophobia in Germany during the Boer War (1899-1902), further added to 
the Anglo-German discord. This long and costly war in South Africa shook late-Victorian 
Britain's confidence to the roots and raised serious doubts about the merits of John Bull's 
continued 'splendid isolation'.9 At a time when Britain was experiencing difficulties in 
South Africa, rumours that the Kaiser was organizing a European coalition against her 
widened the rift between London and Berlin further.
Nevertheless, a glimmer of hope offered itself during the period from 1898 to 1902 
for an Anglo-German rapprochement. In the very year of Tirpitz's first Navy Law, Joseph 
Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, made overtures to Berlin for an Anglo-German 
alliance, but his approach was rejected by the WilhelmstraBe. Renewed efforts for an 
alliance were launched after Lord Lansdowne's accession to the helm of the Foreign Office
in 1900. The bilateral negotiations that ensued during 1901 and 1902, however, proved 
futile - a failure due mostly to Prime Minister Lord Salisbury's distrust of German 
diplomacy and intentions, and to the fundamental divergence between both sides' positions 
and interests. As J.A.S. Grenville suggests:
Biilow [the German Chancellor] had decided that if an alliance was to be 
concluded at all Britain must join the Triple Alliance; ... In London, on the 
other hand, anything more than a carefully defined and narrow agreement 
specifying the exact conditions of the casus belli was regarded with 
extreme misgivings. The gap between these different points of view was 
never closed. In the long run it is impossible to conclude an alliance 
unless there is some degree of faith on both sides.
This mutual good faith, it turned out, was 'singularly lacking' between the governments of 
London and Berlin.10
The failure of the alliance talks was significant, for 1901-02 marked a watershed 
confirming the rise of the 'German challenge' in the eyes of British governmental circles.11 
By 1902 the embryonic German fleet had begun to attract the British Admiralty's attention. 
In September of that year, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary at the Admiralty and 
future War Secretary, Sir Hugh O. Amold-Forster, warned that 'Germany must be regarded 
as a possible enemy'. Lord Selbome, the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote a 
memorandum in October 1902 claiming that 'the great new German navy is being carefully 
built up from the point of view of a war with us'.12 In late 1904, with the arrival of Sir 
John Fisher as First Sea Lord, the Admiralty redistributed its fleets, reducing the Royal 
Navy's strength in the Mediterranean and withdrawing the bulk of its battleships to home 
waters, apparently in response to the growing German naval presence in the North Sea. As
26
Samuel Williamson observes, Fisher, who often talked of 'Copenhagening' the German 
fleet, 'quickly gave British strategy an anti-German orientation'.13
Before leaving office in April 1905, Selbome had occasion to reflect on Anglo- 
German relations when another round of heated exchanges took place between the British 
and German press. He attributed the 'real source1 of British resentment of Germany to 'the 
libels of the German Press on the British Army during the Boer War'. As Selbome 
observed:
The people did not mind German opinion being against us as to the merits 
of the quarrel; they did not mind French opinion being against us as to the 
merits of the quarrel; they did not much mind, though they made a grimace 
over, the French libels against the British soldier, for they never really 
expected anything else from the French considering what the history of the 
two countries has been and that the Fashoda incident had only just closed.
But they never for one moment had anticipated the libels in letter press and 
in cartoon of the German Press and it bit them to the bone [emphasis 
added]. This being so they were predisposed to view with suspicion 
everything that Germany did, and inevitably the sudden growth of the great 
German Navy has absorbed their attention.14
Selbome thus pinpointed a discrete series of events which contributed to the Anglo-German 
antagonism. It is interesting to note, though, that from Selbome's standpoint, perfidious 
libels were expected of the French but not the Germans.
The year 1905 also witnessed the first Moroccan crisis. Following the sending of a 
French expedition to Fez in the early part of the year, the German government felt 
compelled to act to safeguard German economic interests in Morocco. Under pressure
from his ministers, Wilhelm landed at Tangier in full military dress on 31 March. In a 
flamboyant display of brinkmanship, he made a speech affirming the maintenance of that 
country's integrity. This move, however, was also aimed at testing the Anglo-French 
entente, which had been bom in April 1904 when Britain and France settled their long­
standing colonial disputes by concluding a set of agreements.15 These accords, among other 
things, had recognized French preponderance in Morocco and Britain’s 'free hand’ in Egypt. 
In the view of Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, the Kaiser wanted to 
'show to the French people that an understanding with England is of little value to them 
and that they had much better come to an agreement with Germany’.16 Careless and 
impetuous, the Kaiser's actions at Tangier had the ultimate effect only of exacerbating 
Anglo-German tensions and strengthening the Anglo-French entente.
Although the German government's bold step might have come as a surprise to 
Whitehall, its grievances were to an extent justified, judged by the merits of its case. In 
the previous summer, Berlin had expressed concerns about its commercial interests in 
Morocco, as well as the maintenance of the status quo and an 'open door’ in that country. 
Lansdowne observed that 'they [the Germans] thought they saw symptoms of an intention 
on the part of France to monopolize’ the concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco17 
- a suspicion which was not without foundation. Given a free hand in Morocco, the French 
naturally took the most of what their position there afforded them through their 'peaceful 
penetration’ of the nominally 'independent' country. Germany after all was a signatory to 
the Treaty of Madrid of 1880 which stipulated equal rights in Morocco for all parties and if 
German rights were being infringed upon, it is natural that Berlin would want to seek 
redress. After long drawn-out negotiations, this crisis was ultimately resolved, peacefully, 
in April 1906 with the signing of the Treaty of Algeciras.
During the intervening period, the War Office and Admiralty began drawing up 
contingency plans for a possible war with Germany.18 Incidentally, the keel of the first all­
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big-gun battleship, HMS Dreadnought, was also laid down in Britain on 2 October.
Powered by turbine engines (the first of its type), armed with ten twelve-inch guns, and 
achieving a maximum speed of twenty-one knots, this vessel which would be launched in 
February 1906 was to render all existing battleships obsolete. Rather than 'win' the naval 
arms race for Britain, however, this technological marvel was only going to intensify it; 
rather than sap the German will to contest British naval supremacy, it hardened Berlin's 
resolve to stay the course.
But while the Dreadnought was being developed in Britain, inaugurating a new 
phase in naval technology, a changing of the guard was also taking place in the German 
military establishment. In December 1905 Count Alfred von Schlieffen, architect of the 
famed Schlieffen Plan, retired from his post as Chief of the German General Staff, making 
way for Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Just about nine years later, his plan for a two- 
front European war, involving a German offensive against France via Belgium, was to be 
put into effect at the outbreak of the continental conflict.
December 1905 also saw the fall of the Conservative government of Arthur James 
Balfour. Having been in opposition for close to a decade, the Liberals finally returned to 
office. On 5 December the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was granted an 
audience with the King and requested to form a government. Shortly thereafter, in January 
1906, the Liberals were to be swept into office in an electoral victory of unprecedented 
proportions.
Meanwhile, Britain's entente with France was being reinforced. Barely two weeks 
after the Liberals assumed office, military conversations were begun unofficially between 
the British and the French. On 15 January 1906 these staff talks were given their official 
stamp of approval by Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary.19 He in turn advised 
the incoming War Secretary, Richard Haldane, to be prepared lest a situation might arise 
which would suddenly compel the British government to go to the aid of France in her
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continuing dispute with Germany.20
It was also during this protracted Moroccan crisis that the first tangible, unofficial 
efforts at Anglo-German conciliation came to fruition. The year 1905 may have witnessed 
an invasion scare, the heated press wars, and the crisis in Morocco. But to paraphrase and 
even risk over-simplifying Marx and Hegel, every thesis has its antithesis. Just as the 
forces making for war were gaining strength in 1905, so the forces promoting peace too 
were making headway in their efforts. For by the autumn of that year, certain individuals 
in Britain and Germany had decided to take action to defuse the Anglo-German tension.
The Fourteenth Universal Peace Congress
The setting for this coming together of high-minded Britons and Germans was 
provided by the salubrious shores of Lake Lucerne in Switzerland at the town of Lucerne, 
where the fourteenth Universal Peace Congress was held from 19 to 23 September. At the 
congress, a paper by H.R. Fox Bourne entitled 'Civilization' by War was read. 'We are all 
pledged to denounce war between civilized nations as a dangerous, degrading, and 
essentially savage institution’, the paper declared, 'and to do our utmost towards putting an 
end to it.’ It added that war against 'uncivilized communities’, waged under the pretence of 
civilizing them, was 'yet more degrading and the climax of savagery’.21 Among the 
noteworthy issues discussed at Lucerne was that of arbitration agreements. According to a 
report prepared by Elie Ducommun, Swiss delegate and president of the congress, twenty 
bilateral arbitration agreements had been completed since the previous year's congress at 
Boston. Switzerland appeared to be the most avid participant in arbitration, being a 
signatory to six of such agreements, whereas Britain had concluded only three.22 At the 
end of the five days' proceedings, the congress adopted resolutions calling for the 
promotion of international fraternity, international law, propaganda in the interests of peace, 
and resolutions dealing with such questions of 'actualities' as the Russo-Japanese War and
Scandinavian neutrality. Eight principles were laid down by means of which a system of 
international law might be created, one of them being that 'nations are mutually dependent'. 
In the field of propaganda, the congress set forth the idea of international educational 
exchange, advocating the establishment of a 'common curriculum1, 'official exchanges of 
students and scholars1, and the founding of an 'International University'.23
Throughout those five days, some of the British and German delegates were also 
able to confer in private and, anxious to check the spiralling tension between their nations, 
undertook to organize an Anglo-German Conciliation Committee in their respective 
countries.24 Following the congress, individuals in Britain who were involved in the peace 
movement set about organizing an inaugural public meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 
One such individual was Sir Francis William Fox, the prime mover in this campaign in 
Britain.25 A prominent member of the Society of Friends, Fox had himself been in 
attendance at Lucerne, where he had submitted a memoire calling for the establishment of a 
European consultative council - in his own words, 'un Conseil consultatif supreme pour 
l'Europe' - as a step towards strengthening the Concert of Europe. An internationalist of 
vision, he conceived of a European federation having its own council which would be 
presided over alternatively by the European Great Powers: Britain, Germany, France,
Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. In his plan, the council would meet every two years as 
a matter of course, but could be convened at any time with the consent of any two of the 
six powers. As Fox stated, this council would have as its function 'le reglement des 
questions intemationales ayant un caractere administratif .26
In a letter of 8 November, Fox invited Lord Avebury to preside over the proposed 
meeting to be held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, in the afternoon of 1 December. In Fox's 
own words, 'Your Lordship's presence would add greatly to the weight of the Meeting.' 
Most unfortunately for the committee, the Duke of Argyll could not attend the meeting but 
would have a letter to be read there nevertheless. As of the day of Fox's letter, over 150
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signatures - belonging to peers, bishops, clergymen, Members of Parliament of both parties, 
and well-known lawyers - had been secured for the address to be issued at the meeting.27
Son of a banker, Fox was bom in Kingsbridge in 1841, one of thirteen children 
descended from Quakers on both parents' sides. In addition to acquiring knowledge in 
banking at his father's firm during his early days, he was trained as an engineer and in 
1873 opened the Atlas Engineering Works at Bristol. Later in life, Fox became involved in 
licensing reform and the anti-slavery movement, serving on the Anti-Slavery and 
Aborigines Protection Society from 1888 onwards. An activist in international arbitration 
and naval disarmament, he turned his attention from 1906 to 1912 towards the work of the 
China Mission Emergency Committee, serving as one of its honorary secretaries.28
On 25 November Fox addressed a communication to Lord Lansdowne, asking if he 
'would be willing to send a Message of sympathy with the objects of the Meeting and the 
movement which the Meeting is intended to inaugurate'.29 Three days later Lansdowne 
replied in very guarded terms that he considered it 'quite unusual' for him to undertake 
such action, being afraid that extending the message of sympathy might create an 
'inconvenient precedent'. He, however, added that Anglo-German relations 'are at this 
moment so far as His Majesty's Govt are concerned, uncomplicated by any international 
difficulty'.30 Curiously, it appears that in the face of Lansdowne's intractable resolve to 
avoid setting 'inconvenient precedents' for his office, a compromise of sorts was reached 
with Avebury and the cracks papered over. The text of Avebury's speech that was to be 
read at the meeting was submitted for the Foreign Secretary's approval, which was given on 
29 November.31
Caxton Hall: The Birth of the Friendship Movement
On Friday, 1 December, up to 2,000 devotees to the cause and spirit of Anglo- 
German conciliation converged on Caxton Hall for the scheduled meeting at 4.30 p.m.32
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Lord Avebury, otherwise known as Sir John Lubbock, had accepted Fox's invitation to take 
the chair at this meeting. A man of diverse interests and talents, Avebury was at once a 
writer, lover of nature, politician, lawyer, scientist, philanthropist, and now assumed the 
role also of international peacemaker. An Eton boy and prominent financier, he was a 
partner in the merchant banking firm of Robarts, Lubbock & Co. on Lombard Street, and 
'the beau ideal of the City banker'.33 Between 1866 and his death in 1913, Avebury also 
served as a director of the Phoenix Assurance Company.34 He was first elected as a Liberal 
to the House of Commons in 1870 and was elevated to the peerage in 1900. His 
credentials indeed seem impressive: Fellow of the Royal Society, Trustee of the British 
Museum, Doctor of Civil Law from Oxford, German Order of Merit. He was now aged 
seventy-one but still able to maintain a relatively active political and literary life. With 
such diverse titles as The Pleasures of Life (1887-89), The Scenery of Switzerland (1896), 
The Scenery of England (1902) and Peace and Happiness (1909) already under his prolific 
penship, he issued his Notes of the Life History of British Flowering Plants literally just 
days before the Caxton Hall meeting.35 In 1904 alone, he had published his pamphlet Free 
Trade, a personal copy of which was sent to, among other people, the Prince of Wales and 
the American President Theodore Roosevelt.36 At one time Senate member and Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of London, chairman of the London County Council (1890- 
92), and president of the Institute of Bankers (1879-83), the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of the United Kingdom, the Metaphysical Society, and the Society of 
Antiquaries (he was re-elected to this post just in 1905), he was indeed no stranger to 
philanthropic organizations or public service.37
Opening the proceedings, Avebury cited the efforts begun in Lucerne and admitted 
that even though 'the two countries have really no antagonistic interests', 'it cannot be 
denied that a feeling of antagonism, if not yet strong, has recently been growing up'. 
Likening the 'lack of a good understanding’ between Britain and Germany to the story of
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Much Ado about Nothing. Avebury ascribed the current 'feeling of irritation' foremost to 
the irresponsible exchanges between the British and German press. He also urged that 'we 
should like to see on this side [of the Atlantic] the United States of Europe'.
Pointing to the benefits of Britain's commercial ties with Germany, Avebury 
mentioned that Germany, next to India, was Britain's best customer. After acknowledging 
the debt which Britain owed to Germany in literature, Avebury hailed the German 
Emperor as one of the ablest men of that generation. Evoking racial and cultural kinship, 
he declared: 'We belong to one race; have one common origin, kindred laws and kindred 
faiths, and have the same great interest in the maintenance of peace of the world.'
Fox, acting as honorary secretary, then read letters of sympathy; indeed, there was 
none from Lansdowne. The Duke of Argyll's letter scolded Britain for becoming childish 
in her 'suspicious old age', unfairly jealous of Germany while the economic progress and 
navies of the United States and France passed unnoticed. He further accused the British 
mentality of being averse to changes to the status quo and thus liable to treat the Germans 
as scapegoats.
The letter from James Bryce, M.P., chided the 'happily small, though vociferous' 
section of the British press that had been attempting to incite feeling against Germany. 'I 
earnestly trust', said Bryce, 'that your meeting may help to shew that the British people at 
large, so far from being hostile to Germany, desire not only peace but friendship.' Letters 
of sympathy were also read from, among others, Noel Buxton, the Lord Chancellor Sir 
Robert Reid, Sir West Ridgeway of the Athenaeum Club, Edward Caird, Master of Balliol 
College, Oxford, the Dean of Durham University, the secretary of the National Society of 
Amalgamated Brassworkers and Metal Mechanics, and the secretary of the National 
Amalgamated Union of Labour.
Sir John Kennaway moved a resolution declaring that 'neither the economic nor 
political interests of the two nations are antagonistic; and that there is good ground for
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believing that in the hearts of the main body of the people of this country there exist 
feelings of cordial friendship and respect for the German people’. Citing the ties of 
common blood and the Protestant faith of the two peoples, he declared that at bottom both 
nations had 'a  sincere admiration for each other’.
The Bishop of Southwark, seconding Kennaway’s resolution, also invoked the idea 
of Anglo-German racial kinship. Alluding to the 'real cousinship’ between the British and 
Germans, he remarked that the British people could understand the Germans, just as they 
could not understand the Oriental or Slavic races, and not even always the Celts - an 
observation that brought laughter to the hall. He also spoke of the brassworkers of 
Birmingham as an example of Anglo-German cooperation in industry. In his view, a war 
with Germany 'ought to be only less impossible than a conflict between England and our 
own brethren in America, the very suggestion of which a little while ago produced so 
remarkable and splendid a recoil of protest of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic’. 
Kennaway’s resolution was declared to be carried unanimously, in spite of one hand, that of 
an Arnold White, raised against it.38
Sir Herbert Maxwell moved the second resolution calling for the formation of an 
Anglo-German Friendship Committee, claiming that the Anglo-German misunderstanding 
arose 'in great part from a mutual want of appreciation of the true facts', again a veiled 
reference to the general ignorance of the people and the exaggerated tones of the 
newspapers. Reiterating what previous speakers had already mentioned, he emphasized 
that the British and Germans were 'kindred alike in blood and religion’. Leonard Courtney, 
seconding the resolution, remarked that a prosperous Germany made a better customer for 
Britain - a reference to the importance of German trade to Britain. Lord Stanmore, also 
seconding the resolution, claimed, again alluding to racial kinship: 'There is a closer 
affinity between Germans and English than between any other nation in the world.’
Towards the end of the proceedings, Sir Michael Foster moved for the appointment of a
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committee to carry on the task of promoting good relations between Britain and Germany. 
Seconded by the Rev. Dr. R.F. Horton, the resolution was carried.
Thus was bom the Anglo-German Friendship Committee in December 1905, as a 
successor to the Conciliation Committee, and having its office at 28 Victoria Street, 
London. Avebury was appointed its president, the Duke of Argyll its honorary president, 
and Fox and George Herbert Perris its honorary secretaries. Sir Ernest Tritton occupied the 
post of treasurer, and Thomas Newman that of chairman. Its vice-presidents included the 
Earl of Lonsdale, Kennaway (later to become president of the Church Missionary Society), 
Stanmore, Maxwell, the Bishop of Southwark and Lord Monkswell. The signatories to the 
committee's inaugural address counted close to fifty Members of Parliament, fourteen 
academics, twenty-seven members of clergy or persons involved with church societies, 
three persons connected with the Society of Friends, and two prominent German men of 
business and finance: Alexander Siemens and A. Roese of the Deutsche Bank, London. 
Among the individual names that stood out were the Liberal politician Noel Buxton; the 
barrister and legal scholar Sir Thomas Barclay; Henry Hobhouse, the Liberal pioneer in 
local government; Sir Thomas Barlow, Professor of Medicine at the University of London; 
Adolphus William Ward, Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge; Karl Breul, University Reader 
in German at Cambridge; Henry F. Pelham, president of Trinity College, Oxford; Prof. 
Arthur Schuster, prominent physicist and mathematician; the historian George Peabody 
Gooch, then a Member of Parliament for Bath; John H. Muirhead, Professor of Philosophy 
at the University of Birmingham; Thomas W. Rhys Davids, Orientalist scholar and 
Professor of Comparative Religion at London; William Stead, editor of theReview of 
Reviews: Sir Percy William Bunting, editor of the Contemporary Review: Alfred G. 
Gardiner, journalist; B. Seebohm Rowntree, the eminent sociologist; the Quaker, Joseph 
Allen Baker, M.P.; John Bright, M.P.; John Burns, M.P.; Herbert J. Gladstone, M.P.; J.
Keir Hardie, M.P.; Arthur Henderson, M.P.; Thomas Lough, M.P.; Joseph A. Pease, M.P.;
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Herbert Samuel, M.P.; Charles Trevelyan, M.P.; Henry J. Wilson, M.P.; the Archbishop of 
Westminster; the afore-mentioned Rev. Horton, president of the Free Church Council; 
George Cadbury, the chocolate manufacturer; and Francis A. Bevan of Barclay & Co., 
Ltd.39 Comprising influential businessmen, clergymen, academics, journalists and 
politicians, this committee had considerable stature. In January 1906 a compendium 
newspaper, the Anglo-German Courier, began its weekly issues under the editorship of Leo 
Weinthal, who also edited the African World and had connections with businessmen and 
financiers in South Africa, many of German descent. This newspaper was financed by 
Alfred Beit,40 a German-born banker who, as one will see in Chapter 4, played an active 
role in the Anglo-German friendship movement before the war.
As we have seen, there were numerous references made at Caxton Hall to racial 
and cultural kinship between British and Germans. Most of the participants at the meeting 
tended to recognize Germans as belonging to the same racial stock and cultural heritage as 
Britons. Avebury invoked Britain's debt to Goethe, Schiller, Humboldt, Beethoven, 
Mendelssohn, Haydn, Mozart and Wagner. Expressing a sentiment of cooperation and 
affinity, W.J. Davis, the secretary of the National Society of Amalgamated Brassworkers, 
wrote in his letter addressed to the meeting that, 'Such noble races as the English and 
German must not be brought into conflict.' Where German industrial might and the trade 
rivalry were mentioned, the economic relationship was invariably viewed as a benefit to 
Britain. Alluding to Anglo-German economic interdependence, Avebury argued that 
Germany was Britain's best customer after India. Reinforcing this mood, Courtney 
declared: 'The more Germany prospers the better customer she will be to us and there is 
nothing in this that should set people against each other.'41
But the speeches at Caxton Hall are notable for what they omitted as much as for 
what they mentioned. The growth of German naval power, a major issue in Anglo-German 
relations at the time, was hardly touched upon. Equally absent were references to the other
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sources of friction such as the Moroccan crisis and the invasion scare of the previous year. 
These omissions could well be explained by the composition of those present or involved 
in the committee. Of the some forty-seven Members of Parliament who either were there 
or signed their names to the address, an overwhelming majority were Liberal, followed by 
a significant handful of Labour members. Conservatives, not counting the Liberal 
Unionists, numbered only two.42
The overwhelming presence of Liberals in this gathering no doubt set the tone for
the proceedings. By 1905 the political battle lines in the 'tariff reform* debate had been
clearly drawn. The Conservatives, who in large numbers were in favour of enacting
protective tariffs, had forged an informal alliance with the Tariff Reform League (which
will be discussed further in Chapter 3). Having in common a fear of German economic
competition, both groupings tended to stress the German menace. The Liberals, on the
other hand, generally adhered to the tenets of Cobdenism. That affirmations of commercial
linkage with Germany received a favourable hearing at Caxton Hall should not be 
r
suprising. They veritably reflected the Liberals' commitment to free trade.
Also notable is the large representation of business and financial interests in the 
Anglo-German Friendship Committee, especially in its executive committee,43which would 
make the various references to trade and business relations all the more understandable. 
Consider, for instance, the presence of Harry Nuttall, Liberal M.P. for Stretford who 
became president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1905. Formerly an import- 
and-export merchant in Manchester, Nuttall was also president of the Manchester 
Geographical Society. Another person worthy of mention is Sir John Brunner, Liberal 
M.P. for Northwich and co-founder of Brunner, Mond & Co., the renowned alkali works 
established in 1873, itself an Anglo-German venture.44 The trade unions too were well 
represented. As mentioned, letters of sympathy were received from the National Society of 
Amalgamated Brassworkers and Metal Mechanics as well as from the National
Amalgamated Union of Labour. Among those in the Friendship Committee representing 
labour interests were Richard Bell, Labour M.P. for Derby, and general secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants; W.H. Appleton, secretary of the Society of 
Operative Lace Makers; and George Bames, secretary of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers.
Soon after Caxton Hall, Francis Fox travelled to Berlin to gauge the effects of the 
meeting in Germany. Apparently the meeting produced a positive response from 
commercial interests in Germany which promptly organized reciprocal gatherings. Already 
by mid-December 1905, we have evidence from the British Consul-General in Hamburg, 
William Ward, that the 'better class of the inhabitants of Germany' were beginning to feel 
the necessity, 'in view of the unsatisfactory state of the relations between Germany & 
Great Britain, - of giving public expression to their wish that these relations should be re­
established on a friendly footing1.45 Reflecting this spirit, the Berlin Merchants' Guild held 
a public meeting at the Bourse on 17 December. This function, attended by about 2,000 
persons, mainly members of the banking and business communities, passed a resolution 
stating that the meeting 'reciprocates in the warmest manner the desires for a good 
understanding between the two nations as recently expressed at various meetings held in 
London at the instance of leading Englishmen'.46
On 30 December the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in turn held its annual 
public meeting, attended by a 'very large number of Hamburg Merchants & Shipowners', 
and issued a unanimous resolution expressing a desire that a more friendly footing be 
reestablished between Germany and Britain. A meeting took place on the same day in 
Frankfurt carrying a similar resolution. As Ward reported, the Bremen Chamber of 
Commerce, in its annual report issued in December, expressed sentiments to the same 
effect 'on the part of the Bremen Commercial classes'.47
These public expressions of goodwill in Germany, spearheaded by the business and
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financial classes, were to continue into the following year. On 6 January 1906, for 
instance, a meeting was held in the Old Town Hall of Munich. Though concerned 
primarily with Anglo-German trade matters, this gathering also invoked racial and cultural 
ties. One speaker, for example, declared that Britain and Germany were 'the two greatest 
cultured States of Germanic origin' and should thus remain on good terms. Also in 
attendance was the president of the Bavarian Local Navy League who was related to the 
Dukes of Norfolk. Betraying his Anglophilism, he referred to both countries' common 
interests of culture and spoke fondly of his own early days in Britain.48 Not surprisingly, 
the meeting carried a resolution citing the two countries’ 'common origin and joint heritage 
of culture'.
Fox, along with Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador at Berlin, also attended 
a banquet on 6 January 1906 given by the Berlin Chamber of Commerce.49 Three days 
later the president of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce addressed an invitation to 
Avebury to attend a meeting scheduled for 14 January - 'a  public manifestation in support 
of the promotion of good feeling and a mutual good understanding between England and 
Germany'.50
Even though the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was formed in late 1905, 
unofficial steps had already been taken in Britain at least twelve months before towards 
improving Anglo-German relations. One individual actively engaged in these efforts was 
Sir Thomas Barclay. A member of the international arbitration movement, and author of 
Problems of International Peace and Diplomacy (published later in 1907), Barclay made a 
trip to Germany in December 1904 on a 'mission of peace'. In an interview with the 
Standard, he warned that the anti-British feeling in Germany was not as strong as the press 
in both countries would suggest, and called on Britain and Germany to appeal to their 
'business instincts'. Keenly aware of the ties between British and German commercial 
interests, Barclay attended the annual meeting of the German Associated Chambers of
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Commerce, in February 1905, where he delivered a speech in German.51
We know from Lascelles's private papers that the formation of an Anglo-German 
Union Club was proposed as early as December 1904. This scheme elicited support from, 
among others, Amold-Forster, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Walter Kerr, Lord Rosebery, Earl 
Spencer, and the presidents of the Royal Society, the Royal Geographical Society, the 
Royal College of Physicians, and the Royal College of Surgeons of England.52 By May 
1905, the Anglo-German Union Club had already established its offices on Fleet Street, 
London. Its stated objectives were to promote Anglo-German friendship, to advance 
knowledge, science and art, to arrange meetings between British and German parliamentary 
representatives, and to hold international sporting events. Field Marshal Lord Roberts was 
made honorary life member of the club. It must be noted that several Germans of the 
upper and business classes served on the Union Club's committee: C. Edward Melchers, 
president of the German Athaeneum Club in London, the industrialist Alexander Siemens, 
Baron Bruno Schroder, Alfred Beit and Sir Edgar Speyer, the last three of whom were 
prominent bankers in the City of London.53 Hence, even before the peace congress at 
Lucerne in September 1905, a parallel movement for Anglo-German conciliation had 
already been initiated in Britain under different auspices.
Further Developments in the 
Anglo-German Friendship Movement
During the first few months following the Caxton Hall meeting, the Anglo-German 
Friendship Committee in Britain was gripped with inertia. As long as Britain and Germany 
maintained a semblance of normality in their relations, the committee's goal of preserving 
Anglo-German 'friendship' was met, thereby rendering the body in a sense superfluous. Its 
lack of vigour could also be explained by the inability of its varied interests to unite on the 
political issues facing Anglo-German relations. As a result, the Friendship Committee
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lacked effectiveness as a pressure group. Moreover, Anglo-German tensions did in fact 
abate after the settlement of the Moroccan crisis in April 1906, leading Fox to conclude, 
prematurely, that the committee’s aims had been achieved.
The period between 1906 and 1910 saw a decline in the number and influence of 
the 'pacifists’ in the executive committee who were committed to the broader international 
peace movement. Those years indeed were marked by the ascendancy of Thomas Barclay, 
Percy Bunting, Karl Breul and Lascelles, British ambassador to Germany from 1895 to 
1908. Their rise confirmed the trend of the Friendship Committee towards concentrating its 
efforts on Anglo-German relations alone, rather than striving to promote world peace.
In 1910 Thomas Rhodes, an agent of Albert Ballin, the German shipping magnate 
and owner of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line, formed the Albert Committee, spurred 
by his belief that the Friendship Committee was too loosely organized to respond 
effectively to press attacks against Germany. The objective of the Albert Committee, 
named in honour of the late Prince Consort, was to 'disseminate trustworthy information 
about Germany and German affairs'. Besides publishing pamphlets, it helped to promote 
the study and teaching of German in Britain, and in 1911 it organized a London conference 
of teachers and professors of German.54 Though not officially affiliated with the Friendship 
Committee, Rhodes's organization was nonetheless presided over by Avebury, who 
therefore represented a personal link between the two bodies. An Anglo-German Students 
Commitee was also formed in 1910 to encourage the exchange of students between Britain 
and Germany.55
Meanwhile, a parallel clerical movement emerged in the promotion of Anglo- 
German friendship. As early as the autumn of 1907, Joseph Allen Baker, M.P., and Baron 
Eduard de Neufville proposed bringing together the British and German clergies to further 
the interests of peace. Throughout 1908 and 1909 exchange visits were undertaken 
between British and German churches, leading to the establishment in April 1910 of the
Associated Councils of the British and German Churches for Fostering Friendly Relations 
between the Two Peoples. Presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the British 
Associated Council had over 130 vice-presidents and began the first issue of its quarterly 
magazine, the Peacemaker, in July 1911.56
In 1911 the Anglo-German Friendship Society was formed to incorporate the 
Anglo-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, and other bodies affiliated 
with the Anglo-German friendship movement. Avebury was again appointed president of 
this new body. Its honorary president was the Duke of Argyll and its chairman Lascelles.57 
At the inaugural meeting held on 1 May 1911, the same themes of traditional Anglo- 
German friendship, racial kinship and economic interdependence, were echoed. Avebury, 
for instance, declared in his speech that: 'In reality there are no foreign nations, and the 
more we realize how closely our interests are interwoven, how every country, and 
especially our own, benefits by the prosperity of others, the less becomes the chance of 
war.'58
In the meantime, though, relations between London and Berlin had again 
deteriorated. During 1908 Whitehall received a stream of reports alleging that the Germans 
were planning to invade Britain, thereby heightening fears of war. The atmosphere was 
further charged by the 'Daily Telegraph affair’, an episode arising from the newspaper's 
publication on 28 October 1908 of a supposed 'interview' with the Kaiser. Some of his 
indiscreet and embarrassing remarks that were printed caused a sensation and a public 
outcry in Germany. Wilhelm's comments about the German navy and his role in the Boer 
War aroused particular consternation in the Foreign Office, fuelling suspicion in Whitehall 
of Wilhelm's impetuosity, unreliability and lack of good faith.59
The latter part of 1908 and early 1909 also witnessed a naval panic, triggered by 
rumours that the Germans were secretly accelerating their battleship construction 
programme. News of the supposed German plans created a panic and led to the
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Admiralty's demand for the laying down of six dreadnoughts for fiscal year 1909-10. 
However, the Radical 'economists' in the Liberal cabinet, keen on implementing social 
reform and keeping naval spending under control, favoured the laying down of just four.
In February 1909, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith agreed to a formula whereby the keels 
of four dreadnoughts were to be laid down immediately in the fiscal year 1909-10, and 
another four by 1 April 1910 if rendered necessary by the German pace of construction. 
The crisis intensified in March when, upon the naval estimates for 1909-10 being made 
public, the Conservative opposition began clamouring for the laying down of eight 
dreadnoughts and launched the 'We want eight and we won't wait' campaign in the 
Commons. The upshot and irony of this scare was not lost on Winston Churchill, then the 
President of the Board of Trade, who later observed: 'The Admiralty had demanded six 
ships: the economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight.'60 In reality, of 
course, the British fear of the Germans' furtive fast-track building scheme was to prove to 
be unfounded. By April 1912, contrary to the gloomiest predictions made during the scare 
of 1908-09, the Royal Navy was still ahead of the Germans by fifteen dreadnoughts to 
nine.61 Nonetheless, this panic and the public campaign which it aroused in the press did 
not fail to stir up a fresh invasion scare. The German bogey once again reared its ugly 
head.62
Just when Anglo-German relations appeared to be improving in 1910, tensions 
mounted again in the summer of 1911 with the onset of the second Moroccan crisis, known 
otherwise as the Agadir crisis, sparked by the docking of the German gunboat Panther at 
Agadir. Though the crisis was eventually resolved peacefully, Britain came close to the 
brink of war with Germany in that summer.63 In response to the heated state of Anglo- 
German relations, a meeting of the Anglo-German Friendship Society was convened in 
London in November 1911, calling for 'the removal of all existing misunderstandings with 
Germany'.64
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In 1912 the Anglo-German Friendship Society was renamed the British-German 
Friendship Society.65 The impetus for peace was not lost, for in that year an Anglo- 
German Understanding Conference was organized in London from 30 October to 1 
November, presided over by Lascelles and his German counterpart, Graf von Leyden.
Based on an initiative by the National Peace Council, this conference brought together the 
British-German Friendship Society and the Associated Councils of Churches.66 The clerical 
and secular branches of the movement thus joined forces. Thanks to the relative calmness 
of Anglo-German relations between the end of 1912 and the summer of 1914, the 
movement did not see much activity during that period.
Among the British clergy, too, notwithstanding the commonly cited historic ties of 
religion between the two Protestant nations, the idea of shared Anglo-German racial origins 
was dominant. In one of his sermons, the Rev. R.F. Horton, for instance, referred to 
Britons and Germans as 'two kindred peoples1 as closely related as 'the kinship between 
Ephraim and Judah’. But not only were these two peoples sprung from the same racial 
stock, they were in his eyes the most progressive, free and noble of all races. As Horton 
argued: 'The Angles and the Saxons who came to this island at the close of the Roman 
occupation were Germans, and they brought with them their language, their social 
organization, their fundamental ideas of liberty, of truth, and of social purity, which have 
been the strength of this country ever since.’67
*  *  *  *
Race and economics thus appeared to form the backbone of the Anglo-German 
friendship movement. When tensions between London and Berlin rose to seemingly 
dangerous heights, the commercial interests in both countries readily awoke to the clarion 
call and sprang to action - in defence of Anglo-German understanding and the maintenance 
of peace. If the governments seemed to be heading towards war, then there was evidently
a divergence of interests between official policy and private business, which compels us to 
reconsider how important economic factors in effect were in the Anglo-German 
relationship. Selbome insisted that Germany's navy constituted the main stumbling block 
to improved relations and downplayed her commercial ascendancy. As he argued: 'I do not 
think that the existence of a German Colonial Empire or the marvellous expansion and 
prosperity of German commerce are in any way responsible for the Englishman's suspicion 
of Germany. He regards the former as quite natural and the latter with admiration although 
he feels the competition.'68
But on the other hand, William Ward placed primary importance on the rise of 
German economic power. As he claimed: 'the dislike of Germany in Gt Britain is, to a 
great degree, owing to the feeling of commercial & industrialjealousv'. Ward even argued 
that the expressions of goodwill by the German business classes should not be 'overrated in 
their importance'. But in stating this claim, he was only suggesting that the British and 
German press may not have shared the spirit of conciliation. Indeed, Ward did not at all 
question the authenticity of the German businessmen's desire for improved Anglo-German 
relations.69
It is important to bear in mind that The Times was not exactly pro-German. In 
fact, as a mouthpiece for the Conservative Party, the paper was often Germanophobic. Yet 
its coverage of the Merchants' Guild meeting of 17 December 1905 in Berlin seemed 
almost to reflect the spirit of conciliation embodied by that occasion. Drawing attention to 
the disparities between official and non-official aims. The Times stressed that the German 
government's agenda did not always coincide with that of the German business classes. 'It 
may be safely affirmed', the paper's correspondent observed, '... that few or none of those 
who took part in the meeting on Sunday would have endorsed the particular way in which 
the Morocco policy of Germany was inaugurated last spring, or, perhaps, even the way in 
which it has since been conducted.' However, the paper also drew attention to the relative
weakness of these commercial interests in shaping official policy. As it noted, 'the 
financial, commercial, and intellectual classes in Germany are seldom able to exercise any 
appreciable, or at least any direct, influence upon the daily phases of German policy'.70
The demonstrations of goodwill at Caxton Hall and elsewhere in Germany suggest 
that some non-governmental interests in Britain and Germany may have had a stronger 
tendency to see eye to eye than their respective governments. It is obvious, then, that there 
existed a certain commonality of interests between the British and German business and 
financial elites. These commercial links between the two countries will be the subject of 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
ANGLO-GERMAN ECONOMIC RIVALRY: 
AN OPTICAL ILLUSION?
'Neither Crowe nor we who succeeded him ever gave to 
the Germans the least ground for thinking our antagonism 
due to commercial jealousy. It would have suited us well 
that Germany should develop peacefully and buy more,
Lord Vansittart1
As we have seen, the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was dominated by 
business and financial interests. Lord Avebury himself was a prominent City banker and 
president of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, reflecting the strength of economic 
forces in the campaign for Anglo-German peace. Judging by the speeches made at Caxton 
Hall, a widespread assumption among many of the British business classes was that 
Britain’s prosperity was greatly dependent on Germany's, and that an Anglo-German war 
would be detrimental to Britain’s commercial well-being. The aim in this chapter is to 
examine in greater depth the nature of the Anglo-German economic relationship and probe 
links between British and German business interests.
Anglo-German Trade Relations, c.1890-1914
That the thirty years before 1914 marked a period of German industrial and 
commercial ascendancy is a commonplace. But this period also saw a gradual but distinct 
change in the terms of the Anglo-German economic relationship, a transformation 
characterized by the relative decline of Britain's world economic position in manufacturing
and trade, and Germany's concurrent rise. For though the British economy was growing in 
absolute terms during this period, Germany's rate of growth was higher. During the 1906- 
10 period, Britain's share of the world's manufacturing capacity stood at 14.7 per cent, 
eclipsed by Germany's 15.9 per cent. The change in Germany's position between 1880 and 
1914 is further reflected in her growing share of world trade. As Table 3.1 below 
indicates, even though Britain still held the largest percentage of the world's trade in 1913, 
her share had fallen from 23 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 1900 and 17 per cent in 
1913, with Germany a close second in 1913 with a 13 per cent share.
Table 3.1 
Percentages of World Trade
1880 1900 1913
Britain 23 20 17
Germany 10 13 13
France 11 9 8
U.S.A. 10 11 l l 2
A glance at individual manufacturing sectors would show even more glaringly 
Germany's phenomenal rise during that period, because by 1914 she had clearly outstripped 
Britain in certain key areas of industry. In pig iron, for instance, Britain's output was 8 
million tons in 1890 compared to Germany's 4.1 million; by 1914, however, Germany was 
producing 14.7 million tons compared to Britain's 11 million. In steel production, 
Germany's rise was even more spectacular, from 2.3 million tons in 1890 to 14 million in 
1914, an approximate sixfold increase. During the same period, Britain's production rose 
only from 3.6 million tons to 6.5 million, about twofold. The output of coal, often an
indicator of heavy-industrial capacity, also did not augur well for Britain. Though she still 
led Germany in coal production in 1913 - only narrowly, with 292,000 tons compared to 
Germany's 279,000 - Britain's relative decline in this field was quite pronounced.3 Thus 
again, Britain's output was growing but Germany's was rising even faster.
As these figures suggest, Germany's economy during these thirty years underwent a 
remarkable and relatively rapid restructuring involving a shift from agriculture to heavy 
industry - as was reflected in her exports. In the early 1890s beet sugar was Germany's 
leading export in value terms; in 1913, by contrast, her main exports consisted of 
chemicals, machinery, ironware, coal and textiles. In that year her exports of chemicals 
amounted to £52 million, whereas those of beet sugar came to a mere £13.2 million.4
These shifts in the German economy no doubt had an impact on the Anglo-German 
trading relationship. As the trade figures demonstrate, Britain came to rely increasingly on 
German manufactures so that by the start of 1914, Germany had become the principal 
source of Britain's imports of manufactured products. In 1908, for example, the value of 
'wholly or mainly manufactured' goods from Germany amounted to about £36.6 million. 
Imports of these goods from France, the second largest source, came to almost £25 
million.5 In 1913 Germany, still the biggest supplier, sold approximately £56.1 million of 
these products to Britain, an increase of almost £20 million in five years. France, still 
ranked second, exported a mere £29.5 million in that year.6 Evidently, whereas the level of 
imports of 'wholly or mainly1 manufactured products from France remained relatively stable 
during the 1908-13 period, German imports soared at a phenomenal rate, reflecting Britain's 
growing dependence on Germany's industrial output.
Over the same period, even though Britain's exports of manufactured goods to 
Germany rose, the value of those exports was much lower than that of her imports from 
Germany. For example, in 1913 Britain exported approximately £27 million worth of 
wholly or mainly manufactured products to Germany, less than half the value of such
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imports from Germany (£56.1 million).7
Incidentally, Germany was also an important source of 'food, drink and tobacco' for 
Britain, which was more dependent on Germany than Germany was on her for these 
products. In 1913 Britain took in close to £16.5 million worth of these goods, while 
exporting only slightly over £4 million worth to Germany8- a considerable deficit. Even if 
beet sugar had decreased sharply in importance as a German item of export, Germany still 
remained Britain's principal source of sugar up to 1914. During the 1909-11 period, for 
instance, Germany provided up to 40 per cent of Britain's imports of sugar.9
During the prewar period, Britain's share as a supplier of raw materials and 
foodstuffs to Germany also fell consistently, from 15 per cent in 1890 to 8.1 per cent in 
1913, with the United States and Russia rising to become Germany's major sources in this 
area. In certain products, however, such as certain types of woollen yams, Britain 
remained Germany's important and almost exclusive supplier up to 1914. But at the same 
time, Germany's imports of raw materials and foodstuffs from Britain's overseas 
possessions also increased. In 1913 the British Empire provided 12 per cent of such 
imports, with India alone, Germany's leading source of jute and rape seed, accounting for 5 
per cent.10
Raw wool represented a product for which Germany was greatly dependent on the 
British dominions. The United Kingdom may have supplied only a relatively small portion 
of Germany's wool imports, but the Second Reich's single largest source of wool by 1914 
was Australia. New Zealand and South Africa too were important suppliers of wool for 
Germany. In 1910, for instance, all three countries accounted for about half of Germany's 
intake of raw wool, so that the whole British Empire provided her with up to 55 per cent of 
such imports in that year.11 One indeed should not overlook the size and importance of 
Britain's dominions as a trading bloc for Germany. With the onset of any Anglo-German 
hostilities, as was to be borne out in 1914, Germany would suffer a major interruption of
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her trade not only with Britain but with her entire imperial domain as well.12
In the prewar period, the significance of Britain as an export market for Germany, 
especially German manufactures, was undeniable. Alternatively put, Germany was without 
doubt a mainstay for Britain's imports. Even as early as the 1890s, Britain ran annual trade 
deficits with Germany (not counting the re-exports of German imports or the trade in 
'invisibles') but by 1913 the trade gap had widened significantly. In that year Britain's 
imports from Germany (£80.4 million) amounted to almost twice the value of her exports 
to Germany (£40.6 million). In 1913 also, German imports into Britain ranked second in 
value only to imports from the United States (£141 million). As an export market for 
Britain, Germany (at £40.6 million) was only the second largest behind India (£70.2 
million) but well ahead of Australia (£34 million) and the United States (£29.2 million).13 
In view of Germany's importance as both a source of imports for Britain and a market for 
British exports, it would be easy to understand the motivation behind Avebury's efforts to 
bring about Anglo-German conciliation. Indeed, an Anglo-German war would have been 
disastrous for Anglo-German trade, as was to be demonstrated in 1914-18.
Along with these shifting patterns, an awareness of the tilt in the Anglo-German 
economic balance of power was growing as well in Britain throughout the 1890s, when 
Germany's economic power became a major issue of public debate. In 1896 there appeared 
'Made in Germany*, a book by Ernest Edwin Williams prophesying the eclipse of British 
trade and industry at Germany's hands. 'The industrial glory of England is departing, and 
England does not know it,' Williams wrote.14 Aiming to explain the causes of German 
success, Williams cited such factors as protective tariffs, government subsidies, cheaper 
transportation, superior technical education, and the Germans' adaptability. As a remedy, 
he proposed the federation of the British Empire.15 It should be remembered that the 
German Empire enacted its first tariff increases in 1879, thereby shielding German 
industries from foreign competition behind a protective barrier which, it was widely
believed in Britain, gave Germany an unfair advantage. The call for retaliatory tariffs was 
thus made, shaking the foundations of Cobdenism and free trade and inaugurating a 
national debate in Britain which, in the end, would split the Conservative Party and lead to 
the fall of Arthur Balfour's government in December 1905. The upshot of this national 
debate was the emergence of the Tariff Reform movement spearheaded by Joseph 
Chamberlain, who launched his campaign for protective tariffs in 1903.
It is clear, then, that during the decade preceding the Liberals' sweeping electoral 
victory of January 1906 centred around the slogan of 'cheap bread', the German threat to 
British industrial supremacy was a burning issue in Britain. Not all commentators, 
however, regarded Germany's rise in as pessimistic a light as Williams did. There were 
some indeed, particularly free traders, who were not persuaded by Williams's prophecy of 
doom and tended to see his prognosis as overly alarmist. In reply to Williams, for 
instance, George Medley published The German Bogey, asserting the continuing vitality of 
Britain's trade. In his view, Williams's alarm was groundless.16 Another voice of optimism 
was provided by Harold Cox in his Are We Ruined by the Germans?, in which he accused 
Williams of exaggerating Germany's economic strength. While admitting that Germany 
was 'hitting us hard' in some areas, Cox maintained that she was not on the whole causing 
Britain any injury.17 Evoking interdependence, he pointed out that Germany was one of 
Britain's best customers.
Yet a quick glance at the popular periodicals of the day would undeniably suggest 
that cracks were showing in the veneer of British commercial and industrial self- 
confidence. German superiority and methods became much talked about, as did British 
vulnerability. In 1899 a piece in the Nineteenth Century declared that with the exception 
of 1877, 1898 marked 'the only year in the long history of our commerce of which it can 
be said that our visible exports plus the latest estimated "invisible exports" have failed to 
pay for our imports'.18
One commonly cited reason for this intense and seemingly intractable German 
challenge to Britain's industrial preeminence was the Germans' superiority in technical 
education, along with their greater investment in new plant and technology. But the most 
vocal complaints coming from the branches of British industry most affected by German 
competition were focused less on Germany's efficiency than on her protective tariffs and 
her practice of 'dumping' in the British market - that is, of undercutting the British 
manufacturers by selling in Britain below the cost price. A typical plea was made by a 
representative from the British iron and steel industry who urged: 'Nothing less than the 
removal of German tariffs would enable us to compete against that country either in 
England, Germany, or any other part of the world. In our opinion it is because Germany 
by her tariff is able to secure her home market that she is able to attack us elsewhere.'19
It was against this backdrop that Joseph Chamberlain formed the Tariff Reform 
League in July 1903, receiving support particularly from leaders in the iron and steel, 
engineering and electrical industries - the sectors most harmed by German competition.
Later in the year, Chamberlain established the Tariff Commission, a body of experts and 
business representatives formed to gather evidence on tariff reform and examine the state of 
the various sectors of British industry. Between 1904 and 1909 the commission issued a 
series of reports, along with witness testimonies and exhibits.20
Anglo-German Linkage: Explosives
At the turn of the century, Britain and Germany thus appeared to be heading for a 
trade war which was, however, averted as tariff reform faced a sound defeat in the 
elections of January 1906. There can be little doubt about the existence of Anglo-German 
industrial and commercial competition in the prewar period. Yet any suggestion of an 
economic 'antagonism' between the two countries is tempered by instances of cooperation 
and linkage between British and German business interests, some of which were locked
together in arrangements yielding mutual benefit as well as mutual dependence. Trusts and 
cartels represented instances of such arrangements. In fact, of the forty international cartels 
existing before the First World War, some twenty-two were Anglo-German.21
In the pre-1914 era, despite Lord Avebury's call for a united states of Europe, 
European economic integration was only in its embryonic stages, certainly nowhere 
approaching the level of consolidation seen in the European Union during the 1990s, or 
even near the post-World War II internationalization of economic ties as symbolized by the 
growth of multinational corporations.22 But to deny the existence of integration altogether 
in pre-1914 Europe would be erroneous. As Carl Strikwerda argues, 'a  high degree of 
economic integration already existed in Western Europe on the eve of the war, a level not 
achieved again until at least the 1960s'.23 Examples of integration could be found in the 
strategic sectors such as explosives and armaments, which underwent a high degree of 
trustification and cartelization in the thirty years or so before 1914. In these trusts and 
cartels one could in fact discern a network of interconnecting British and German interests. 
It is this complex web of Anglo-German ties in explosives and arms manufacturing, sectors 
crucial to what is today called the 'military-industrial complex', which will be examined 
below.
At the time the Anglo-German friendship movement was being launched at Caxton 
Hall in late 1905, there already existed well-developed ties between British and German 
interests in the explosives industry. The businessmen in this sector, being far-sighted and 
pragmatic, were well ahead in this game of conciliation and had appreciated the value of 
compromise as early as the 1880s - approximately the time of Germany's emergence as a 
commercial power. In April 1906, British and German representatives from the explosives 
industry met in Cologne to discuss collective action and policy with regard to a common 
threat, the American producers. Hence, amidst the hoopla and rhetoric of Caxton Hall, a 
fine example of Anglo-German collaboration was already in motion - albeit in corporate
boardrooms, far from the public view.
Just as the Anglo-German friendship movement was getting under way, some 
British business interests were already securely locked in, and still reinforcing, links with 
the future 'enemy' in connection with a substance that tended to render war - an Anglo- 
German war no less - easier, more destructive, and more efficient than ever. By the dawn 
of the twentieth century, dynamite and smokeless propellant powder had undoubtedly 
become the most crucial ingredients in modem instruments of war, ranging from rifles, 
machine-guns and cannon to artillery and battleship guns. By August 1914, of course, 
what may have been viewed as an instance of Anglo-German cooperation in explosives had 
turned into an embarrassing case of British firms' 'sleeping with the enemy'.
Explosives in Britain: Alfred Nobel
The British blasting-explosives industry owed its birth to Alfred Nobel. His father 
Immanuel had pioneered the large-scale production of explosives in Sweden in the 1860s 
using nitroglycerine as the blasting explosive. Nitroglycerine, first produced in 1846, 
represented a revolutionary advancement in explosives as it replaced gunpowder which had 
been in use for the previous five centuries. Thus the Nobels' family business took off in 
earnest.24 But owing to the volatility of nitroglycerine, Alfred Nobel was compelled to 
search for a less hazardous substitute. His quest led him to the invention o jicieselguhr. 
better known as dynamite, which he began to produce commercially in 1866. Later in the 
mid-1870s, Nobel was to invent an even more advanced explosive called 'blasting gelatine' 
which, resembling a rubbery gel, was easily extruded, cut and wrapped, and was hailed as 
the 'perfect explosive'.25
In the 1860s Alfred Nobel sought to establish a foothold in Britain, appreciating the 
full potential of Britain's imperial market and the economy of manufacturing dynamite 
domestically. His search for partners led him to John Downie, an engineer who introduced
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Nobel to Glasgow, which had a concentration of mining, shipbuilding, and heavy-chemical 
interests. By a formal agreement concluded between Nobel and Downie in April 1871, a 
limited liability company bearing the name of British Dynamite Company was formed, 
having its factory in Ardeer, a section of Glasgow. In 1877, by another set of agreements, 
this firm was superseded by a new company, Nobel’s Explosives Company Ltd.26
Nobel in Germany
Nobel's Explosives of Glasgow was not Nobel's sole enterprise abroad. Even at the 
time of its inception, the Glasgow company already had a counterpart in Germany. Before 
setting up his venture in Britain, Nobel had left Sweden for Germany in 1865. Settling in 
Hamburg, Nobel went into partnership with Wilhelm and Theodor Winkler, Swedish 
merchants, and C.E. Bandmann, a German lawyer. On 20 June 1865 the partners officially 
formed Alfred Nobel & Co. As we will see later, this German company was to prove to 
be a vital link in the Anglo-German explosives cartel. On 8 November 1865 the firm was 
granted permission to construct a nitroglycerine factory in Krummel, a few miles south of 
Hamburg on the Elbe. The Krummel works, wrecked by nitroglycerine-induced explosions 
in 1866 and 1870, were consequently rebuilt, and the firm reorganized as a limited liability 
company. First renamed the Deutsch-Osterreichisch-Ungarische-Dynamit 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG), it then became known as Dynamit AG in 1876, still headquartered 
in Hamburg.27
By the time Dynamit AG was formed, it already had a serious German competitor 
in the shape of Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, established in Opladen, near Cologne, in 1873. 
Then, in 1882 there appeared two new firms: Deutsche Sprengstoff AG, Hamburg, and 
Dresdner Dynamitfabrik, Dresden. In the mid-1880s, the German explosives industry 
expanded further with the emergence in the Cologne district of A-G Siegener 
Dynamitfabrik of Siegen and Rheinisch-Westphalische Sprengstoff AG of Troisdorf, both
known as the Rhein-Siegen Group.28 Taken together, these German companies constituted 
the most powerful constellation of explosives firms in Europe. Though Nobel's company, 
Dynamit AG, was still the oldest and largest of them all, Nobel would have been wise to 
come to terms with these rivals rather than engage in futile competition with them.
Trustification: The Anglo-German Connection
Pressure for amalgamation was building up from within Nobel's own 'empire', 
brought on by internecine struggle. It must be noted that although Nobel was a shareholder 
in both Nobel's Explosives and Dynamit AG and sat on both boards as well, he was not in 
a position to direct or run either company. As W.J. Reader reminds us: 'He could warn, 
encourage, advise, and threaten, ... but that was the limit of his power.'29 The limits to his 
ability to control the conduct of his firms were made glaringly obvious by the fierce 
competition in which the Glasgow and Hamburg companies engaged themselves during the 
1870s, when Nobel himself confessed to being 'an idle spectator' to the proceedings.
Though both firms belonged to the 'Nobel group', the name 'Nobel' was about the most 
they had in common. Concerned mainly with their own profits, both behaved as 
independent entities without much regard for the other's interests, leading Nobel to 
characterize their policies as 'pugilistic' and their relationship as 'suicidal'.30
But as much as the acute Glasgow-Hamburg rivalry propelled Nobel towards 
amalgamating the two companies, another factor which lent further impetus to the move 
was the imminent expiration of the patent protection which the Glasgow company enjoyed 
in Britain. Once Nobel's Explosives lost that protection, the floodgates would have been 
opened and the British market threatened by foreign, not least German competition, 
including competition from Dynamit AG. In 1879 Nobel was duly warned that: 'Within a 
few years the English dynamite patents will lapse, and unless you come to some kind of 
arrangement with Hamburg, you will find their competition very serious indeed.'31
With the resignation of the Glasgow chairman, Alexander Cuthbert, in 1883, the 
last major obstacle to amalgamation was finally removed. By this time also, as we have 
noted above, two other non-Nobel firms had emerged in Germany in addition to Rheinische 
Dynamitfabrik. Competition in Germany was thus growing relentlessly. Not only did 
Nobel face the challenge of attenuating the Glasgow-Hamburg rivalry within his own 
empire, he also had to deal with the threat from the other companies in the German market.
By 1884 conditions were proving favourable not only for bringing the two Nobel 
companies closer together but also for entering into a trust with the non-Nobel German 
manufacturers, who were themselves caught in the throes of competition. In September 
1884 the German companies, seven in total, signed a price-fixing convention, essentially an 
agreement between six dynamite firms on the one part and one on the other. The six were 
Dynamit AG, Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Opladen, Deutsche Sprengstoff, Hamburg, Kolner 
Dynamitfabrik, Kalk, Dynamitfabrik, Vingst, and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik, Dresden. On 
the other part stood Siegener Dynamitfabrik, Cologne.32
On the heels of this convention came a preliminary agreement concluded in 
October 1884 for an international convention. The parties to this preliminary agreement 
included Nobel's Glasgow and Hamburg companies, and three of the independent German 
companies: Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Kolner Dynamitfabrik and Deutsche Sprengstoff.
This led to the First International Convention of 1885, whereby the signatories agreed on 
prices and terms of sale in all markets, and consented to the creation of a common fund. 
They also agreed not to supply explosives to competing manufacturers.33
More importantly, though, in November 1885 the German Union was formed, 
comprising Nobel's Dynamit AG, Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Deutsche Sprengstoff, and 
Dresdner Dynamitfabrik. This union, as Reader explains, constituted more than just a 
price-fixing conglomeration and approached what the Germans would call a 'community of 
interests' UnteressengemeinschaftV Under this agreement, a Union Board was established
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as a permanent body of administration, having directors delegated to it from the board of 
each member firm. Below this board was a Board of Managers. These four companies 
were in effect parties to a pooling agreement, with a machinery for determining the pooling 
of profits and losses. Dynamit AG, being the largest of the four, was allocated the biggest 
proportion of the union's profits.34
In May 1886 the German convention of 1884 was superseded by the Second 
German Convention, being a more comprehensive agreement drawing in a larger number of 
companies. In that year also a Second International Convention was concluded, aimed at 
regulating prices everywhere except in Germany, Luxembourg and Russian Poland, as well
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as setting up^common fund financed by a tax on explosives according to the method laid 
down in the First International Convention.
This spurt of price-fixing and pooling activity set the stage for Nobel's Explosives 
and the German Union to resolve outstanding matters between themselves and between 
them and other companies, as well as to enter upon a trust agreement. A series of trust 
agreements were thus concluded in October 1886, one of which, Trust Agreement No. 2, 
established a new company in London called The Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company Ltd., 
which was to have an authorized capital of £2 million, about half of it to be issued in £10 
shares. These stocks were to be exchanged for shares in Nobel's Explosives and each of 
the four firms of the German Union. Consequently, Nobel's Explosives, Dynamit AG, 
Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, Deutsche Sprengstoff and Dresdner Dynamitfabrik became 
subsidiaries of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company.
This trust company, formed for the purpose of consolidating the dynamite business, 
was indeed a holding company, having at its disposal all of its subsidiary companies' assets. 
The management and policies of these subsidiaries were placed entirely in the hands of the 
board of the trust company whose chairman was always to be British, though German 
interests were to be represented on the board. This new grouping was indeed more
consolidated than a price-fixing or profit-pooling arrangement. Clear, non-contradictory, 
long-term policies among the subsidiary companies could thenceforth be set and enforced, 
all their resources channelled to serve the interests of the whole, and all decision-making 
concentrated in the centre. No longer was there going to be futile internecine rivalry. In 
the immediately ensuing years, the trust company proceeded to conclude agreements with 
companies and syndicates in Germany, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, all with the aim of controlling the trade in high explosives, detonators and 
fuses.35
The Cartelization of Dynamite and Smokeless Powder
Until now, we have been concerned mostly with the dynamite side of the 
explosives industry. Broadly speaking, 'explosives' consisted of two categories: dynamite 
and propellant powder. The former, under which blasting gelatine fell, was a blasting agent 
and used primarily for civil purposes; propellant powder, on the other hand, was a military 
explosive used in various kinds of ordnance, rifles, machine-guns and artillery shells.
In 1887 Alfred Nobel produced his last major invention: ballistite. A composite of 
nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose, ballistite was a propellant powder more powerful than any 
in existence then. More importantly, it was smokeless, and its advent prompted the 
dynamite industry to move into the military trade. Until 1887, propellant powder was 
easily made from old-fashioned recipes for gunpowder and, consequently, it held out little 
attraction to the dynamite manufacturers. Smokeless powder, however, opened up new 
possibilities for the coffers of the dynamite companies. Additionally, it posed a threat to 
them because the powder manufacturers now emerged as a force to be reckoned with. 
Consequently, 'The immediate reaction of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust, ... was to come to 
terms with the makers of propellant powders in Germany in a profit-sharing agreement so 
tightly and elaborately drawn as to be almost a merger.'36 Thus ensued another major
66
round of agreements in the late 1880s.
The invention of smokeless powder represented a major advancement for 
nineteenth-century weaponry. Nobel had found that blasting gelatine, while able to propel 
a projectile, would damage or destroy the gun as well. Hence, the propellant generally 
used in weapons was black powder. Though it burned slowly - an essential requirement for 
arms - it was very smoky, damaged the guns, and would not work after direct contact with 
water. By the 1880s, there was another propellant in the market known as 'cocoa powder1, 
pioneered by J.N. Heidemann and Max von Duttenhofer. The former was also chairman of 
Rheinische Dynamitfabrik, one of the members of the German Union, as we may recall. In
1889 Heidemann became general manager of the powder company, Vereinigte Rheinisch- 
Westphalische Pulverfabriken. Through Heidemann alone, the Nobel-Dynamite Trust 
Company already had a foot in the door of the German propellant makers.
It should be noted that just when the Explosives Group was consolidating itself into 
a trust, a parallel movement towards amalgamation was taking place in the propellant- 
manufacturing group, otherwise known as the Powder Group. In 1884 Vereinigte 
Rheinisch-Westphalische Pulverfabriken concluded a profit-pooling agreement with 
Pulverfabrik Rottweil-Hamburg. In 1889 these two firms reinforced their position further 
by bringing Cramer & Buchholz Pulverfabriken and Wolff & Co. into the agreement. In
1890 Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphalische Pulverfabriken and Pulverfabrik Rottweil- 
Hamburg merged to form Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken of Cologne.
Meanwhile, the Powder Group also revealed an Anglo-German link, for it had a 
British subsidiary in the form of the Chilworth Gunpowder Company Ltd. As Chilworth 
was bought out by Vereinigte Rheinisch-Westphalische Pulverfabriken in 1885, Heidemann 
and von Duttenhofer consequently sat on Chilworth’s board from that year onwards. 
Although Chilworth still retained a British chairman after 1885, control of the company 
was effectively wrested by the Germans. From the standpoint of this analysis, the irony
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cannot be greater because, 'There was thus a German outpost in the heart of England, 
closely concerned with the supply of military explosives to the British Government.'37 The 
existence of this network of interlocking agreements and takeovers between German and 
British firms in the explosives industry meant that when war broke out in 1914, Britain and 
Germany were to some extent 'allied' in the manufacture of explosives.
What brought the Explosives and Powder Groups together was the fact that 
smokeless propellant powder and gelatinous blasting explosives were very closely related. 
There was therefore every reason for the dynamite makers to go into the propellant 
business and, similarly, for the propellant firms to involve themselves with dynamite. In 
1889 both groups entered into the General Pooling Agreement, which stated:
Guided by the fact that the business of the two Groups ... are veiy closely 
connected in Germany, and likewise in all the markets of the world, and 
that, therefore, joint action would be attended with advantageous results for 
both parties, whilst on the other hand an eventual conflict could only result 
in severe losses on both sides, the four Dynamite Companies grouped as 
the German Union, on the one part, and the four ... Powder Manufacturers, 
on the other part, came to the conclusion that it would be well that they 
should be mutually interested in the results of their respective businesses
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Taking effect on 1 July 1889, this convention was intended to last until 31 December 1925. 
Basically this was an agreement to pool and divide profits, of which the Explosives Group 
would receive 60 per cent and the Powder Group 40 per cent. The result was the 
emergence of a very powerful international combination in the explosives industry, 
consisting of Europe's major manufacturers of both blasting explosives and propellants.
By two supplemental agreements, the non-German companies of the Explosives 
Group - namely, Nobel's Explosives, Alliance Explosives, South Wales Explosives, and 
three South American companies - were brought into the combination. As a result, the 
Glasgow company's profits came under the reach of the pool.
The pre-1914 Anglo-German explosives industry thus assumed its shape in 1889. 
(See Table 3.2 below.) The pooling agreement of that year was strengthened in 1890 by 
the Muller Agreement, which brought the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company into a profit- 
pooling arrangement and joint-working understanding with five other German explosives 
companies known collectively as the Muller Group, named after the general manager of the 
largest of these five companies, the Rheinish-Westphalische Sprengstoff AG. The other 
four companies comprising this group were Siegener-Dynamitfabrik, Sprengstoff AG 
Carbonit, Sprengstoff Gesellschaft Kosmos and Erzgebirgische Dynamitfabrik AG Geyer. 
The parties to this agreement became known as the General Syndicate.39
Table 3.2
The Explosives Industry in Britain and Germany, 188940 
The General Pooling Agreement. 1889
The Explosives Group The Powder Group
Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company Vereinigte Rheinisch-
and its subsidiaries: Westphalische Pulverfabriken*
a) German Union Pulverfabrik Rottweil-Hamburg*
Dynamit AG Cramer & Buchholz
Rheinische Dynamitfabrik Wolff & Co.
Deutsche Sprengstoff 
Dresdner Dynamitfabrik
b) Non-German companies 
Nobel's Explosives Co.
Alliance Explosives Co.
S. Wales Explosives Co.
3 South American Cos.
* These two companies were merged in 1890 to form Vereignite Koln-Rottweiler 
Pulverfabriken of Cologne.
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*  *  *  *
We now return to 1906. The date is 27 April, and the setting is Cologne. The
£
Anglo-German explosives and powder cartel had been in operation for over fifteen years, 
and had proven to be a workable and effective combination. Alfred Nobel also was no 
longer an active participant in the cartel's business, having died of a cerebral haemorrhage 
in 1896. On this day, three British and two German delegates met. Presiding over the 
proceedings was Sir Ralph Anstruther, chairman of the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company 
since 1904. He was joined from Britain by Thomas Johnston, who had replaced Alexander 
Cuthbert as general manager of Nobel's Explosives in 1884, and Henry de Mosenthal, 
'technical secretary' of the trust company since the mid-1880s. Their German counterparts 
were Dr. Gustav Aufschlager of the German Union, and Emil Muller, a director of 
Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken. This, therefore, represented an Anglo-German 
gathering of the main explosives and powder forces allied under the General Pooling 
Agreement of 1889.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the renewal of a market-sharing 
agreement signed between the German powder firms and the American explosives makers, 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., in 1897. Subsequent to the Cologne gathering, 
negotiations between the German Powder Group and du Pont continued apace. Eventually, 
although du Pont was compelled in 1913 to nullify the 1897 agreement under pressure from 
the U.S. government for infringement of U.S. anti-trust laws, a cross-licensing agreement 
was concluded in London in June 1914 between the Anglo-German powder firms and du 
Pont. Therefore in 1914, on the eve of war, the Anglo-German cartel still held firm and 
was forging new links with its American competition. The war indeed took all the parties 
by surprise.41
A lesson to be drawn from these international ties in the explosives industry is that
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fierce as the competition for markets was, it did not preclude the major British and German 
manufacturers from settling accounts and coming to a modus vivendi among themselves.
As Reader observes:
The unspoken assumption seems to have been that the market, ... though 
large, was limited, and that there was little or nothing which either group 
could do to increase total demand. ... Therefore, they seem to have said to 
themselves, we will share out the business that is available, taking care to 
leave the weaker firms comfortable enough not to spoil things for 
everybody by desperate underselling.42
Remarking on the unique character of this international dynamite and powder cartel, Clive 
Trebilcock observes that between 1900 and 1914 it acquired 'a  completeness that no other 
international armament alliance could rival'. As he adds: 'The interchange of funds and 
ideas between the Nobel concerns and the German Powder Group was a thing apart.'43 
Thus explosives provide a fine instance of how the pursuit of profits was channelled 
constructively into Anglo-German accommodation and collaboration.
Anglo-German Linkage: Armaments
The story of explosives would not be complete without a parallel account of 
armaments, for rifles, guns and artillery were undeniably dependent for their function on 
propellant powder. At around the turn of the century, links were also being forged between 
explosives makers and arms manufacturers in Britain and Germany. Through this complex 
web, we can discern further Anglo-German linkage.
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Vickers and Armstrongs: The Explosives-Armaments Connection
At around 1900 the manufacture of British armaments was dominated by two 
names, Vickers and Armstrong. Having origins as a steel company, Vickers, Sons & Co., 
was formed as a limited company in 1867. One of the leading metallurgical firms in 
Britain, Vickers made a decision in 1888 to lay down plant for the construction of guns and 
armour plate. It was then that this steel company went into the arms-manufacturing 
business.44
Armstrongs' origins can be traced to the Newcastle Cranage Company, established 
by William George Armstrong in the 1840s which, during the Crimean War, branched out 
from engineering and hydraulics into the manufacture of armaments, pioneering the rifled 
gun for use on warships. Hailed as the 'first truly modem weapon',45 Armstrong's 
invention, a three-pound breech-loader, was first delivered to the Royal Navy in July 1855. 
In 1864 the firm became known as Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co. and thereafter entered the 
warship-building industry. Having bought the Low Walker Yard, a shipbuilding yard on 
the Tyne owned by Charles Mitchell & Co., the firm was superseded in 1883 by a new 
public company, Sir W.G. Armstrong, Mitchell & Company, Ltd.46
The latter half of the nineteenth century truly represented an unprecedented period 
of breathtaking technological change, not least in the development of weapomy. As M.S. 
Anderson observes: 'The old smooth-bore musket of the Napoleonic period, little changed 
in essentials for generations and hardly superior as a weapon to the long-bow of the later 
Middle Ages, was now being changed out of all recognition.'47 In the fifty-odd years 
leading up to 1900, more numerous and far-reaching technical innovations were made than 
in the previous five hundred years. The story of dynamite and ballistite alone would serve 
as an illustration, as would Armstrong's contribution to the enhancement of ship gunnery.
This awe-inspiring progress was reflected also in the development of automatic 
weapons, and it is necessary to consider the pioneers in this area before proceeding to
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examine the Anglo-German link in the Vickers-Armstrongs relationship. The pacesetter in 
automatic weapons was Richard Jordan Gatling, an American who invented the machine- 
gun in 1862 consisting of barrels rotating around a shaft and attaining a rate of fire of up to 
350 shots per minute. Another important figure in pioneering automatic weapons was 
Hiram Maxim, also an American, who in 1881 made his first drawings of what was to 
become known as the 'Maxim gun’. Maxim's quick-fire gun, unlike Gatling's which was 
based on the concept of a 'revolver'- that is, a number of barrels revolving around a central 
shaft - relied on the principle of using the gun's own recoil to force each subsequent 
cartridge into the barrel and to detonate it as well. In this way the firing, which depended 
on the explosive force of the cartridge, was self-perpetuating, rendering Maxim's gun 'a  
truly automatic weapon'.48 Hence, while naval guns were becoming bigger, firing explosive 
shells, and attaining longer ranges, the infantryman's rifle was being complemented by a 
new weapon whose destructive power lay in its ability to fire rapid and continual bursts of 
shots.
Armstrongs obtained the right to be sole licensees of the Gatling Gun Company in 
Britain as early as 1870. Maxim therefore approached the Vickers family for backing. In 
1884 when the Maxim Gun Company Ltd. was formed, Albert Vickers became its 
chairman while two other Vickers brothers, Edward and Tom, were allotted a substantial 
number, though not a majority, of shares in the company. It must be noted also that the 
Vickers brothers were merely investors in Maxim's Gun Company as private individuals; 
Vickers, Sons & Co. was not officially tied with it. Indeed, Vickers was not yet in the 
arms-manufacturing business in 1884. In 1888 Maxim was amalgamated with another 
machine-gun company, Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Company Ltd.; the new company 
became known as Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Company Ltd. In 1888 also, 
Maxim granted a licence to the giant German arms-manufacturing firm, Friedrich Krupp
A point of note is that the merger of Maxim and Nordenfelt was made possible by 
financiers of German background, Ernest Cassel and Nathan (1st Baron) Rothschild, both 
of whom were given shares in the Maxim Gun Company and consequently held an interest 
in Maxim Nordenfelt. In the next chapter, Cassel and Rothschild will be reexamined for 
their roles in promoting Anglo-German cooperation and linkage - Cassel for his part in 
founding the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, and Rothschild for his ties with 
Cecil Rhodes as well as his role in financing South African diamond- and gold-mining 
enterprises.
Chilworth and Sigmund Loewe: The German Connection in British Armaments
In the last years of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-German explosives 
manufacturers proceeded to strengthen their ties with the arms industry. As already seen, 
in 1885 Chilworth Gunpowder Company was bought out by Vereinigte Rheinisch- 
Westphalische Pulverfabriken (superseded by Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken in 
1890), thus becoming a subsidiary of the German Powder Group. With the General 
Pooling Agreement of 1889, Chilworth by default fell under the partial control of the 
Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company as well. After the takeover of 1885, Chilworth concluded 
an agreement with Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co., whereby Chilworth would become 
Armstrongs' exclusive supplier of military powder. In return Chilworth would obtain 
'certain compensating advantages'. The company signed a similar agreement with Maxim 
Nordenfelt in 1892.
In 1897 the firms of the General Pooling Agreement established in Berlin a Central 
Scientific and Technical Testing Station. But it was not just the explosives and powder 
firms of the cartel which had a stake in this venture. Krupps were represented on the 
Kuratorium of the Centralstelle. along with Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken, 
renowned makers of machine-guns and owners of Waffenfabrik Mauser.50 Here one can
already discern the intermingling of explosives and armaments interests.
The year 1897 was pivotal for the arms and explosives industries as it witnessed a 
string of takeovers and the emergence of two blocs - Vickers and Armstrongs - in the 
British arms-manufacturing and warship-building sectors. In that year Sir Joseph 
Whitworth & Co., the naval-gunmaking firm, was acquired by Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co. 
to form Sir W.G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. Indeed, Joseph Whitworth stands 
alongside Armstrong as one of the ground-breaking pioneers of naval gunnery in the mid­
nineteenth century. Whereas Armstrong increased the efficiency and destructiveness of 
naval warfare by creating the rifled gun, Whitworth revolutionized the art of gun making 
by introducing 'precision'. The novelty of his manufacturing process lay in the fact that 
whereas 'earlier, men had worked in fractions of inches, Whitworth was thinking in terms 
of thousandths, and even ten-thousandths, thus translating gunfounding and gunnery from 
the realm of somewhat airy art to the status of very exact science'.51
In 1897 also, Maxim Nordenfelt was taken over by Vickers, Sons & Co., which 
thereby strengthened its position in the machine-gun business. Consolidating its 
shipbuilding base, Vickers in the same year purchased the Naval Construction & 
Armaments Company Ltd. at Barrow. Lord Rothschild, who had been instrumental in the 
1888 Maxim-Nordenfelt amalgamation, played a big hand again in 1897 by engineering the 
appointment of his German protege, Sigmund Loewe, to the board of the new company, 
Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. In Chilworth - through the German Powder Group and its 
alliance with Nobel-Dynamite Trust under the General Pooling Agreement of 1889 - the 
Anglo-German connection is already evident. Parallel to this was the Rothschild-Loewe 
connection which further tightened the interlocking Anglo-German network in the 
explosives and armaments industries.52
Between 1897 and 1903, when he was killed in a motoring accident, Sigmund 
Loewe was a director of Vickers, Sons & Maxim, and 'in effect, if not by title, financial
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controller'.53 The entrenchment of Loewe's position in the company assumes added 
significance because he represented a 'personal link'54 tying Vickers with Deutsche Waffen 
und Munitionsfabriken, a firm founded by Sigmund's elder brother, Ludwig.
The Anglo-German nexus, however, does not end there, for the Nobel-Dynamite 
Trust Company was an important party again in this intricate web. Vereinigte Koln- 
Rottweiler Pulverfabriken, the principal firm within the German Powder Group, held shares 
in Deutsche Waffen's predecessor company, Deutsche Metallpatronen. When Deutsche 
Metallpatronen became Deutsche Waffen in 1897, the German Union also took shares in 
the company. Consequently, Nobel-Dynamite Trust held a sizeable, though not a 
controlling, stake in Deutsche Waffen. In 1902, for instance, the trust company held 
RM3.5 million of the German firm's total nominal capital of RM15 million.55
We now briefly return to Chilworth and Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken. 
As arms, ammunitions, explosives and propellants were very closely related, it was not 
inconceivable for a gun maker to enter into the manufacture of propellant powder. Aiming 
to avert Armstrongs' and Vickers's entry into the propellant-powder business, Chilworth 
made an approach to the two giant arms manufacturers. Although Armstrongs dropped out 
of the negotiations, Vickers went on to conclude an agreement with Chilworth on 11 July 
1900. By this accord Vickers, for the sum of £120,000, acquired a 40 per cent interest in 
Chilworth Gunpowder against Koln-Rottweiler's 60 per cent. Vickers was also empowered 
to nominate two of the company's directors against Koln-Rottweiler's four. Koln-Rottweiler 
in turn relinquished its right of veto on the Chilworth Gunpowder board. More 
importantly, by this agreement Vickers undertook not to go into the manufacture of blasting 
or powder explosives anywhere in the world. In return, it was agreed that the explosives 
sold to the company by Chilworth or Nobel's Explosives would never exceed the prices 
charged to Armstrongs. Vickers also agreed to purchase 'in preference' all of its required 
explosives from Chilworth, and if not from Chilworth, then from Nobel's Explosives.
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Nobel's Explosives and Chilworth, meanwhile, consented to share all orders for ballistite or 
cordite in the United Kingdom at a 3:1 ratio. In return for Koln-Rottweiler's providing 
information on manufacturing military explosives for use in the British Empire, both firms 
consented not to sell military explosives, except cordite, outside the empire except at prices 
agreed to with Koln-Rottweiler.56 Assessing the importance of this deal, Trebilcock writes: 
'These terms constituted perhaps the most substantial agreement to be struck between the 
hardware and software sectors of the defence industries in the ante-bellum period.'57 A 
further and important link between arms and explosives, and between British and German 
interests, was thus sealed.
At the heart of this complex web lay the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company. As a 
holding company for the German Union and the British explosives makers, as allies of the 
German Powder Group under the General Pooling Agreement of 1889, and as shareholders 
in Deutsche Waffen, Nobel-Dynamite Trust was to a large extent the hub of this Anglo- 
German explosives and armaments network. Chilworth's agreement with Vickers also 
enabled the trust company to circumvent potential intrusion from Britain's leading arms 
manufacturer, the producer of 'hardware', into propellant powder, the 'software' sector of 
the arms industry.
Vickers and Deutsche Waffen
The origins of the Vickers-Deutsche Waffen connection has already been noted.
This link reveals yet again a considerably high degree of Anglo-German collaboration. 
Vickers, through licensing and patent-sharing agreements, forged ties with Deutsche Waffen 
and Krupps. Vickers's dealings with Deutsche Waffen originally came indirectly through 
the route of Maxim Nordenfelt. As already mentioned, Vickers purchased Maxim 
Nordenfelt in 1897 to form Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. But prior to that, Ludwig Loewe 
had already acquired the rights from Maxim Nordenfelt in 1891 to manufacture Maxim
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machine-guns. At that time, Loewe's company was still the Deutsche Metallpatronen; as 
we might recall, this firm was superseded by Deutsche Waffen only in 1897. We should 
also recall Lord Rothschild's active role in and financial support - backed by Ernest Cassel 
- for the 1888 Maxim-Nordenfelt amalgamation. By the time of the 1897 takeover, 
Sigmund Loewe was already Rothschild's protege, and he found a place on the board of the 
new Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. largely thanks to Rothschild's machinations. Their 
relationship had in fact begun in the early 1890s when Loewe was an agent for the 
Rcjburite Explosive Company and was on friendly terms with Carl Nauheim, Rothschild's 
London manager. Through Nauheim Loewe met Rothschild, who offered him the 
management of Maxim Nordenfelt. Loewe thus became Maxim Nordenfelt's managing 
director in 1895, thereby giving his family's machine-gun business a foothold in Britain.
His move was also undertaken on the basis that he would effect an amalgamation with 
Vickers, which indeed took place in 1897.58
After 1897 Vickers proceeded to supplement the 1891 licensing agreement and 
consolidate its relationship with Deutsche Waffen. The shrewdness of such a move is 
underscored by Trebilcock's observation that the German company was 'perhaps the 
foremost European competitor in this specialized line of weaponry and no market in which 
it remained a free agent could be counted secure'.59 Hence, the pattern in explosives was 
closely mirrored by that in the arms industry. Just as the Anglo-German dynamite and 
powder groups were willing to arrive at a modus vivendi to regulate competition in the face 
of limited demand, the arms manufacturers too - similarly locked in an Anglo-German 
network - proved amenable to the idea of accommodation.
In 1898 came the first concrete step towards a 'clearer codification of interests',60 
when Deutsche Waffen concluded its first agreement, dated 15 February, with Vickers 
relating to the manufacture of Vickers-Maxim machine-guns under licence in Germany.
This arrangement was elaborated further by a subsequent agreement of 5 October 1901,
which made Deutsche Waffen the sole licensee to manufacture and sell Vickers-Maxim 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons of 37mm calibre and under, in Germany and all 
other countries, with the notable exceptions of Britain and her empire, France and her 
colonies, and the United States of America. This agreement, however, contained a clause 
stating that the granting of exclusive rights to Deutsche Waffen was 'subject to the rights 
now vested in Friedrich Krupp or his assigns as hereinafter mentioned' - thus in effect 
subject to an agreement with Krupps. Pistols and rifles fired from the shoulder were 
excluded from the agreement. Vickers, meanwhile, would be entitled to a share of 
Deutsche Waffen's profits from the manufacture of those guns. As we may recall, Maxim 
Nordenfelt had also concluded an agreement with Krupps in 1888 - an agreement that was 
renewed in 1896 - granting Krupps the licence to manufacture and sell Maxim guns in the 
German Empire. By the accord of 1901, Vickers undertook to pay Deutsche Waffen 10 
per cent of royalties received under the agreement between Maxim Nordenfelt and Krupps.
Over the following years, the Vickers-Deutsche Waffen link was consolidated 
further. In 1911 the two firms drew up an agreement dividing the world between 
themselves for the sale of Maxim guns. On the eve of war in 1914, yet another agreement 
was concluded, dated 10 June, serving as a second supplementary agreement to the 1901 
convention. By this accord, Deutsche Waffen's orders from the German government were 
to be excluded from the 1901 agreement, as were the British government's orders to 
Vickers.61
i
Vickers and Krupps
Meanwhile, Vickers was also securing pacts with Krupps, though dealing less with 
licensing than with patent-sharing. By an agreement of 1902, Vickers obtained from 
Krupps the right to manufacture and sell, in Britain and abroad, all Krupps time-fuses and 
combined time-and-percussion fuses. According to this arrangement, Krupps would
79
provide designs as well as information on all existing and future designs and improvements.
Moreover, Vickers participated in a major international syndicate called the Steel 
Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate Ltd., formed in 1901 with the object of regulating the price 
of nickel, virtually a French monopoly as France was at that time Europe's only producer of 
nickel. Loewe had already concluded an agreement with Le Nickel, the leading French 
company, to receive preferential treatment for the supply of the metal at reasonable prices. 
By forming the syndicate, all member firms were able to purchase their supplies of nickel 
from the French company at the same reduced prices offered to Deutsche Waffen.
Another international syndicate which Vickers joined was the Harvey Syndicate, 
centred around the manufacture of steel armour plate through a new process called the 
Harvey process. This syndicate, formed in 1894, was comprised of the main armour-plate 
makers of Britain, Germany, France and the United States. It, however, came to an end in 
1911.62
Anglo-German Economic 'Rivalry': A Reconsideration
Now that we have examined Anglo-German linkage in the strategic sectors of 
manufacturing, it would be worthwhile probing the 'rivalry' between the two countries 
before 1914 by considering other complementary and mutually beneficial aspects of the 
Anglo-German economic relationship. To place the trade 'rivalry' in proper perspective, 
one might cite Paul Kennedy's observation that despite the increase in tensions arising from 
Germany's industrial and commercial growth during the 1880-1914 period, 'there still 
remained many complementary elements in the trading pattern between Britain and 
Germany, and many interests benefited greatly from the steadily rising commerce and thus 
had a strong incentive to prevent a trade war'. Besides, the Anglo-German trade rivalry 
was confined largely to certain sectors and occurred only at specific times, making for a 
'fragmented' commercial 'antagonism' between both countries.63
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As demonstrated by the Tariff Reform movement, the British industries worst hit 
by German competition - and thus most strongly in favour of retaliatory tariffs - were 
mainly iron and steel, boots and shoes, engineering and chemicals. But even in these areas, 
there were certain benefits produced by German competition. Some of the testimony 
before the Tariff Commission would indicate that cheap iron and steel from Germany had 
the added effect of lowering costs and allowing some British manufacturers to hire more 
employees. As one firm testified: 'The purchase of German steel has enabled us to employ 
more men and those more regularly.' It further admitted that: 'We gain far more from 
cheap foreign billets than we lose from competition in our own manufactures.'64
The deleterious effects of German competition on British industry indeed should 
not be overstated. German competition bode well for the orthodox free-trading principle of 
buying cheaply and selling expensively, and thus suited the businessman's basic aim of 
maximizing profits. Hugh Bell, an iron and steel manufacturer and avid Free Trader, did 
not think that German 'competition' meant the death knell for British iron and steel. As he 
explained: 'Britain either buys cheap and sells dear, or when she buys dear she gets what 
she wants.'65 He was not the only Free Trader to express such a confident attitude, even 
though Britain had become the world's largest importer of iron and steel by the eve of war. 
As a typical Free Trader argued in the prewar period: 'By all means ... let us import cheap 
foreign steel bars so that we may manufacture corrugated sheets for export... let us import 
cheap foreign billets so that we may manufacture jthe thousand and one articles of which 
they are the raw material ...'66 Thus from the Free Trader's standpoint, certain cheap 
foreign imports, especially of products constituting raw materials, were in fact welcome.
Steel manufacturing illustrates the trend towards specialization that was partly 
spurred by Germany's rise in the industry. With the onset of German competition, Britain 
ended up specializing in the manufacture of finished steel products, in which she remained 
competitive, and buying in large quantities the cheap semi-finished steel products which
Germany 'dumped' in the British market. Within this framework of open, free trade, it 
made economic sense for Britain to import the semi-finished goods while increasing her 
exports of the higher-value finished steel. As has been pointed out: 'The tendency for 
Britain to export steel of high rather than low value was ... all to the good, and it was not 
necessarily a bad economic feature that our net exports fell from 1907 onwards.'67
This specialization in specific products, reflecting 'the order of the pre-war 
international market',68 could also be seen in the chemical industry. Though Britain 
dropped from first place in 1880 to third in 1913 (behind the United States and Germany) 
in the production of chemicals, her eclipse was most evident only in organic chemicals and 
electrochemicals. In heavy inorganic chemicals, acids, alkali and soap, she was able to 
remain a strong world competitor. Consequently, she and her main competitors ended up 
specializing in different areas and carving out their own niches within the industry. Thus 
in 1913 Britain dominated in the production of soda ash, whereas Germany held a 
commanding position in dyestuffs and the United States in sulphuric acid and 
superphosphates.69
Described as 'the most important event in the history of the chemical industry' 
during the late nineteenth century,70 the growth of Germany's dyestuffs industry in the 
1880s and 1890s was indeed spectacular. On the eve of war, Britain's almost complete 
dependence on German dyestuffs was most pronounced. Iq 1913, of the close to 61,000 
cwt. of dyes and coal-tar dyestuffs imported by Britain, a little over 60,000 cwt. came from 
Germany. In aniline and naphthalene dyestuffs, Germany provided over 90 per cent 
(258,629 cwt.) of all of Britain's imports (283,027 cwt.) in 1913. Commenting on the 
German monopoly of the British dyestuffs market, a contemporary Briton observed: 'The 
dye-works of this country are so dependent on dye-stuffs imported from Germany that it is 
not pleasant to conceive what would happen if supplies were stopped or tampered with. 
Any rupture in the trade between the two countries would lead to most serious difficulties
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...'71 The German dominance of the British market in synthetic indigo in the prewar period 
was equally overwhelming.72 It is highly ironic that, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, 
most of the dyes used in the manufacture of the British army’s khaki uniforms came in fact 
from Germany.
Yet British reliance on German dyestuffs can be seen in a broader context of 
Anglo-German interdependence. The coal tar which German manufacturers used to 
produce their dyestuffs was derived in huge quantities from British coal. While Germany's 
production and exports of coal increased tremendously between the 1890s and 1914, she 
still continued to import coal, a great deal of it from Britain. Even though Germany had 
by 1913 become only the third largest importer of British coal (behind France and Italy), 
her 9 million tons of British imports in that year represented almost twice more than the 
amount of coal which she had bought from Britain in 1898.73 Her continued importation of 
British coal could be explained by the simple dictates of economics. Although Germany 
produced coal sufficiently to meet her needs, in her coastal districts the cost of bringing 
coal from the ports to the factories proved lower than the expense of transporting coal 
overland from her own mining districts. It was for this reason that British coal was able to 
maintain a 'safe markef in Germany, especially in the north and east. Sir Francis 
Oppenheimer, the British Consul-General in Frankfurt, could attest in 1909 that 'near the 
coast, in the district of the Baltic, and in Berlin, British coal enjoys a certain popularity’.
In the northern and eastern regions of Germany, h,e pointed out, 'the price and the facility 
of transport are decidedly in favour of British coal1.74 So much, then, for the Anglo- 
German trade 'rivalry'. Where it proved cheaper and more convenient, both countries still 
found it desirable to buy from the other the same goods in which they were 'competing'.
A similar pattern of bilateral exchange could be detected in iron and steel. In 
1907, for example, Britain sold £1,518,000 worth of partly manufactured and £1,557,000 of 
fully manufactured iron and steel to Germany. In turn, Britain imported £2,410,000 worth
83
of partly manufactured and £2,532,000 of fully manufactured iron and steel from 
Germany.75
In shipbuilding, a sector in which Britain enjoyed unsurpassed supremacy even in 
the face of German competition, one can clearly see the benefits accruing to British 
shipbuilders from the irony that 'one man's rival product was another man's raw material'.76 
Many British steel manufacturers may have complained about being undersold by cheap 
German imports, but to many British shipbuilders who benefited from cheap raw materials, 
the imported steel, whether German or otherwise, was a welcome blessing. Up to 1914 the 
comparative advantage in shipbuilding still lay with Britain, being the world's leading 
builder of ships, and one country from which her shipyards received a considerable number 
of orders was Germany. Ironically, German shipowners were beneficiaries of the lower 
costs of British shipbuilding partly because of Germany's own 'dumping' of cheap iron and 
steel products in Britain.77 During the prewar period, British shipyards increasingly relied 
on steel castings from Germany which were considerably cheaper than British-made ones.
In 1912-13, for example, up to 43 per cent of steel castings used by British shipyards were 
imported, mainly from Germany.78 Nonetheless, the cheaper German steel castings cannot 
be considered a 'serious element' in British shipbuilding as they constituted only one item 
among many in ship construction. As a rule, non-British steel was used only in small 
quantities in prewar British shipbuilding owing to the fact that imported steel came mostly 
in the form of open-hearth or basic steel, which \yas not highly favoured by British 
shipyards.79
In 1913 the British merchant marine amounted to 12,119,000 net tons compared to 
Germany's 3,153,000 net tons80 - a substantial margin indeed, even though Germany by that 
time already possessed the world's second largest merchant fleet. It has been estimated that 
by 1914 the British mercantile marine owned 33.4 per cent of the world's tonnage, and, 
more importantly, 90 per cent of the world's tramps, which were the primary ocean
carriers.81 The claim made by a contemporary observer that, 'We carry more goods from 
foreign port to foreign p o rt... than all our British trade amounts to'82may have been a 
slight overstatement, but it still rightly reflected the confidence and the thriving state of 
Britain’s shipping trade. In view of Britain's maritime supremacy, it is to be expected that 
her merchant fleet carried a large proportion of Germany's trade as well, especially her 
trade with Britain. Interestingly, British ships carried a far greater tonnage of Germany's 
exports to Britain than they did her imports from Britain. The Board of Trade estimated in 
1911 that only about a third of the vessels bringing cargo into Britain from Germany were 
German, the reason being that most of German shipping arrived in British ports in ballast 
and left with cargo. In 1910, for instance, of approximately 2.1 million tons of goods 
entering British ports from Germany, over half (about 1.3 million tons) were carried on 
British ships, with German vessels accounting for only about 30 per cent of the tonnage 
(close to 637,000 tons). German ships, however, carried up to 2.1 million tons of goods 
leaving Britain for Germany, almost equal to the 2.5 million tons hauled by British 
vessels.83 These trends were to be maintained until 1914.
Even though Germany was not totally dependent on the British merchant marine 
for her trade with other countries, British ships certainly carried a substantial portion of her 
global commerce. In 1913, for example, British ships comprised almost half of all foreign 
vessels bringing cargo into Germany, totalling approximately 5.9 million tons out of over 
12.5 million tons. British merchant shipping, however, carried a smaller share of 
Germany's export trade. In the same year, of about 7 million tons of cargo leaving 
Germany on foreign ships, only around 2.56 million tons (about 35 per cent) were 
conveyed on British vessels.84
Another important element in the Anglo-German commercial maritime relationship 
was the provision of marine insurance by British firms, with London being the world's 
leading centre for marine insurance. There may not be sufficient records surviving to allow
us to determine the percentage of German merchant shipping insured by British companies 
in the prewar period, but one can safely assume that it was substantial. As the Alliance 
Assurance Company's testimony before the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in 1911 
suggests, 'a  very considerable volume1 of German marine insurance was effected in Britain. 
During the prewar period, Germany was undeniably a highly lucrative market for British 
insurance companies, and not just in marine insurance. British firms transacted a sizeable 
volume of reinsurance business in Germany dealing with fire policies in particular. As the 
general manager of Alliance testified in 1911, British firms tended to reinsure 'a  large 
portion of their surplus home risks' with German companies. The British reinsurance 
business in Germany, consequently, totalled approximately £700,000 a year in 1911, 
amounting to about 20 per cent of the entire business of the German firms.85
But a more significant aspect of Germany's maritime trade pertained to its 
financing, which came largely from London merchant houses. Finance thus represented an 
area which bound German commercial interests closely with Britain, and conversely,
British financial interests with Germany's commercial well-being. Given London's position 
as the world's financial centre and the relative weakness of the German capital markets, it 
was inevitable that Germany's international trade would be dependent to a large extent on 
British capital and on the services provided by the City of London. Thus in 1911, as 
Frederick Huth Jackson contended, 'the greater part of the trade between Germany and the 
British Empire, and a good deal of the trade between Germany and other countries, is 
financed in London'. A prominent City banker, then president of the Institute of Bankers 
and a Director of the Bank of England,86 Huth Jackson affirmed in that year that Germany 
was the City's 'principal debtor'. He estimated that no less than 20 to 25 per cent of the 
entire London acceptance business dealt directly or indirectly with Germany.87 In view of 
the immense value of German business to the bankers and brokers in the City, it is hardly 
surprising that these financial interests constituted 'the most persistent economic lobby for
good Anglo-German relations' during the prewar period.88
Finance provided another forum of Anglo-German linkage in that the City itself 
contained a strong German presence. Although foreign merchants had operated in London 
as far back as the Middle Ages, the establishment of a German foothold in the City can be 
traced to the founding of Baring Bros. & Co. Ltd. in 1763, a merchant firm of German 
origin that arrived via Exeter. It was, however, only at the dawn of the nineteenth century 
that the German merchant banking community truly blossomed in London. Thanks to the 
Napoleonic wars, which severely disrupted the patterns of Continental trade, a string of 
German merchants established themselves in London during the period between 1800 and 
1815. Thus from such commercial centres as Hamburg, Frankfurt and Leipzig came J.H. 
Schroder in 1802, E.H. Brandt in 1805, Frederick Huth in 1809, and Frtihling & Goschen 
in 1814. Added to that were Manchester-based firms such as N.M. Rothschild & Sons, 
which had moved from Germany in the eighteenth century and which established a base in 
London also at around this time - in 1805. This period of the French wars witnessed the 
rise of commission agents and the subsequent growth of accepting houses in London, 
especially after 1825. By the mid-nineteenth century, the leading acceptance houses in the 
City were Rothschilds and Barings.89 The strength and importance of the German presence 
in the City's merchant banking community was demonstrated shortly after the outbreak of 
war in 1914 when the Accepting Houses' Committee was fprmed on 5 August. Of the 
twenty-one firms comprising this committee, elevfn were of German origin or 'Anglo- 
German'. They were Baring Bros. & Co., Arthur H. Brandt & Co., William Brandt, Sons 
& Co., Friihling & Goschen, C.J. Hambro & Son, Horstman & Co., Frederick Huth & Co., 
Kleinwort, Sons & Co., Konig Bros., N.M. Rothschild & Sons, A. Ruffer & Sons, and J. 
Henry Schroder & Co.90 Trade with Germany and the lucrative acceptance business may 
have been disrupted in August 1914, but these Anglo-German merchant houses continued 
to play a significant role in the City. As Stanley Chapman notes, they represented 'one of
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the most enterprising sectors' of City finance at the outbreak of war.91 Many of them in 
fact still exist today, in one form and name or another.
The prewar German presence in the City was represented also by the major 
German banks which opened branches in London in the late nineteenth centuiy. Reflecting 
the growth of its overseas acceptance business during that period, the Deutsche Bank 
established its London branch in 1873. It was followed suit by the Dresdner Bank in 1895 
and the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1899. Showing a steady growth in its business over the 
years, the Deutsche Bank London Agency's turnover came to almost £1.1 million in 1913.92
The German element was further manifest in the London Stock Exchange. 
Foreigners may have represented only a small minority in the membership of the Stock 
Exchange. For example, between 1900 and 1909, 2,297 members were admitted of whom 
only 99 were foreigners. Nonetheless by 1914 more than half of the Stock Exchange's 
naturalized members were German by birth. Even as far back as the 1870s, Germans 
formed the largest group of all its foreign-born members.93 Looking back on his pre-First 
World War days in the Exchange, an old member recalled in 1969 the
many German, predominantly Jewish firms ... who came to England after 
the Franco-Prussian War. Their names were legion - Biedermann,
Schlesinger, Schwarbacker, Lichrenstadt and Weinberger among others. ...
My firm had a large and influential German and continental connection 
through which much trade came to London.94
Moving away from firms, one should bear in mind prominent individuals of 
German descent in the City. One of them was Sir Ernest Cassel, who will be dealt with at 
length in later chapters. Bom in Cologne, Cassel emigrated to England in 1869 and 
embarked on a career in finance with Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt before eventually
becoming one of the leading international financiers in the City by the early 1900s. A 
member of King Edward VII's entourage, Cassel was influential not only in finance but 
also in government, and was consulted regularly by Chancellors of the Exchequer. In 1903 
the Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, Sir Edward Hamilton, remarked that he 
considered Cassel to be one of his 'first counsellors'. Hamilton's other 'first counsellors', it 
should be noted, were Lords Rothschild and Revelstoke (John Baring), further testimony to 
the respect and prestige commanded by the Anglo-German firms in the City.95 Another 
prominent City financier of German ancestry who acted as a financial advisor to the British 
government was Sir Edgar Speyer, known to have been 'highly favoured' by David Lloyd 
George,96 who became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908. Not to be forgotten also is 
Baron Bruno Schroder, a partner in J. Henry Schroder & Co. Once referred to by a fellow 
City banker as 'the leading German in London', Schroder acted in the capacity of ex officio 
financial advisor to the German embassy in London.97
One area of banking which should not be overlooked concerns the operations of 
British overseas banks, notably those which established branches in Germany or otherwise 
provided financing for German trade with the banks' specialist regions overseas. A fine 
example is the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), which opened a 
branch in Hamburg in 1889 owing in large part to the lucrative commerce carried out 
between the German port-city and the Far East. Other British overseas banks which set up
t
offices in Hamburg were the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (1904), and the 
Standard Bank of South Africa (1905). The Hamburg branches of these banks held larger 
market shares than their German competitors. The HSBC, for one, effectively had 'a  
predominant role* in the financing of Germany's trade with Japan.98
The interdependence between Hamburg's merchant firms and the HSBC as well as 
other British merchants in the Far East is well illuminated by David King. Alluding to the 
HSBC's 'special relationships' with German finance and merchants, King brings to light a
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network of intricate ties reflecting a concurrence of interests that went counter to Anglo- 
German political discord. As he explains,
the HSBC benefited just as much from the growth of German as it did 
from that of the British commerce, and, in China, British and German 
finance worked together to the satisfaction of at least the HSBC.
Furthermore, a high percentage of the British export trade to China was 
handled by German merchant houses financed by HSBC."
The HSBC’s Hamburg branch of course constituted only one portion of prewar
British direct investment in Germany, the total amount of which, unfortunately, has not
been reliably estimated. Nevertheless, it has been clearly established that the areas of
German manufacturing having the largest concentration of British investment before 1914
were the tyre, soap and gramophone industries.100
Prewar German direct investment in Britain also has not been accurately quantified,
a shortcoming which, incidentally, applies to all foreign direct investments in Britain for
the entire pre-1945 period. As Geoffrey Jones points out: 'It is difficult to quantify the
amount of capital which foreign companies invested in British industry before 1945.'101
There is, moreover, a general lack of reliable statistics on German overseas investments
»
(direct and portfolio) for the pre-1914 period.102 One can nonetheless state that most of 
Germany's direct investment in Britain before 1914 was concentrated in the chemical, 
electrical and pharmaceutical sectors. Even so, at the outbreak of the First World War, 
German direct investment in Britain was well surpassed by that of the United States.
During the war, the amount of German equity in identified manufacturing subsidiaries in 
Britain was estimated at only about £1.7 million,103 reflecting the relatively low level of 
German direct investment activity in the United Kingdom.
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In optics, however, Britain represented an important market for German exports as 
well as investment. The pre-1914 decline of Britain's optical industry is already a 
commonplace, as is Britain's tremendous dependence on German optical products which 
was woefully exposed at the outbreak of war.104 The prewar British optical industry has 
been characterized as 'a  fragmentary collection of craft-based family firms, many entirely 
concerned to retail German goods'. In August 1914 Chance Bros., the leading British 
manufacturer of optical glass, could meet only 10 per cent of Britain's needs. At the 
outbreak of war, up to 60 per cent of the British demand for optical glass was supplied by 
the giant German makers, Carl Zeiss of Jena.105 Indeed on the eve of war, Zeiss's sales to 
Britain made up 21.4 per cent of the entire German optical industry's exports,106 a testimony 
to the importance of the British market for German optics.
But apart from dominating sales in Britain, the firm was also a direct investor in 
the United Kingdom, starting first with the establishment of Carl Zeiss, London, as a sales 
office in 1901, then the formation of a limited liability company in 1909, after which the 
manufacture of optical glass was begun at a site in north London. Zeiss's operations in 
Britain certainly yielded huge earnings. In 1910 the London sales office accounted for 30 
per cent of all of the firm's subsidiary profits.107
* *  *  *
ft
This chapter has attempted to provide a balanced perspective to the prewar Anglo-
£
German economic 'antagonism' by examining colloboration as well as reciprocal 
relationships and mutually beneficial ties between British and German business interests. It 
is highly symbolic that on the eve of war, in June 1914, a paper was presented by the 
economist, Edgar Crammond, before the Royal Statistical Society emphasizing this very 
reality of interdependence and reciprocity between the economies of both countries.108 
Back in 1910, Crammond had presciently warned of the deleterious effects of a war 'with a
Power in a position to challenge our supremacy upon the sea'. As he predicted then, such a 
war would bring down the London Stock Exchange, diminish Britain's earnings from her 
mercantile marine, and disrupt her supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials.109
Crammond was not the only one to recognize the growing linkage between 
countries in the international system of trade and finance. In 1909 Norman Angell 
published his work Europe's Optical Illusion (reissued in 1910 as The Great Illusion), 
arguing the futility of the European arms race and the counter-productiveness of a European 
war. 'The complexity of modem finance1, Angell claimed, 'makes New York dependent on 
London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been 
the case in history.'110
As has been shown, the strategic sectors of the British and German economies, 
comprising the explosives and armaments industries, were in some respects 'allied' and 
locked in cartels. Prewar Anglo-German commercial links were indeed quite substantial. 
But more importantly, businessmen in both Britain and Germany were themselves highly 
alert to the reality of Anglo-German interdependence and keenly appreciated the material 
benefits to be gained from the maintenance of Anglo-German peace. It is scarcely 
surprising that in early 1910, in response to the growing Anglo-German diplomatic tension, 
the London Chamber of Commerce was spurred to form an Anglo-German Section, with 
the very aim of promoting trade and 'removing misunderstandings' between Britain and 
Germany.111 Undoubtedly, these two objectives \vere closely intertwined: Anglo-German 
misunderstandings were certainly harmful to healthy commercial exchange. On the eve of 
war, in June 1914, a delegation from the Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of 
Berlin was in fact in London meeting with the London Chamber of Commerce and 
affirming the importance of continued German trade with Britain.112
Such activities were very telling indeed. Given the extensiveness of British 
commercial links with Germany and the high degree of Anglo-German economic
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interdependence, one can understand the generally favourable attitude of the British 
business classes towards Germany. Their Germanophilism can be explained by the simple 
fact that healthy relations with Germany bode well for the British economy. As 
demonstrated by the Caxton Hall meeting and the reciprocal gatherings in Germany, British 
and German business and financial opinion shared a commitment to maintaining friendly 
Anglo-German relations. Moreover, these commercial circles were apt to appeal to racialist 
notions of Anglo-German kinship in support of promoting healthy Anglo-German economic 
ties. Racial attitudes were evidently closely bound to the ethos of Anglo-German business. 
In sum, British business opinion was far from being wholly antagonistic towards Germany.
The full dimension and complexity of the prewar Anglo-German trade 'rivalry*
should thus be properly grasped. After all, Tariff Reform agitation had all but dissipated
by 1914, thanks in large part to the trade cycles and the great boom that came after the 
1907-09 recession. Undoubtedly, a prosperous economy spoke volumes in vindication of 
free trade. Lord Avebury had died by the time the war broke out in August 1914, but even 
if his fellow Free Traders who were alive were not able to prevent the outbreak of the 
European conflict, they had clearly 'won* a significant battle. Indeed, on the eve of war 
Anglo-German trade and business links were more robust than they had ever been. Our 
understanding of the Anglo-German economic relationship should not suffer from an
t
optical illusion.
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CHAPTER 4
THE GERMAN CONNECTION IN BRITISH EDUCATION
'The object is that an understanding between the three great 
powers will render war impossible and educational relations 
make the strongest tie.1
Cecil Rhodes
'These great modem Institutes, the far-reaching beneficent 
effects of which would soon make themselves widely felt, 
would require less expenditure than that needed for building 
the smallest Dreadnought. Their practical usefulness would 
in course of time be seen to outweigh by far that of many 
costly ships that are at present considered necessary for the 
preservation of peace.’
Karl Breul
Having considered Anglo-German ties in business and trade, this thesis will now 
turn to a different area of non-political linkage: education. In this chapter three examples 
of the German connection in British education will be analysed.
The King Edward VH British-German Foundation 
The Original Scheme, 1910
The first example is the King Edward VII British-German Foundation, an 
educational and cultural foundation established by Sir Ernest Cassel in 1911 to promote
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Anglo-German exchange. The foundation's surviving records have made it possible to 
construct the following account of its origins and early years.1
Cassel originated the idea of his foundation in 1910, the occasion for it being 
provided by the death of King Edward VII, his close friend, in May of that year. As 
originally conceived, an endowment was to be set up in memory of the late King with the 
aim of fostering better understanding between Britain and Germany. Such an honour 
perhaps befitted a monarch who had in earlier years taken a keen interest in educational 
affairs, as demonstrated by his ardent support for the Imperial College of Science and 
Technology. One also cannot separate the actions of Cassel, the private man, from the 
broader context of international politics and public diplomacy. Even though the Agadir 
crisis was still months away, Anglo-German relations had recently been shaken by the 
naval scare of 1909.
By 22 August 1910 a ten-page 'suggested scheme' had been drawn up by Sir 
Francis Trippel, Cassel's associate, for what was tentatively known then as the 'King 
Edward VII Anglo-German Fund'. In this proposal, a benefaction of £200,000 was to be 
used to create a fund 'from which to assist necessitous and deserving English and German 
men and women with gifts or loans'. The main portion of the money, however, was to go 
towards establishing 'The Anglo-German Memorial Institute', situated both in London and 
Berlin, whose purpose was to 'give reliable information and advice gratuitously' as well as 
to 'provide teaching at a nominal cost'. These institutes were also to provide financial 
assistance and create twelve annual travelling scholarships - twelve each in Britain and 
Germany - to enable students and promising teachers from Germany to visit Britain and 
their British counterparts to travel to Germany. As Trippel's scheme envisaged: 'They [the 
institutes] will spread correct information, will render assistance of every possible kind to 
numerous English and German men and women at home and abroad who are in need of it, 
and will thus naturally develop into powerful agencies for promoting proper understanding
and good feeling between the two nations.1
This institute was most likely the brainchild of Karl Breul, who was appointed 
Schroder Professor of German at Cambridge in 1910 and who was at that time the 
president of the Modem Language Association. For years this academic had been a keen 
advocate of precisely such an institute in London and Berlin. In 1900 Breul had called for 
the establishment of an 'Imperial Institute1 in London for German students and teachers of 
English, and as recently as 1909 he had proposed a slightly modified scheme under the title 
of 'A  German House in London'.2 Untiring and undaunted in his efforts, he was active yet 
again on this occasion as it is evident from a letter in the foundation's files that Breul was 
able to meet with Trippel and 'allowed to explain his old cherished scheme'.3
Giving a sketch of the institute in London, Trippel's proposal stated: 'Germans of 
all classes and both sexes, upon landing in England, should not be left to chance, but 
should know that at once they can obtain reliable information and advice on applying at the 
Institute.' The institute's twin purpose was to serve Germans arriving from Germany or 
residing in Britain, and to assist Britons who were 'anxious to learn German' or who 
wished to improve their German but were 'unable to pay the ordinary fees that would be 
charged elsewhere'.
This document made it plain that 'special attention' should be paid to teachers and 
students, as well as clerks, governesses, writers and journalists. It added: 'Since 
misunderstandings are due to prejudice which is the result of ignorance of the language, 
customs, and thoughts of the other nation, a main feature of the Institute in London should 
be instruction in the German and English languages on inexpensive terms, so that clerks, 
governesses, teachers and others should have exceptional facilities for acquiring a fair 
knowledge of these languages.'
It was estimated that the London institute, which would ideally have been located 
close to the German consulate on Russell Square, would have an annual operating cost of
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£4,000, a fourth of which should be devoted to assisting needy Germans in England, 
including subcriptions to benevolent societies. This scheme, however, stipulated that the 
institute as a rule should not give charity to individuals. Trippel also recommended that of 
the twelve annual travelling scholarships, four should be half-yearly to the value of £75 
each, and the other eight should be worth £40 each and meant for travel of six or three 
months' duration.
At the head of the institute would be a director or managing secretary, assisted by 
two clerks (one British and one German) and a 'typewriter' capable of reading English and 
German. In Trippel's proposal, the director in London should as a rule be a German or 
Briton of German extraction, and the director in Berlin an Englishman.4
The Foundation Comes into Being
The foundation which was finally established in 1911 did not fundamentally 
diverge from the one outlined by Trippel's suggested scheme, except that its name - the 
'King Edward VII British-German Foundation' - was slightly different from the one 
originally conceived, and moreover, that it did not include the envisaged Anglo-German 
Memorial Institute, though the idea of travelling scholarships did survive. Having 
championed his cause for over a decade, Breul still could not see his dream realized. He 
was, therefore, tenaciously making his case again for his institute in the May 1911 issue of 
the Contemporary Review.5
A gift of £200,000 was made by Cassel, who provided an additional £5,000 each 
for the London and Berlin sections to meet the costs incurred during the first year. Each 
section was also invested with a capital of £100,000. In the British section, a council of 
administration, chaired by Viscount Esher, was established with twelve initial members of 
council, who numbered among them Lord Redesdale, Baron Bruno Schroder and Felix 
Cassel, nephew of Sir Ernest. Esher, it should be mentioned, had formerly been Cassel's
business associate, having been involved with Cassel's dealings in Egypt and the United 
States between 1902 and 1904 in return for a share in his business.6 Also on the council 
were Dr. Ernest Schuster and Sir Hemy Babington Smith, at one time the private secretary 
to the Earl of Elgin, Viceroy of India, and president of the National Bank of Turkey.7 
Coincidentally, Schuster was later to become chairman of the Anglo-German Section of the 
London Chamber of Commerce, which was discussed in the previous chapter. His 
participation in Cassel's scheme should thus not be surprising. Trippel was appointed 
honorary secretary, while W.B. Peat & Co. acted as the honorary auditors for the council.
A committee was also set up in Manchester to serve that city as well as Salford, Bradford, 
Leeds and Liverpool. This committee in the north was presided over by Sir Charles 
Behrens, a Manchester businessman descended from German Jews who also sat as a 
member of council.8
The first meeting of the British section's council of administration was held on 21 
March 1911 at Brook House, Cassel's residence on Park Lane, where the Trust Deed was 
executed by Cassel and the trustees of the foundation. On 28 April the council appointed 
an executive committee, which met for the first time on 8 June to deal with applications for 
assistance. As a rule, the council met monthly while the executive committee meetings 
were held weekly. Meanwhile, the foundation established offices at Denison House on 
Vauxhall Bridge Road.9
According to the report for the first financial year, allowances were typically made 
for one year's duration, subject to quarterly reports. However, those already in receipt of 
Poor Law relief were not eligible for assistance, while able-bodied applicants were referred 
to the German Farm Colony. 'The general application of the fund', it was stated, 'has been 
primarily to provide for the necessities of life, and next to the payment of arrears of rent 
and the redemption of household effects and clothes in pawn.' Moreover, while the 
executive committee's goal was to give aid which would produce 'permanent benefit', it
also made a point of assisting applicants 'incapacitated through age or ill-health from 
earning a livelihood1. 'Aged governesses' who were forced to relinquish their employment 
were also regarded with 'special favour'.
In its first year, the British section dealt with 410 cases, of which 177 were 
assisted, 134 refused, fifty-four deemed ineligible, and only two referred to the German 
Farm Colony.10 Of those receiving aid, the occupational group with the highest 
representation were casual labourers, numbering thirty-two. Next came the category called 
'professions', consisting of teachers, governesses and journalists, totalling twenty-one; 
followed by hotel employees (waiters, chefs and porters) numbering eighteen; and then by 
butchers and bakers numbering ten. The rest of the successful applicants ranged from 
barbers to engineers, watchmakers to sailors, and nurses to servants. Grants and allowances 
were also provided for 'special purposes'. True to the foundation's stated objectives, 
seventeen - the single-most highest number - of these cases were for the relief of rent 
arrears, while eleven were for redeeming pawned effects. In ten instances assistance was 
given for the purpose of starting a business and purchasing stock.11 It appears that of the 
177 cases assisted, only eighty-four were awarded a one-year grant, and among these 
eighty-four - again, reflecting the foundation's faithfulness to stated objectives - the over­
sixty age group proved to have the most favourable hearing; almost three-quarters of these 
eighty-four were aged between sixty and seventy-nine! In fact, only one was aged below 
thirty (he or she was twenty-two). Additionally, about £575 was spent on nine private 
charities, of which the German Society of Benevolence, with a gift of £184.2s., received 
the lion's share. The Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress, along with the Seamen's 
Hospital Society and the German Industrial and Farm Colony, was also well supported with 
a contribution of £100.12
In the foundation's second financial year ending on 30 April 1913 the caseload 
decreased. The number of cases dealt with fell from 410 of the previous year to 314. The
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number of persons assisted, however, rose - from 177 to 218. As before, the 'professions', 
waiters, and bakers and butchers were among the most numerously assisted groups. The 
number of general labourers, however, fell to just eight while the category called 
'miscellaneous trades and occupations1 now numbered a hefty forty-two. Unfortunately it is 
not possible to ascertain what these 'miscellaneous' trades were. The number of applicants 
receiving a one-year allowance increased to 116 in the second year, again with the 
sexagenarians and older constituting the overwhelming majority. The number of charities, 
as well as the amount of contributions given to them, also rose in the second year. The 
total sum given out to charities now stood at £655, with twelve organizations receiving aid 
and, though the German Society of Benevolence still ranked among the top five entities 
allocated the largest contributions, the amount it received was down to £100. Among the 
new recipients of the foundation's charitable contributions in the second year were the 
German Young Men's Christian Association and the Association of German Governesses.13
Despite the escalation in expenditure, the foundation was adequately equipped to 
sustain the increased pressure on its resources, as the second year's report would bear out. 
'In view ... of the large surplus they [the executive committee] were able to deal with their 
cases this year on a more liberal basis,' it was noted. Another encouraging sign for the 
foundation was that the 'better class of applicants', who would normally be reluctant to 
accept help from charities, was seen to be applying to the foundation in greater numbers.14
During the foundation's second year the organization of the Manchester committee 
was finally completed and it too began accepting cases. In that year the committee 
received fourteen applications, refusing three and granting assistance to eleven of them. Of 
these eleven, ten were awarded a one-year allowance. Students of demographics might 
note that the youngest one of these ten was sixty-eight years old; six of them came from 
Manchester alone.15
The second important development of the year was the first annual joint conference
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of the foundation's British and German sections, convened on 24 September 1912 at Brook 
House. Among the members of the German section's council of administration present 
were Count von Posadowsky-Wehner, Albert Ballin and Max Warburg. The question of 
surplus funds assumed a central place on the conference's agenda. It was proposed that the 
surplus funds from both sections of the foundation be used to effect an exchange of 
students and professors between Britain and Germany. But at the conference doubts were 
expressed as to the efficacy of professorial exchanges; the idea of allowing British students 
to pursue studies in Germany and of enabling German students to study in Britain, 
nevertheless, was favourably received.16 Thus a resolution was carried unanimously stating:
That a certain proportion of the surplus funds of the German Section be 
employed in enabling British subjects to attend or visit Universities, 
schools, institutes or business establishments in Germany, or to reside in 
Germany, and that a certain proportion of the surplus funds of the British 
Section be employed in enabling Germans to attend or visit Universities, 
schools, institutes or business establishments in the United Kingdom, or to 
reside in the United Kingdom.17
Hence, the third important development of the year. This studentship scheme, 
which went into effect in spring 1913, has indeed remained until today. The British section 
of the foundation expressed hope that these new studentships would provide British 
students with 'an insight into the customs and character of the German people' and help 
them facilitate 'lasting friendships with their German cousins'. This idea of racial kinship, 
as we will see, constituted a remarkable and constant feature in Anglo-German individual 
relationships before the war.
The amount allocated by the British section for the studentships was £800, and in
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1913-14, their first year in operation, only about half that amount was expended.18 During 
the year ending on 30 April 1914, the British section awarded five such studentships (for 
German students coming to Britain) while the German section offered seven (for British 
students going to Germany). Of the five German studentship recipients, one remained in 
England for only four months to undertake the study of English dialects. The other four, 
all carrying the title of 'Doctor', were engaged mainly in economic studies, even if of an 
esoteric nature. One of them, for instance, was a Helmuth Poensgen from Dusseldorf 
whose special subject was 'The meat supply of European countries'.19 As for the seven 
British studentship holders, four had studied at Oxbridge, two at Edinburgh, and one at 
Imperial College, London. This last was in fact able to extend his stay in Germany thanks 
to a supplementary grant from the foundation, and went on to obtain the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy from the University of Berlin.20
As might be expected, the foundation's business saw a steady increase in 1913-14. 
Three hundred and fifty-four applications were received in that year, of which 248 were 
accepted. The Manchester committee also experienced an increase in workload, assisting 
seventeen of the eighteen cases it dealt with. This third year, however, witnessed an 
appreciable drop in the amount of contributions given to charitable societies, down from 
£655 the previous year to £220. Also significant is that only four charities were so 
benefited in 1913-14. The German Society of Benevolence, until then a favoured honoree, 
now received only £35 in aid.21
The Outbreak of War in 1914
The foundation's fourth year was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of the First 
World War. Eight British students were selected for studentships in 1914-15; with the 
exception of one student, none of them had yet begun their studies in Germany when war 
broke out. The lone exceptional case was already in Germany in August 1914 but
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managed to return safely to England, 'leaving his luggage behind'.22 At the outbreak of 
war the executive committee decided to refund these students any expenses already 
incurred. They were also informed that the studentships would be reserved for them until 
the conclusion of hostilities.23 Little could these men, in reaching this decision on 5 
August, have foreseen how long the war was going to last or how many lives were going 
to be lost. Much as the foundation sought to conduct business as usual after the outbreak 
of war, it is apparent from the executive committee's meeting minutes that its task was 
becoming ever more difficult. As early as 5 August, the committee already had to deal 
with some of the most salient and prickly legal issues surrounding dealing with the enemy 
in time of war, questions complicated further by the fact that as an Anglo-German 
establishment, the foundation indeed had become half 'enemy*. The foundation's honorary 
solicitor, Bernard Barrington, was requested to ascertain from the Board of Trade the status 
of persons already receiving assistance, as well as the status of future applicants. Evidently 
with a view to a potential immigration problem, Barrington was also instructed to enquire 
about the status of E. von Gaisberg, the foundation's secretary who was presumably a 
German national.24
Unmistakably the war, along with the atmosphere of suspicion which it engendered, 
was to encroach upon the normal running of the foundation. At its meeting of 12 August, 
the executive committee decided that no new cases were to be accepted until the end of the 
war. It was also decided, by a unanimous resolution, that payments to current recipients of 
aid would thenceforth be made only upon evidence that these persons were registered with 
the police. The problem of helping Germans stranded in Britain was cast aside by the 
committee as 'a  matter for systematic treatment by the Government and police [rather] than 
for the sporadic efforts of private charity'. Requests for assistance from Breul and Christ's 
College, Cambridge, thus went unheeded.25
An unusual occurrence at the executive committee's meeting of 26 August was the
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presence of Sir Ernest himself. It appears that Cassel may have been displeased with the 
direction in which the foundation was moving. At this meeting, he called for a revocation 
of the committee's decision of 12 August. He further raised the question of employing the 
foundation's capital to provide relief to destitute Germans, insisting that he would be 
prepared to replace the capital expended. This forthrightness was apparently sufficient to 
silence the opposition from Geoffrey Drage, the committee chairman, and thus the shunting 
away of Germans in need of relief was reversed. But as the minute books suggest, this 
reaffirmation of the foundation's principles by the founder himself might have been inspired 
by a growing apprehension about the foundation's future - and also about the future of 
Germans in Britain. Cassel seemed to think that 'after the war there was likely to be less 
scope for the work of the Foundation. In his judgment feelings would be so embittered 
that the German population in the United Kingdom would be appreciably diminished'.26
Cassel's victory on 26 August was indeed shortlived. On that day, it was revealed 
that the Home Office was drawing up plans for the treatment of aliens in distress, and had 
established a committee under Frederick Huth Jackson which would deal with cases 
requiring charity. Under the Home Office scheme, Germans needing assistance would be 
referred to the foundation. On 2 September confirmation was received of the foundation's 
thenceforth cooperation with Jackson's committee. In the meeting of that day, the 
executive committee was informed that Cassel's proposal to draw on the foundation's 
capital to relieve Germans had to be dropped. As the minutes record: 'The Secretary 
reported on behalf of Sir Ernest Cassel that the difficulty in obtaining authority for drawing 
on the capital of the Foundation was so great that in Sir Ernest's opinion it would not be 
worth while to follow the matter up. It was therefore decided to take no further action.'27
Nonetheless, the work of the foundation was carried on albeit in a diminished and 
constrained role, and with the express blessing of the Home Office. As a letter of 30 
October 1914 from Edward Troup, the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office,
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declared: 'I am directed by the Secretary of State to say that he trusts that the Foundation 
will continue its work in connection with the alleviation of distress among aliens as long as 
there is any scope for its beneficent services'.28
Cassel was to continue playing a role in government throughout the war years, 
being a member of the Anglo-French delegation to the United States in 1915 which secured 
an American loan. During the war also, he donated at least £400,000 for medical services 
and the relief of servicemen's families. Supplementing the work of the foundation, he 
further established the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust in 1919 with a gift of £500,000. 
Some of the funds of this trust were later used to develop the London School of Economics 
and Political Science into the Economics Faculty of the University of London.29
The Imperial College of Science and Technology
The King Edward VII Foundation was not the only educational establishment with 
which Cassel was involved. In 1907 he donated £10,000 towards the founding of the 
Imperial College of Science and Technology, also known as the 'London Charlottenburg'. 
One may recall that this project also received support from King Edward VII. It is to this 
college that we now turn our attention.
Peter Alter, in The Reluctant Patron, along with Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson's 
Portrait of Haldane at Work on Education.30 has already dealt at length with the 
establishment of Imperial College. E.P. Hennock has also examined the extent to which 
the German Technische Hochschule was adopted as a model for emulation and imitation in 
British higher education.31 The aim here is not so much to present new knowledge or 
source material as to highlight the German connection in the founding of Imperial.
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The Role of Richard Haldane
As its epithet may suggest, Imperial was broadly modelled upon the renowned 
Koniglich Technische Hochschule zu Berlin in Charlottenburg, otherwise known as just the 
Technische Hochschule of Charlottenburg, founded in 1879 and one of several polytechnics 
in Germany created specifically for higher education in technology.
Imperial College represents just one example of a broader social movement in 
Britain at the turn of the century which sought to improve the performance of government, 
the army's war-fighting ability, the national physique and other areas of life, by adopting 
German methods as the model for emulation. This 'national efficiency1 movement was 
based on an ideology which attempted to 'discredit the habits, beliefs and institutions that 
put the British at a handicap in their competition with foreigners and to commend instead a 
social organization that more closely followed the German model'.32
The early life of Richard Burdon (later Viscount) Haldane will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 7 below. For now this thesis will confine its discussion to his 
activities in bringing about the founding of Imperial. Haldane himself was a keen advocate 
of 'national efficiency'. An observer at the time credited him with inventing the word 
'efficiency', so widely known was Haldane as its 'recognized exponent'.33 His efforts with 
respect to the founding of Imperial, therefore, must be properly understood within the 
context of the National Efficiency movement. In the first decade of this century,
'efficiency' certainly was the catchword of the day, cited as the 'the most prosperous word 
in the language' and representing the 'political gospel' of a new doctrine.34
Though Haldane was instrumental in Imperial's founding, its genesis was more 
rightfully provided by Sidney Webb (later Lord Passfield), co-founder of the Fabian Society 
and founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science, which was opened 
in 1895. In 1900 the University of London was formally reconstituted by statute as a result 
of an Act of Parliament, the University of London Act of 1898, making it not just an
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institution which administered examinations and conferred degrees, such as its function had 
been since its foundation in 1837, but also one which provided teaching and conducted 
research based on a loose federation of autonomous colleges in London, governed by the 
reconstituted central body known as the Senate.35 As chairman of the Technical Education 
Board of the London County Council (LCC), Sidney Webb had provided an active voice in 
the reorganization of the university and subsequently also sat on the newly founded Senate. 
In this venture, he collaborated closely with Haldane, who recounts: 'Sidney Webb and I 
took counsel together. He was a very practical as well as a veiy energetic man. We laid 
siege to the citadel.'36
In 1901 Webb began agitating for the creation of a college for applied sciences in 
London. In June he anonymously authored two articles in The Times putting forward his 
case. Entitled 'The Organization of University Education in the Metropolis’, the first article 
appearing on 4 June declared: 'The distinctive note of the University is evidently destined 
to be that of applied science'. It then spelled out the various fields of science and 
technology in Britain which had fallen to neglect, as well as the dire dearth of institutions 
in London providing instruction and training in these subjects. As Webb argued: 'the most 
serious deficiency in the London faculty of science is not the inadequacy of the instruction 
for the science degree, but the lack of anything like adequate provision for chemical, 
physical, and biological technology, or the application of science to industrial processes'.
He therefore appealed to 'those who are interested in the great mining enterprises of South 
and West Africa, America, and Australasia' to consider 'whether the time has not come for 
the establishment of a distinct school of metallurgy and mining, with special reference, not 
to coal and iron and the conditions of Great Britain, but to the products and needs of other 
climes'.37
Four days later, the second part of the article appeared in The Times, discussing the 
deficiencies among London's various faculties and making recommendations for
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improvement. Declaring that 'the provision now existing for engineering instruction can 
only be described ... as trivial', Webb proposed ways to expand and strenghten the 
engineering faculty in London, including increasing staff, enlarging existing centres, and 
creating new centres of instruction.38
This campaign was followed up in September of that year with an article in the 
Nineteenth Century and After advocating the promotion of National Efficiency.39 Invoking 
such terms as a '"National Minimum" standard of life', Webb issued a call to arms for 
'National Efficiency in education' as well. 'Nothing would be more widely popular at the 
present time, certainly nothing is more calculated to promote National Efficiency,' he urged, 
'than a large policy of Government aid to the highest technical colleges and the 
universities.'40 This article elicited the warmest praise and encouragement from Haldane, 
who wrote: 'We are delighted with the "Escape from Houndsditch"[.] ... That isvour 
speech for the new movement & it is a very important one.' Haldane added that 'no one 
can say that your line is stale or that it is not suggestive'. Characterizing her husband 
Sidney's article as 'a brilliant success', Beatrice Webb's diary entry of 1 October confirmed: 
'The Asquith, Haldane, [and] Grey lot are delighted with it: Rosebeiy evidently pleased.'41
Affirming his collaboration with Webb in this campaign, Haldane later wrote: 'I 
worked at it, as I had worked at the University of London question, with my friend Mr. 
Sidney Webb.'42 Haldane made his first visit to the Technische Hochschule of 
Charlottenburg in April 1901, calling it 'by far the most perfect University I have ever 
seen'.43 As he recalls in his autobiography:
after studying the organization of Charlottenburg on the spot with the aid of 
my friend, Geheimrat Witt, the Professor of Chemistry there and Head of 
the School, I set to work in London ... to found the new Imperial College 
of Science and Technology ... The new College was to be fashioned so as
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to be brought as quickly as possible into a reconstructed University of
London.44
By September 1901, as he confided to Beatrice Webb, he too was preparing an article 
comparing British and German methods of higher education, based on his findings in 
Berlin.45 This paper, presented in Liverpool on 22 October, upheld the excellence of 
German technical education and the model of the 'alternative University, theTechnische 
Hochschule. Observing that 'architecture, civil engineering, marine engineering, 
mechanical engineering, chemistry and general technical science are ... taught [in Germany] 
on a scale which has no parallel in this country,' he argued: 'I  do not think that anyone can 
appreciate the form and fulness of university life there without having this relationship 
[between science and industry] before his eyes'.46
Incidentally, Haldane was also active in the campaign in progress at that time to 
grant university status to University College, Liverpool. His Liverpool address of 22 
October was conceived not merely as aiming for the establishment of an institute for 
science and technology in London, but as part of a broader and bigger fight for national 
higher education reform. As Haldane asserted, 'we want to make this item of "Efficiency 
in Tertiary Education" a link in our Chain of proposals'.47 Hence, his speech, along with 
the idea of a London Charlottenburg, was viewed as basically a first step in a long 'chain 
of proposals'.
The crusade for a London Charlottenburg was indeed to gather momentum. The 
next burst of propaganda came from Webb who, 'in the hope of catching a millionaire',48 
began preparing yet another article in April 1902 for the Nineteenth Century: this essay 
appeared in the June 1902 number of the periodical.49 Laying down a policy of developing 
postgraduate work, specialist teaching and original research, Webb forecast that the 
faculties of science and engineering in the recently reconstituted university were 'clearly
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destined to be London's strongest side'. He added:
What London University wants ... is, ... a British 'Charlottenburg' - an 
extensive and fully equipped institute of technology, with special 
departments for such branches as mining and metallurgy, naval architecture 
and marine engineering, ... electro-chemistry, optics, the various branches 
of chemical technology, and all possible applications of biology. Such an 
institution, which could be begun on any scale on the land lying vacant at 
South Kensington, should admit only graduate students, or others 
adequately qualified, and should lay itself out from the first to be a place of 
research in which there would be no teaching, in the ordinary sense, but 
only opportunities for learning ...50
It appears obvious from Webb's essay that the idea of establishing a Charlottenburg 
on the vacant land in South Kensington had already been germinated and pondered over.
At that time, instruction in engineering and the applied sciences at London University was 
available primarily at University College and King's College. A third option was 
represented by the Central Technical College of the City and Guilds of London Institute. 
All three suffered from 'lack of space, lack of staff, and lack of funds'.51 Indeed, none of 
them were anything near the size of a typical German Technische Hochschule. In South 
Kensington, however, there was already in place a concentration of technical colleges 
which could form the hub of something potentially bigger. Located there were the Royal 
College of Science and the Royal School of Mines, both under the Board of Education as 
well as the above-mentioned Central Technical College of the City and Guilds of London 
Institute.52 As early as December 1902 enquiries were already being made within official 
circles to reorganize the School of Mines and to affiliate the Royal College of Science with
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the University of London.53
South Kensington may have appeared to be a favourable site for a great institute 
for applied sciences as the existing colleges there could be amalgamated and land was also 
available nearby - provided it could be obtained from the Royal Commissioners of the 
Exhibition of 1851 who held title to it - to facilitate the construction of new buildings and 
facilities for an enlarged institution. But, as has been pointed out: 'To turn the idea into 
reality required money, government consent to surrender its colleges in South Kensington, 
co-operation from the City and Guilds, agreement on the part of the 1851 Exhibition 
commissioners to release land, and negotiations with the University of London so that any 
London Charlottenburg would not be separate from the University’.54
Thus, a series of obstacles had to be overcome before the 'Charlottenburg scheme’ 
could be realized. There is certainly evidence suggesting that Haldane seized the initiative 
in direct action rather than engage in academic pontification in the manner of Webb. On 9 
May 1902, Haldane met with the merchant and finance firm of Wemher, Beit and Co. in an 
attempt - which proved successful - to secure a pledge of financial support for 'our big 
scheme’.55 In January 1903, he was arranging for Sidney Webb to draft a letter for Lord 
Rosebery, the first Chancellor of the reorganized University of London, who would then 
present it to the LCC with the aim of proposing the 'Charlottenburg scheme’.56 The 
importance of securing the LCC’s support for the project lay in the fact that it was the 
authority responsible for technical education in London.
Rosebery's letter was ready for public consumption on 27 June 1903. It was 
addressed to Lord Monkswell, the chairman of the LCC, and was also printed in The Times 
on 29 June. Making the first public reference to the 'Charlottenburg scheme’, Rosebery 
alluded to the 'special attention’ paid in other countries to the 'highest technical training’.
He suggested:
Perhaps the most perfect instance of such provision is the great College of 
Applied Science at Charlottenburg, alongside of the University of Berlin, 
erected at an outlay exceeding £500,000, and costing £55,000 a year. From 
its portals there issue every year some 1,200 young men of 22 or 23 years 
of age, equipped with the most perfect training that science can give ...
Rosebery deplored that 'our London young men often find the highest places filled by the 
better educated Germans', and that it was 'little short of a scandal' that these students were 
compelled to acquire technical training in Germany or the United States. He thus called for 
London to be made the centre of scientific training for the whole British Empire.57
According to Rosebery's blueprint, the envisaged institution would constitute 'a  
distinct "School"' of the University of London, though under the management of its own 
committee. The intricate details of what transpired between 1903 and the eventual 
founding of Imperial College in 1907 need not detain us here. Briefly put, the Board of 
Education promptly followed up on the publication of Rosebery's letter. The 
commissioners of the 1851 Exhibition also proved willing to relinquish the four acres or so 
of land at South Kensington, as requested by Rosebery.
King Edward VII appears to have played a significant part in these negotiations for, 
according to Haldane, he 'was very helpful and was instrumental in procuring for us the 
grant of the requisite land from the Exhibition Commissioners'.58 During this campaign to 
acquire the land at the South Kensington site, Haldane forged 'what became a confidential 
and intimate relationship' with the monarch. 'I began to see the King very frequently,' 
Haldane recalls, 'and he took a good deal of interest in the plan, which gave effect to an 
earlier idea of Prince Albert.'59 Rosebery also appears to have made a direct approach to 
the King concerning acquisition of the land at South Kensington. As President of the 
Royal Commission of the 1851 Exhibition, Edward VII was certainly in a position to help
and exercise influence from above. As Sir Francis Knollys, the King's private secretary, 
remarked to Rosebery in a letter of 19 July 1902: 'The King is still nominally President of 
the '51 Com[missio]n, and will remain so until next Nov[embe]r when he will be succeeded 
by the Prince of Wales. If therefore you will send me the proposal to which you refer I 
will submit it to H.M..'60 In view of the king's position, it is hardly surprising, then, that 
the commissioners were eventually persuaded to relinquish the land.
The machinery, however, ground away slowly, leading Haldane to complain to 
Rosebery in December 1904 that 'I still think the Education question wants settling. It is a 
stumbling block. ... Fel[ix] Schuster, Asquith and I had a talk about it last Friday.'61 It was 
not until March 1905 that the Board of Education gave its consent to the incorporation of 
the Royal School of Mines and the Royal College of Science to constitute the new Imperial 
College - a decision confirmed officially on 3 April 1905. The City and Guilds Council 
also showed itself amenable to allowing its college to become part of the scheme. In June 
1905 the Treasury agreed to provide an annual grant of £17,000 to the new institution; in 
November the amount was raised to £20,000. Finally, the royal charter for the Imperial 
College of Science and Technology passed the Great Seal on 8 July 1907.62 When the 
college's foundation stone was finally laid in July 1909, Haldane boastfully referred to the 
occasion as marking 'the birth of another child of mine'.63
It should be noted that even after 1902, Haldane's role in the project had not 
diminished. He was appointed a member of the Departmental Committee on the Royal 
College of Science, formed by the Board of Education in April 1904. Officially this 
committee's task was to look into the operation of the Royal College of Science to consider 
how it could be employed 'to the fullest extent for the promotion of higher scientific 
studies in connection with the work of existing or projected institutions for instruction of 
the same character in the Metropolis or elsewhere'.64 In the course of its proceedings, 
however, the committee overstepped its mandate and as early as February 1905, when
issuing its preliminary report, recommended that the 'proposed College of Applied Science1 
be a federation of the three existing colleges in South Kensington.65
Haldane succeeded to the chair of the committee in early 1905, thanks to the 
resignation of Sir Francis Mowatt, brought down by illness. Hence, from the committee's 
second and third year onwards Haldane was in a prime position to influence proceedings, 
including and especially the committee's final recommendations and findings, issued in its 
report of February 1906, which were later embodied in the college's charter.
But important as Haldane's role was in bringing about the London Charlottenburg, 
it should not be overstated. No doubt his energy and personal and political skills, not to 
mention his admiration for the German model, made it all possible. First, one must bear in 
mind that embracing the German model as a paradigm of excellence already had precedents 
in the nineteenth century, symbolized, for instance, by Matthew Arnold, the educationist 
and Germanophile. In his Higher Schools and Universities in Germany, he had written 
glowingly of German education when arguing: 'It is in science that we have most need to 
borrow from the German universities. The French university has no liberty, and the 
English universities have no science; the German universities have both.'66 Secondly, 
Haldane was not the first or the only voice in this movement. In fact he had 
contemporaries who had for years spoken publicly in favour of reforming British education 
along the lines of the German model. One of them was Michael Ernest Sadler, Vice- 
Chancellor of Leeds University from 1911 to 1923, who was, however, unable to translate 
his words into action. Thirdly, one should not ignore the part played by others in the 
founding of Imperial. Robert Morant and Francis Mowatt, Permanent Secretaries 
respectively of the Board of Education and the Treasury, were important in helping to drive 
the scheme forward within their agencies. Mowatt in particular was critical in ensuring 
financial support from the Treasury. Morant, who proved to be a faithful supporter, both 
professionally and personally, shared Haldane's enthusiasm for higher education reform as
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well as his disaffection with the apathy of the bureaucratic establishment. As Morant wrote 
to Haldane, heaping praise on his book Education and Empire: 'I am exceedingly glad to 
read your bold stirring of the diy bones - may it indeed make many of them live. You 
have said what needs saying over & over again, & you have said it pointedly ...'
Criticizing the 'smallness of vision' prevailing at Whitehall, Morant very unequivocally 
urged Haldane on. As he implored: 'I hope you may imbue many in authority with the 
realization of what England needs.'67 That Morant shared a commitment to reforming 
British higher education based on the German model should not be surprising considering 
that he was himself a Germanophile. In the 1890s, avowedly 'ashamed at my helplessness' 
with the German language, he had been determined to undertake an extended period of 
absence to travel to Germany and 'soak in German'.68 Evidently, Morant too had a high 
regard for German culture.
Some credit is also due to Rosebery, the 'catalyst' whose participation enabled the 
project to move 'beyond the stage of informal discussions'.69 Being a former Foreign 
Secretary and Prime Minister, Rosebery commanded even greater political clout than 
Haldane. When Wemher, Beit, in promising financial support to the scheme, asked for a 
body of trustees to be appointed, Haldane acknowledged: 'I f  I can get Rosebery ... to serve 
on it I think we may get a million' - an implicit recognition of Rosebery's influence. 
Consequently, Haldane was confident that Wemher, Beit 'will give much more than 
£100,000 really'.70 Though an 'enigma', Rosebery was known for his 'wit and original 
thought' and his ability to 'make all the world listen'. Moreover, he was 'a  bom actor' that 
was 'first-rate at appearances'71 - qualities of immeasurable value in any endeavour to win 
financial support.
As originally conceived, Imperial was to be London's 'Charlottenburg', and the 
relevance of the German model was widely appreciated at the time of the college's 
founding. Journals such as the University Review and Nature referred to the new
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institution as the 'Charlottenburg of London'. As a 2 July 1903 article in Nature declared, 
'with the magnificent institutes in Germany to adapt from, there is really no reason why it 
[the new college] should not be a grand success1.72 Nonetheless, the German model was 
emulated and in certain respects imitated but only in a form adapted to British conditions. 
The limits to the relevance of the German model in fact were recognized by Haldane, who 
was not keen on keeping the Technische Hochschulen and universities separate, as they 
were in Germany. As he noted: 'my investigations in Germany had at an early stage 
impressed me unfavourably with the separation which had been made there between the 
Universities and the great Technical Colleges'.73 Rather, Haldane believed in what 
Hennock calls the 'university ideal'74 of incorporating technical studies into the core of 
university education and avoiding overspecialization. In its final report of 1906 Haldane's 
committee stated: 'There are certain elements in the German system which cannot, however 
admirable in themselves, be reproduced in this country'.75
Financial Support from Germans
With regard to financing, the German element is even more conspicuous. In his 
Times article of 4 June 1901, Webb made a reference to the 'great mining enterprises of 
South and West Africa' when firing his opening volley in his campaign for a London 
Charlottenburg. It is only proper that the bulk of the financial support for the scheme 
eventually did come from the great South African mining sector - a sector dominated by 
interests of German origin.
In his letter of 27 June 1903 to Monkswell, Rosebery estimated the cost of 
constructing the new technical institution to be at about £300,000. When completed, he 
predicted, the institution along with the site would be worth £500,000. In addition, he 
mentioned the sum of £20,000, being the institution's estimated annual cost of maintenance. 
'For this sum', Rosebery wrote, 'I venture to approach the London County Council'. His
approach soon proved successful, for the LCC in the following month consented to 
providing the grant of £20,000 per annum. Rosebery's letter also acknowledged: 'An offer 
has been made by Messrs. Wemher, Beit & Co. to place a large sum of money in the 
hands of trustees to be applied as a contribution towards the cost of building and 
equipment, and further offers of the same kind have been made by other public-spirited 
London citizens.'76 Thus, the bulk of the financing had already been secured from private 
hands.
The Wemher, Beit offer, to the value of £100,000, was obtained evidently as early 
as a year prior to Rosebery's letter. As mentioned above, Haldane met with Wemher, Beit 
& Co. on 9 May 1902 - a visit which he recounted to Sidney Webb in a letter of the same 
day. Haldane wrote:
I saw the four London partners of W.B. & Co. this afternoon & had an 
hour with them. It was just in time. There had been no talk of a million - 
but they were pondering giving £100.000 to U. Coll. This I have stopped.
They will give £10.000 only. But I have undertaken to prepare a scheme 
for a Committee or body of Trustees to begin our big scheme. They will 
give us £100,000 to start it, & help us to get more. The partners are keen 
to do something [all emphases in the original].77
The body of trustees which Haldane mentioned here was in fact formed. As Haldane 
wished, Rosebery and the Conservative leader, Arthur Balfour, were recruited into this 
committee. It included Julius Wemher, the Duke of Devonshire, Haldane, the Vice- 
Chancellor and the Principal of the University of London, along with representatives of the 
LCC. 'At the request of the first donors [Wemher, Beit & Co.] I have agreed to act as 
chairman of a body of trustees to carry out the scheme to completion,' affirmed Rosebery.
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It would be difficult to deny that it was Wemher, Beit's initial pledge of £100,000 
which got the scheme under way in 1902. According to Rupert Hall, the new Imperial 
College had 'capital resources or endowment' totalling £281,000, not including the 
buildings and land. However, he fails to furnish a precise breakdown of the donors. While 
Hall lists £15,000 as coming from the Bessemer Memorial Fund which was established in 
1903 (coincidentally at about the same time as Rosebery's letter to Monkswell), the sum of 
£22,000 is only identified as being given by 'private donors'.78 A fuller picture may be 
obtained from the annual reports of Imperial's governing body. Besides Wemher, Beit's 
£100,000 and the LCC's grant of £20,000 per annum, Imperial also received an annual 
grant of £20,000 from the government. Funding from private sources, however, was to 
play an important role during the college's early years. On the death of Alfred Beit, one of 
Wemher's partners, in 1906, £135,000 was bequeathed to Imperial as stipulated in his 
will.79 In its first year, Imperial received £50,000 of Beit's bequest as well as 5,000 
preference shares in the De Beers Mining Company. A donation of £10,000 each came 
from Ernest Cassel and Maximilian Michaelis. Meanwhile, Haldane gave £1,000.8° During 
the period up to 1914, significant contributions were also received from other private 
sources, in particular the Worshipful Company of Goldsmiths.81 Nonetheless, the Wemher- 
Beit connection remained the most dominant. As Imperial's governing body acknowledged 
in 1912: 'The expenditure on these extensions of buildings with other works is expected to 
exceed a quarter of a million pounds sterling, and has been rendered possible by the 
beneficent generosity of private individuals and companies. Mention should be made 
especially of the firm of Messrs. Wemher, Beit & Co. ... and the late Alfred Beit, Esq.' 
Upon his death in 1912, Julius Wemher bequeathed to Imperial £100,000 along with a 
portion of his residuary estate, bringing the total of his legacy to approximately £150,000. 
This benefaction was given in two instalments, the second of which was received by 
Imperial in May 1914.82 Alfred Beit's younger brother, Otto, also created an endowment
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worth £10,000 to be used for fellowships tenable at Imperial. These became known as the 
Beit Scientific Research Fellowships.83
Haldane's Autobiography provides a glimpse of the broader network to which the 
Wemher connection led. As Haldane relates,
I had called on Mr. Wemher, of the great firm of Wemher, Beit & Co., 
whom and his partners I did not know excepting as public-spirited men of 
German origin and as impressed with the necessity for this country of 
German scientific training. I found him and Alfred Beit and the other 
members of his firm at their office. They were highly appreciative, and at 
once offered £100,000 for the scheme. To this they added later on other 
very large sums. I lunched at Beit's house in Park Lane to meet Cecil 
Rhodes, who had heard of the scheme for the reconstruction of London 
University into an intellectual centre for the students of the Empire. He 
and I went down to Tring Park to spend a week-end with Rothschild. I 
had much talk with Rhodes, who assisted in getting his South African 
friends to help further. He impressed me, not as an idealist of the kind to 
which I had been accustomed to look up most, but as a splendidly energetic 
man of affairs, with a wide outlook and great capacity for getting things 
through. Sir Ernest Cassel, a man of the same type, in his turn gave a 
large contribution, and so did the Rothschilds.84
Long as the quoted passage may seem, it is useful in the names it mentions of 
Imperial's first sources of financial support. With the exception of Rhodes, all the names 
mentioned were either German or had a German connection. It has not been possible, 
however, to ascertain the amount of financial assistance provided by Rothschild to Imperial.
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But what remains indisputable is that Rhodes, though an Englishman, had close business 
ties with Alfred Beit, Julius Wemher and Rothschild on account of his diamond- and gold- 
mining enterprises in southern Africa. One should now briefly examine this diamond-based 
network which linked Rhodes with Wemher, education with business, and Britain with 
Germany.
W ernher, Beit & Co.
The origins of Wemher, Beit & Co. can be traced to France and South Africa.
After serving briefly in the Franco-Prussian War Julius Carl Wemher, bom in Darmstadt in 
1850, was hired by the French diamond merchant, Jules Porges, founder of the merchant 
house of Jules Porges et Cie. Wemher was assigned as an assistant to Charles Mege, 
Porges's partner, to purchase diamonds at the newly discovered Kimberley diamond fields. 
He and Mege arrived in the Cape Colony in early 1871 and when the latter returned to 
Paris in 1873, Wemher stayed behind as Porges's representative on the 'Fields'. As the 
Dictionary of Business Biography claims: 'Under Wemher's direction Porges et Cie became 
one of the largest shippers of diamonds in the colony.'85 In the mid-1870s, the diamond 
business in South Africa took off. Porges in 1876 purchased £90,000 worth of claims 
which were placed in a private company called the Griqualand Diamond Mining Co., which 
was amalgamated in 1880 with other interests to form the Compagnie Fran9aise des 
Diamants du Cap de Bonne EspSrance with a capital of FF14 million. Otherwise known in 
Kimberley as the 'French Company',86 this new entity was the first diamond-mining 
company to be offered to European investors. In 1880 also Wemher returned to England to 
take up his position as senior partner in Porges et Cie's London office. He was to be 
naturalized in 1898 and granted a knighthood in 1905. Thanks to Wemher's departure from 
South Africa, Alfred Beit thenceforth became the firm's new local representative on the 
mining fields.
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Beit, like Wemher a German, was bom in Hamburg in 1853. He too entered the 
diamond business in 1871, when he went to Amsterdam to learn the diamond trade. In 
1875 Beit moved to Kimberley as a clerk to Max Gammius, the local representative of the 
Hamburg merchant company of David Lippert & Co. Establishing himself in the diamond 
fields, Beit soon became an independent local diamond merchant and speculated as well in 
diamond shares and claims. Beginning in 1883 he represented Jules Porges in Kimberley, 
taking up to one-third the share of the profits from the diamonds shipped to London for the 
company. The latter part of 1886 witnessed a speculative boom in diamond and gold 
shares, resulting in a tremendous boost to Beit's capital and establishing him as one of the 
top Kimberley share dealers. By 1887, his capital in his new position at Porges et Cie had 
risen to £100,000 from just £35,000 in 1884. Subsequent to the discovery of gold in the 
Transvaal in 1886, Beit and Wemher bought claims and farms on the Witwatersrand with 
the help of Porges's capital and his access to European funds, resulting in the floating of 
numerous London-based mining companies. When Porges retired in 1889, the firm was 
reconstituted as the London private partnership of Wemher, Beit & Co. with a capital of £1 
million in cash, diamonds and other investments, and up to £2.5 million in shares and 
speculative ventures of other kinds. By the 1890s Wemher, Beit, becoming the most 
successful mining-finance group in South Africa, accounted for almost 40 per cent of South 
Africa's total annual gold production. Through interlocking directorships, local agents and 
a public holding company known as Rand Mines Ltd., the firm owned some of the richest 
gold mines in the Rand.87
Cecil Rhodes's initial connection with Wemher, Beit was made through Beit, whom 
he met in 1879 while Beit was still with David Lippert & Co. At that time, Lippert was 
second only to the giant merchant house of Mosenthal & Bros., both concerns constituting 
the dominant German presence in southern Africa prior to the opening up of the Kimberley 
diamond fields and the arrival of Porges.88 Rhodes too arrived in South Africa just before
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the start of the boom, landing in Durban in October 1870. With the discovery of diamonds 
in the Orange Free State in the areas of Colesberg Kopje and Du Toif s Pan - better known 
respectively as Kimberley mine and De Beers mine - Cecil Rhodes and his brother,
Herbert, headed for the diamond fields in 1871. Cecil, however, interrupted this enterprise 
in 1873 when he returned to England to study at Oxford but went back to Kimberley late 
in the year. Beginning his association with Charles Rudd in 1874, Rhodes gradually 
accumulated his claims, concentrating his holdings in De Beers mine, one of the two great 
mines of Kimberley. In 1880 Rhodes and Rudd combined their holdings into a new 
company, the De Beers Mining Company, formed on 1 April with a capital of £200,000.
Meanwhile, Rhodes faced a rival in the shape of Barnett Isaacs, later known as 
Barney Bamato, who formed the Bamato Mining Company in 1880 concentrating in 
Kimberley mine. But as the prices of diamonds fluctuated constantly and as Rhodes's De 
Beers Mining Company was not on a secure financial footing, the pressure increased to 
fortify the company's position by amalgamating with Bamato who, though a rival, was a 
bigger concern and thus enjoyed a stronger financial position. The amalgamation of these 
two companies, effectively consolidating all the mines in Kimberley, resulted in the 
formation of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. in 1888. The Wemher-Beit connection 
proved crucial as the deal was made possible with the aid of Wemher and Porges, who 
secured backing from the London merchant bankers, N.M. Rothschild & Sons.89
The importance to Rhodes of Beit's access to the European capital markets should 
not be overlooked. It was largely thanks to Beit that the Rothschilds of London and of 
Germany, Austria and France were brought into South African mining finance. In A 
Pioneer Looks Back. J.B. Taylor, one of Beit's associates, recounts: 'There was not enough 
speculative capital in London for anything big. Alfred Beit saw from the start the 
magnitude of the financial support required by the Rand, and provided for it by obtaining 
Continental support.' Underscoring Rhodes's appreciation of Beit's influence, Taylor adds:
It was never out of Rhodes's mind that it was Beit's money, and the money 
interests that Beit could 'influence', that were the chief props of the 
diamond industry. He realized that Beit's following among the German,
Austrian and French bankers was very strong, and that through these 
sources almost unlimited capital was at Beit's command.90
Beit's personal and business links with Rhodes were not to end there. Expanding 
into north of the Transvaal, Rhodes in 1889 was granted the charter for his British South 
Africa Company, supported with £500,000 from Beit, who in turn sat on its board. In 1895 
Beit played a role as well in the abortive Jameson Raid, arguably an instance of Anglo- 
German business collaboration which failed miserably.
The Rhodes Scholarships
Having explored Rhodes's links with Julius Wemher and Alfred Beit, one can see 
the Wemher-Beit connection entering the equation again in the Rhodes Scholarships, which 
came into operation in 1903. But while Imperial College represented Wemher, Beit's direct 
link to education, the firm's tie with the Rhodes Scholarships existed only through an 
indirect channel. Nonetheless, Rhodes's scholarship scheme had an added German element 
in its provision for German scholarships.
Rhodes and Oxford
Before amassing his wealth in the diamond business in Africa, Rhodes had obtained 
his education at Oxford. At age twenty, Rhodes returned from Kimberley in 1873 to attend 
Oxford, applying for admission to University College, which rejected him on account of his 
failing the entrance examination in Latin prose and perhaps also because he lacked a public 
school education, the real reason still remaining a matter for speculation. He was
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consequently referred to the 'less particular’ Oriel College, where he matriculated on 13 
October 1873. Upon completing his first term, however, he returned to Africa late in that 
year, a move possibly prompted by the death of his mother in November. Rhodes resumed 
his studies at Oxford only in April 1876 and, in effect a full-time entrepreneur embroiled in 
his own business affairs, he was not able to take his degree until 1881.
It has been suggested that Rhodes chose to go to Oxford to 'make contact with the 
cream of the English ruling class' and to lay the foundation for a 'plan of life'.91 Being 
older than most of his peers, he certainly was not the typical Oxford undergraduate. 
Rhodes's Oxford years are known to have been marked by a 'lack of distinction or even of 
any apparent intellectual purpose', as Carleton Kemp Allen, at one time the Warden of 
Rhodes House, has put it.92 The Rev. Arthur Gray Butler, Dean of Oriel from 1875 to 
1895, remarked about Rhodes's career at Oxford as being 'uneventful'. 'He belonged to a 
set of men like himself, not caring for distinction in the schools and not working for them, 
but of refined tastes, dining and living for the most part together1, observed Butler.93 
Described by his Oxford contemporaries as 'lackadaisical', 'natural and unaffected', 
'reserved' and having an 'unconventional attitude towards things in general',94Rhodes 
probably did not strike them as one who would attain such prominence in history as he was 
destined to.
Rhodes died on 26 March 1902 in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and, as 
stipulated in his will, was buried in the Matoppos in Rhodesia on a hill commanding what 
he called the 'View of the World'. Beginning in 1877, when he had his first serious heart 
attack, he drew up a series of wills, the seventh, and final, one of which was made in 1899. 
This last, in addition to bequeathing £100,000 to Oriel College, laid down provisions for 
his scholarship scheme. As stated in the will, he considered that 'the education of young 
Colonists at one of the Universities in the United Kingdom is of great advantage to them 
for giving breadth to their views for their instruction in life and manners and for instilling
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into their minds the advantage to the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom of the 
retention of the unity of the Empire'. Hence, this was conceived as an imperial project to 
bring together the mother country and her colonies. Attaching 'very great importance1 to a 
university with a residential system, Rhodes cited Edinburgh as a university at which he 
would have desired to establish his scholarships, but he deemed it unsuitable 'owing to its 
not having such a residential system’. Therefore Oxford, having such a system, was chosen 
instead. Although intended primarily for the British Empire, the scheme also set aside 
scholarships for the United States, the object being 'to encourage and foster an appreciation 
of the advantages which I implicitly believe will result from the union of the English- 
speaking peoples throughout the world' and to encourage in American students 'an 
attachment to the country from which they have sprung'. His will specified the annual 
value of each scholarship to be £300, tenable at any college for three consecutive years. 
Originally, fifty-two scholarships were provided for in his will: twenty for countries then 
forming part of the British Empire and thirty-two going to the United States. Reflecting 
the ethos of a man of action - whose student life was mixed with business and political 
enterprise, swashbuckling adventures in the mining fields, and outdoor activity in the 
wilderness - he stipulated that the scholarship students should 'not be merely bookworms'. 
Rather, in his view, they should be selected on the basis of 'literary and scholastic 
attainments', 'fondness of and success in outdoor sports', 'qualities of manhood', 'devotion 
to duty', 'moral force of character' and 'instincts to lead'. Betraying hints of 
progressiveness, his testament specifically laid down that a student should not be selected 
or disqualified 'on account of his race or religious opinions'.95 His will, however, failed to 
specify the gender eligibility of his scholars, and until 1977 the scholarships were awarded 
to male students only because Parliament up to that point had chosen to interpret his 
scheme as being single-sex.96 As trustees of the scholarships he named his closest friends 
and associates: Earl Grey, Lord Milner, Alfred Beit, Leander Starr Jameson, Lewis Loyd
Michell, Bourchier Francis Hawksley, and lastly, the Earl of Rosebery. The Anglo-German 
ring indeed comes full circle again. Lord Rosebery, the Chancellor of the reorganized 
University of London, is revisited in the founding of the Rhodes Scholarships.
The German Scholarships
The German scholarships were, as Allen points out, an 'afterthought', brought into 
being only by a 1901 codicil to Rhodes's will. But whether he was motivated by 'political 
rather than educational' reasons, it cannot be doubted that Rhodes's dealings with the Kaiser 
Wilhelm II played a large part in the creation of these scholarships. In 1899 Rhodes had 
obtained a concession from the German Emperor for the trans-African telegraph to go 
through German East Africa. In the course of business he had a personal interview with 
Wilhelm, to whom he took a great liking.97 As Hawksley suggested during the First World 
War when speaking about the scholarships, Rhodes 'had been having a "deal" with the 
Kaiser over East Africa and thought he would like to show his appreciation of his 
consideration and make him a little present'.98 Dr. George (later Sir George) Parkin, who 
was appointed the trust's organizing secretary in 1902 despite the objections of Rosebery, 
who saw him as 'a  round peg in a square hole' in that post,99 published his book The 
Rhodes Scholarships in 1913. There Parkin gave a similar account of Rhodes's 'extremely 
cordial' reception by the Kaiser. Rhodes, according to him, thought Wilhelm a 'broad­
minded man' and recounted that 'I appealed to him in connection with the portion of Africa 
which is under his rule, he met one with a breadth of mind which was admirable'.100
The personal element in this relationship is amply reflected in Rhodes's codicil, 
which accorded the Kaiser the sole authority to nominate the German students for the 
scholarships - a remarkable privilege considering that not even the President of the United 
States or the British sovereign was explicitly given such supremacy over procedure in 
selecting the American and Dominion students respectively. Incidentally, Rhodes's will
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failed to spell out the machinery and procedures for selecting scholars. Moreover, it 
appears that these scholarships were inspired by a wish to pay tribute to the Kaiser for 
having introduced the teaching of English in German schools. Rhode's codicil of January 
1901 thus read:
This is a further Codicil to my Will. I note the German Emperor 
has made instruction in English compulsory in German schools. I leave 
five yearly scholarships at Oxford of £250 per ann. to students of German 
birth the scholars to be nominated by the German Emperor for the time 
being. Each scholarship to continue for three years so that each year after 
the first three there will be fifteen scholars.
In similar vein to Cassel, Rhodes was fired with the lofty ideal of preserving peace, 
as the last line of his codicil read: 'The object is that an understanding between the three 
great powers will render war impossible and educational relations make the strongest tie.'101 
In Rhodes's eyes, then, there were only three 'great powers' in the world - Britain, the 
United States and Germany - and these were the only ones deserving of his scholarships. 
This worldview is significant in its underlying assumption of a shared community of values 
between Britain and the United States, and between Britain and Germany. Even though his 
scheme was conceived primarily as a means of binding the British Empire and the Anglo- 
Saxon nations together, he did not deem it inappropriate to include the Germans in this 
framework - a tribute perhaps to his cosmopolitanism and association with German miners 
and merchants in South Africa. In his book, Parkin could not avoid evoking imagery of 
Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic brotherhood. As he noted:
Oxford's outlook on the world was already wide. ... But a scheme which
134
opened a possibility for chosen youth of the whole Anglo-Saxon and 
Teutonic world to learn their lessons at her feet was ... a wonderful 
widening of opportunity which she heartily welcomed.102
As stipulated by Rhodes, there were to be no more than fifteen German 
scholarships at any one time. It appears that these scholarships had a clumsy and 
inauspicious start. If the records of the Rhodes Trust are to provide any indication, then 
the Germans initially were anything but the models of efficiency. Preparations were in 
progress on the German side by the autumn of 1902 for the admission of the first five 
German scholars in October 1903.103 In May 1903 Francis (later Sir Francis) Wylie, a 
Fellow and Tutor at Brasenose College, was appointed to be the trustees’ representative at 
Oxford. As might be expected, the finer details of the scholarships still had to be worked 
out. Even in June 1903 Wylie was enquiring about how the German students were going 
to be paid.104 Throughout that summer, there are indications of anxiety, if not annoyance, 
on the part of the trustees and the colleges over the German authorities' slowness in
nominating their scholars and selecting the colleges which they would be attending,105 and
by early October the Germans proved no more forthcoming. As Wylie wrote: 'No news 
from Germany: but a man who was over there this summer gathered that they may be 
unable to send their five this year. Meanwhile Magdalen and Balliol are getting anxious.’
It was not until 13 October that news was received of the German scholars being finally 
named, eliciting the remark from Wylie that 'at least they seem to be waking up’. Another 
complaint was made that 'the German Authorities will have themselves to thank if their 
Scholars fail to get rooms in the Colleges they select.’106 Even when the names of the 
students were relayed to the trustees, a clerical error was made resulting in yet another 
stumble. The matter was only cleared up officially on 23 October with a letter from Count 
Bemstorff, Counsellor of the German embassy, who provided the correct names.107 The
first five German Rhodes Scholars were Hans Erdmann von Lindeiner-Wildau (Exeter),
Karl Alexander von Muller (Oriel), Theodor Heinrich Erbe (Merton), Hans Eberhard von 
Schweinitz (Balliol) and Count Helie Talleyrand-Perigord (Magdalen), the last being related 
to the famous French diplomat, Count Talleyrand, of the previous centuiy.108
Despite the teething problems, at least the German scholars did arrive in the 
autumn of 1903, along with six from South Africa. The start of that inaugural year was 
marked by the noticeable absence of the Americans and most of the Dominion students, 
whose selection was delayed because the proper procedures and the whole bureaucratic 
machinery, which had to be established from scratch, could not be brought up to speed. 
Being hand-picked by the Kaiser thus had its advantages, not least that of expeditiousness. 
It must be noted, though, that these five Germans and six South Africans in 1903 were the 
first to arrive but not the first Rhodes Scholars as such. Two students had already been 
selected in 1902 before Rhodes's death but as they were just aged sixteen at the time, their 
arrival in Oxford had to be deferred until 1904.109
Owing to the demands of compulsory military service in Germany, maintaining 
residence in Oxford for three years proved to be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Germans. Responding to a request from the Kaiser, the trustees agreed in 1907 to require 
the German scholars to remain for just two years. Theodor Erbe, one of the 1903 arrivals, 
actually returned for a third year after completing his military service, but he was more the 
exception than the rule.110
How were the Germans viewed in Oxford? In the spring of 1911 Wylie wrote to 
the deans of the colleges soliciting their views of their German scholars. This move was 
prompted by an approach from Dr. Ernst Sieper, a professor of English literature at the 
University of Munich, who complained that favouritism was being shown towards the 
aristocratic class in the selection of German scholars. As Sieper argued, 'the general 
feeling is that the number of aristocrats chosen for Oxford are in no proportion to the
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importance and influence of the German aristocracy upon our intellectual and public life'.111 
The responses from the colleges to Wylie's enquiry nonetheless tended to be salutary. 
'Entirely favourable', 'the right kind of German', and 'a  most favourable impression' 
represented some of the comments received, leading Wylie to remark that the colleges 
'have turned out to be rather less critical than I had myself expected'. Speaking of the 
average Oxford view, he was compelled to conclude that 'there is not very much ground 
for saying that there is any positive dissatisfaction in Oxford with the Germans; or th a t... 
the "Aristocrats” in particular have been the unsatisfactory element'. Therefore, he 
recommended that no representations should be made to the Kaiser about the scholars he 
was nominating.112
Nonetheless, certain more critical voices were heard. Balliol, for instance, besides 
thinking that the Germans kept too much to themselves and occasionally lacked adequate 
skills in English, found that their intellectual level was 'a  good deal lower than that of the 
other Rhodes Scholars'. The reply from Exeter remarked that two of the German scholars 
it had previously had 'gave indications that there might be danger in sending here young 
men of good social standing who had no serious aims'.113 These views would only have 
bolstered Sieper's argument and were perhaps borne out by fact. Count Helie Talleyrand- 
Perigord, for instance, was deemed an 'attractive fellow' but 'idle'. 'His College were 
annoyed with him.' Friedrich von Bethmann Hollweg, son of the German Chancellor who 
arrived at Balliol in 1908, was judged to be 'not very strenuous' though intelligent. But on 
the whole the German scholars who arrived between 1903 and 1911 received favourable 
reviews, according to surviving records. The one entering class with a conspicuous blotch 
seems to have been that of 1906, containing Herbert von Veltheim who 'went wrong', 'got 
badly into debt, wasted his time, and played the fool'.114 Even if representing just a 
minority, these instances of wayward upper-class lads did lend support to Sieper's criticism 
that the scholarships were being awarded to undeserving students. But as Rosebery pointed
out, though aristocrats may have been overrepresented among the German scholars, it 
remained a German matter and not one in which the trustees could rightly intervene.115
The War and the Broken Fellowship
Described as 'a  very nice fellow',116 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had first 
arrived in 1913, was making plans in the summer of 1914 to return to Oxford for another 
year. By 4 August, however, those plans were thrown asunder as the German presence in 
Oxford was drastically reduced at the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, Bieberstein would 
later be killed in action.
Just as the King Edward VII British-German Foundation's educational exchange 
was severed by the war, so too was the Anglo-German connection at Oxford. By 31 
August 1914 Parkin was expressing his doubts about whether the German Rhodes Scholars 
'will now feel like coming to us for some years to come'. He further predicted that the 
scholarships would be only 'a  half-hearted affair' when resumed. Nevertheless, he was not 
willing to cut the German link completely. As Parkin wrote: 'The Scholarships will be 
here for them to take when they want them.'117
During the war, the German Rhodes Scholarships were revoked by a private Act of 
Parliament, the Rhodes Estate Act of 1916. But this annulment could not entirely destroy 
Anglo-German relationships on the individual level. As Count Albrecht Bemstorff,
German Rhodes Scholar who had arrived in 1909, remarked in July 1915:
For me and for all those to whom Oxford was more than merely a very 
happy period of life, this war is a very sad experience. Fate has built up a 
wall between us, and to my mind it seems to be one of the greatest 
tragedies in history that we should fight against another, where we must 
give and exchange and work together.118
This sense of brotherhood among the Rhodes Scholars, transcending national origin 
and wartime allegiances, is evident in an account given by a former American Rhodes 
Scholar who wrote to Wylie in December 1918, informing him of his meeting with former 
German Rhodes Scholars. As a member of the American section of the Armistice 
Commission, the American met Baron Wemher von Ow-Wachendorff (1907) in Spa 
following the armistice, and was in turn introduced to Kurt Schahin von Kamphoevener. 
Describing his meeting with Kamphoevener, the American took particular note of the 
marked English influence on the German's deportment: 'He speaks English without a trace 
of an accent, and still has the Oxford manner.' Subsequent to that meeting, he also met 
with Bemstorff and Conrad Rodiger who, he reported, 'gave me to understand ... that a 
very influential section of the Foreign Office, headed by the Rhodes Scholars, had been in 
continual and violent opposition to the military dictatorship ever since the war began'.119 
Wylie, who in August 1914 had expressed doubts about the return of the German scholars, 
cited Schellens's letter and remarked that the scholarships 'were not perhaps ineffective just 
so far as they went'.120 There was indeed hope for the future of Anglo-German relations at 
Oxford.
By the mid-1920s, a movement was afoot to reinstate the German scholarships, 
culminating in their reestablishment in 1929. During the early 1920s former German 
scholars spoke out in favour of reinstituting the scheme. Based on the evidence available, 
those who were still alive after the war bore neither Oxford nor Britain much ill-will. In 
fact the majority of them, echoing Bemstorff s sentiments, tended to view the war as an 
unfortunate tragedy and favoured reconciliation between the two countries. In their 
thinking they also tended to separate Anglo-German personal relations, which were deemed 
to be healthy and strong, from the governmental and diplomatic ones, which were marred 
by blunders and misunderstandings. Thus, a noticeable trend was the distinction between 
personal ties of friendship and the impersonal ties of public diplomacy. Eckhardt von der
Liihe, for instance, wrote that 'both nations stumbled into this war and the real reason of it 
is, as far as Germany and England are concerned, that both nations have been badly guided 
by their governments and did not understand each other.'121 Any bitterness they bore 
emanated more from the fact that Germans had been banished from the scholarships by the 
Act of Parliament of 1916, than from any deep-seated hostility towards Britain. As Wylie 
observed: 'It is clear that some of them, while anxious to be friendly, and retaining a 
genuine affection for Oxford, are sore at the action taken by the Trustees during the war - 
or, perhaps it would be truer to say, at the continuance of its consequences.'122 Hans 
Eberhard von Schweinitz appeared to take up this issue with particular stridence. He 
complained: 'So long as the general feeling towards Germany in England is ... based upon 
a groundwork of untruths, ... I do not care much to gratify the curiosity of the British 
public as to how I have been spending my time since I left Oxford'. Nonetheless, he added 
that his attitude was 'o f an entirely impersonal nature', expressing his willingness to share 
his peacetime and wartime experiences with 'some old Oxford friends'.123 Hence, while 
tending to view with contempt what he considered to be general ill-feeling and ignorance in 
Britain, he was keen on preserving personal links with Oxford, even observing that his days 
at Oxford had been 'among the happiest of my life'.
The abrogation of the scholarships was indeed viewed as going against the intent of 
Rhodes's will. Writing in 1922, Alexander von Quistorp advised that the scholarships were 
especially relevant and necessary in the postwar period to bring Britain and Germany closer 
again. In similar spirit, Hans Ludwig Rehmke saw no reason 'why one should not let the 
work of Cecil Rhodes go the way, which he desired to go'.124
The idea of Anglo-German racial solidarity came to the fore again in the arguments 
for reinstating the scholarships. Rehmke, for example, alluded to the 'close relationship 
between the German and the Anglo-Saxon race', citing Parkin's book The Rhodes 
Scholarships as well as his own admission that 'the coalition might be enlarged between all
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the Indo-Germanic races'. 'I think it was more than politeness, that he did say so. These 
words show to you', Rehmke added, 'why I do regret, regret very heartily the abolition of 
the German R[hodes]. Scholarships], and be it only a temporary one.'125 Rehmke was here 
referring to a lecture given by Parkin, who in his book had evoked racial imagery, implying 
an Anglo-German brotherhood of shared ideals. In The Rhodes Scholarships. Parkin 
exalted the bringing together of 'the whole Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world to learn their 
lessons at her [Oxford's] feet'. As he argued: 'The confidence in its [Oxford's] moulding 
power, implied in committing to the care of the University ... selected representatives of the 
Anglo-Saxon and German world, for the realization of a great ideal, was a rare and 
profound compliment.'126
These Anglophile attitudes on the part of the Germans may demonstrate that 
Rhodes's aim of promoting mutual understanding through educational ties was at least 
partially realized. At the basis of Rhodes's business ventures lay the German connection - 
a connection comprising diamond, gold-mining and financial networks, and stretching from 
Kimberley to the Kaiser in Berlin. As an observer put it in 1927, in arguing for a 
restitution of the German scholarships:
It was Rhodes' wish that Germans should be included. He had worked 
with them and found them good fellows. ... I am one of those who do not 
think that Germany was entirely to blame for the war. After all and above 
all, it was Rhodes' wish that Germans should share in his testament, for his 
fortune was made bv German co-operation [emphasis in the original], 
perhaps by German and Jewish inspiration.127
This Anglo-German collaboration, exemplified by Rhodes's entrepreneurial dealings, indeed 
should not be overlooked. It symbolized an important cultural as much as a commercial
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link between British and German private interests before 1914.
Conclusion
In the three case studies above, we have demonstrated the German link in the 
British academic community working in different ways. In the case of Imperial College, 
the connection is made by way of German technical education being used as a model for a 
new institution of applied sciences in London. But the German influence, rather than just 
being intrinsic to the concept of a technical institute, manifested itself further with the 
financial support given to the college by British business interests that were of German 
origin.
Private German money was also central to the formation of the King Edward VII 
British-German Foundation, established with the aim of fostering stronger cultural ties 
between Britain and Germany, the underlying premise being that educational and social 
contact would in the long run improve relations between the two countries. In both the 
cases of Imperial College and the King Edward VII Foundation, the impetus was provided 
by a 'threat' emanating from Germany: in the former, the 'threat' took the form of a widely 
perceived German superiority in the technical field with which Britain was prompted to 
catch up, whereas in the latter it was the spectre of rising Anglo-German tension induced to 
a large extent by Germany's determination to construct a modem battleship fleet.
The Rhodes Scholarships, with their German component, were also intended to 
bolster cultural ties through educational exchange. Here, German money was again a 
factor, though only indirectly through the channel of Rhodes's business dealings with the 
Germans in South Africa. The parallels between Cassel's foundation and the Rhodes 
Scholarships, however, run even farther upon closer scrutiny. Cassel undertook his venture 
in tribute to King Edward VII, with whom he had close personal ties; Rhodes created the 
German scholarships in honour of the German Emperor as a personal favour. In both
instances, the personal relationship between a member of the entrepreneurial class and a 
monarch - thus between the business and the ruling political elites - is of central 
importance.
All three case studies reveal a German connection in British educational projects 
before the First World War. That link may not have been particularly extensive and, with 
hindsight, it is possible to see that both Cassel and Rhodes, despite their noble intentions, 
ultimately failed to prevent the rupture that came in 1914. In the end, the ties of education 
and culture proved too weak to counter the geopolitical forces that brought about war in 
1914. These educational endeavours, especially those of Cassel and Rhodes, nonetheless 
represented links that bound Britain and Germany more closely together, and they must be 
seen within the context of other social developments that were aimed at promoting Anglo- 
German friendship in the prewar period.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE GERMAN IN BRITISH EYES: 
FRIEND, FOE OR BLOOD RELATION?1
In the early 1900s, Karl Baedeker and Thomas Cook published a series of 
guidebooks for Germany, providing topographical information, travel tips, and advice on 
currency. In 1906 D.J. Rees issued a pocket interpreter and phrasebook as part of the 
Briton Abroad Series, aimed at enhancing the conversational skills of the British tourist in 
Germany.2 But as passports at that time were not required for international travel, it is not 
possible to ascertain even from the Foreign Office files the annual number of Britons 
travelling to Germany during the 1905-14 period.
Rather than gauge the volume of Anglo-German tourism in purely numerical terms, 
this chapter is more concerned with Britons' impressions of Germany while visiting or 
residing in that country. Angela Schwarz, in a study based on sixty-four published 
monographs taking the form of personal diaries and journals, has analysed the impressions 
left on British visitors and residents in the Third Reich.3 As she explains, the Nazi Party, 
keen on moulding public opinion and eliciting sympathy from foreigners, 'took great 
trouble over British observers in particular'.4 This keenness was apparently reciprocated by 
the enthusiasm demonstrated by British visitors in going to Germany and also by the 
amount of observations they recorded while in the country.
The pre-1914 period, unfortunately, has not bequeathed records of this genre in any 
similar quantities. Wilhelmine Germany would seem lacklustre in comparison with the 
revolutionary period of National Socialism; tum-of-the-century Germany would not have 
evinced the fascination or appeal of the Third Reich to foreign visitors. This may help 
explain the earlier period's relative dearth of travel records. Moreover, if tourism had not 
yet become a mass activity in the 1930s as it is today, it was undoubtedly even less
152
developed before 1914. Therefore, the number of travellers before 1914, along with the 
amount of source material from the period, would naturally be substantially lower than that 
from the Third Reich.
This study is based primarily on published sources obtained through a search in the 
General Retrospective Catalogue of the British Library. Its focus has been on works 
written from personal experience giving accounts of Britons' travel or residence in Germany 
during the 1900-14 period. But as the amount of this material is very limited, this study 
has included other periodical articles and non-travel-related works which deal with images 
and impressions of Germany. A conscious attempt, however, has been made to exclude 
polemical works and political commentaries. Essential as the prewar invasion novels are to 
our grasp of mentalities, these works have also been omitted as they have already been 
scrutinized at length by I.F. Clarke in Voices Prophesying War. As this study is concerned 
mainly with British impressions of Germany, only works written by Britons or published in 
the United Kingdom will be cited. Thus such books as A.T. and B.R. Wood's Ribbon 
Roads (New York, 1910) and articles in the American periodicals. National Geographic 
Magazine and Bibliotheca Sacra, which were pertinent and useful, have regrettably been 
excluded from this discussion.
The discussion below will first of all examine British impressions and stereotypes 
of Germans. German impressions of Britain, while of secondary concern, will nevertheless 
be included to provide a comparative perspective, subject to the caveat that they too are 
derived from British, and thus a limited range of, sources.
Britons in Germany
As we know from Voices Prophesying War, the prewar era witnessed a 
proliferation of sensational war-scare novels boasting high sales and popularity among the 
low-brow reading public, a phenomenon tending to support the notion of hardening British
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popular attitudes towards Germany during the period. The following analysis will attempt 
to place this assumption in context - that is, it will examine whether British attitudes 
towards Germany were indeed hardened and uniform.
The first items analysed will be works written from first-hand experience, whether 
resulting from travels in Germany or long-term residence in the country. It is appropriate 
that this study begins with an anonymous article appearing in Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine in the very month of the inaugural Caxton Hall meeting. Entitled 'In and about 
a German Town', the article is an anecdotal account of the author's recent visit to 
Germany.5 From the outset the author, apparently an Oxonian, declares a favourable 
impression from his trip. He writes:
Being ... hopelessly insular in my ideas, and dependent for my 
knowledge of the Germans on newspapers and hearsay only, I came abroad 
in the full expectation of finding in my Teutonic cousin a swaggering and 
blustering semi-barbarian, eaten up with self-conceit, and never quite happy 
if he was not cramming down a neighbour's throat the German military 
superiority. Let me confess at once that I have been most agreeably 
disappointed.6
What seems most interesting about this article is that the author, in his brief walk 
through the various episodes of experiences in a German town, seeks to correct certain 
misconceptions about Germany. For instance, he mentions the German shopkeeper's 
helpfulness, when not having in stock the desired item, in directing him to a shop that 
would. He is also struck by the courtesy shown in public by the Germans. Whereas a nod 
or a smile at Oxford would suffice when acknowledging a friend, he relates, 'the young 
German, whose lack of courtesy is so often the topic of a letter or paragraph in an English
newspaper, is ... almost inconveniently courteous, the almost incessant taking off of the 
head-dress being the more conspicuous when that head-dress assumes the form of a flat 
coloured cap, invariably worn on the back of the head'. Debunking the notion that 
Germans drink in exorbitant amounts, he writes that they are 'an essentially sober nation’. 
In the course of two months, he claims, 'I have only come across one case of drunkenness’. 
His observation on sports, as we shall see later, would indeed vindicate some of the 
German criticism of the English ethos of physical exercise. As he observes: 'Outdoor 
games, which form a part and parcel of our university life, are practically non-existent in 
Germany.’ In deprecation of British society's own ethos, he adds:
That in our own country a truly ridiculous amount of attention is bestowed 
upon successful game-playing and successful game-players no one can feel 
more strongly than myself: that so much valuable time is wasted on the 
frivolities of life is ... nothing short of a national misfortune.7
Violet Hunt's The Desirable Alien (1913), written with Ford Madox Ford, relates 
the author's 'intimate personal impressions in Germany, full of varied social experiences, 
historical chat, and graphic descriptions’.8 Raised in Germany, Hunt in her book avows that 
'my Tedescan sympathies were fairly developed. ... German nurses cuffed me and hushed 
me in my wicked and virtuous moods respectively, till I knew their language a good deal 
better than my own’ - testimony to her Germanophilism developed at an early age.
'Orderly' is the impression she has of Germans - a characterization we will encounter 
further in the other sources. In one of her anecdotes, she recounts postboxes having 
instructions warning the sender to look carefully before posting a letter and to be sure the 
letter has a proper stamp. She remarks: 'Germans seem to me to think of everything, to 
know everything collectively, and yet to trust no single person, individually, to do either.’9
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As we will see, this dichotomy of the individual and the collective in the German character 
was a theme often evoked by British observers.
Nonetheless, her overall impression of her life in Germany is favourable.
Revealing the respect with which British culture is regarded in certain German circles, she 
tells of a host she once encountered for whom Shakespeare, H.G. Wells and John 
Galsworthy 'were household names'. She asks, 'Where in Birmingham or Salford should I 
have met with this?'10 Describing the 'prettily decorated' beer gardens in Germany, she 
laments that public houses of such beauty in England would not be permitted to operate. 
With a tinge of irony directed at British standards of morality, she adds: 'Government 
morality would be on its hind legs at once lest vice should masquerade as health, as joy, as 
beauty.'11
In 1914 Ida Wylie published Eight Years in Germany, memoirs of her sojourn in 
Germany, motivated by 'an instinctive sympathy with the people of whom I write’.12 Bom 
in Melbourne, Australia, to a Scottish father, Wylie had been moved to England shortly 
after her birth and later, after two years at Cheltenham Ladies' College, was sent to 
Karlsruhe, Germany, at age nineteen for, in her own words, 'a  Teutonic finishing'. During 
her eight years in the country, she avowedly managed to acquire perfect German as well as 
'an insight into the German mentality*. Returning to Britain in 1911, she joined the 
suffrage movement and was to write over 200 short stories and fifteen novels in her 
lifetime.13
In similar vein to the author of 'In and about a German Town', Wylie attempted to 
debunk some common British myths about Germans. Describing her eight years in 
Germany as 'happy', she is dismayed by the widespread ignorance of Germany often 
encountered since returning to England. 'The average Englishman starts off with the idea 
that he knows a good deal about modem Germany', she argues, even though that notion is 
founded on a 'complete misunderstanding of the German people'.14 According to Wylie,
what the average Englishman knows of the German character is 'a  confusion of ideas', and 
when he speaks disparagingly of the 'dowdy women1 and 'heavy ill-mannered men’ of 
Germany, this type of German 'belongs to a class which, flourishing in England some 
twenty years ago, is now fortunately almost extinct'.15
Wylie likens the Anglo-German relationship to a family quarrel, bearing out the 
adage that 'we do not always love our relations'. She elaborates the idea of Anglo-German 
kinship further by stating:
As between families so between nations kinship can become a grave 
hindrance to friendship. We know that the French come of an entirely 
different stock [emphasis added], and so we make allowances for them; ... 
we even study to respect and understand their susceptibilities. As a 
consequence, two hereditary enemies have established a pleasant if 
somewhat fragile entente. But with the Germans the matter is different.
They are our cousins [emphasis added].
Pointing out that while the Germans were at one time patronized as a 'shiftless, unpractical 
branch of the family', their recent success now makes Britain 'considerably annoyed'. But 
nevertheless, Wylie maintains that 'they are still our relations’. 'Their very success', she 
argues, 'accentuates the family likeness'.16
Incidentally Wylie had issued My German Year as recently as 1910, a work 
echoing the same theme of shared racial heritage and inveighing against ill-founded 
prejudices. There she writes:
And so we go on, hating, despising, tolerating, or ignoring the race to 
which we are so closely connected, not according to our knowledge, which
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is often nil, but according to our characters and our inherited prejudices. ...
We have stayed at hotels and judged the Germans by so-called "types", 
which, if they were Englishmen in England, we should ignore as 
exceptions.17
Her 'ordinary experience’ in Germany, she declares, has led her to regard the Germans 
'with respect and affection’ - that, in contrast to her 'innocent days’ when she knew nothing 
at all about Germans and 'disliked them heartily’. The Germany of her 'innocent days’ may 
reflect typical British stereotypes of the German people. As she recounts, formerly she 
conceived of two types of Germans. One was 'a tall, fierce-looking individual with a 
monstrous Kaiser-moustache, an insolent stare, and excessively bad manners'. The second 
type was 'a  stout person with glasses, a drooping, untidy moustache, long greasy hair, and 
a passion for poetic outpourings. He was very exclamatory, ... ready to embrace every one 
at first sight ,..’18 This dual image undoubtedly corresponded to the Prussian and Bavarian 
stereotypes as well.
Wylie also draws attention to the German's 'sensitiveness', which she argues often 
brings him into conflict with his Anglo-Saxon cousin. She asserts that 'once you have 
learnt to treat his feelings with respect, you will find the German the most amiable, kindly 
host’. Therefore, calling for 'a  little sympathy’, she pleads: 'We might build up aij^ntente 
cordiale with our cousin - surely a more natural and fitting one’.19 Among the stereotypes 
she attacks are those concerning German manners. 'They [the English] hold to it that 
Germans are "disgusting", and look the other way when they see an Englishman bolting his 
food like a starved wolf.’20 Likewise, aiming to debunk the belief that Germany is a cheap 
country, Wylie observes that 'cheapness is something unusual, indeed practically unknown 
in a German household; and the hopeful English family proposing tp come and settle in the 
Fatherland in order to "economize" had better change their minds and go elsewhere’.21
In conclusion she admits to having experienced 'nothing but kindness, courtesy, 
and goodwill' in Germany, and argues that 'as individuals the two races agree admirably'. 
But why not as nations? Assuming an enlightened attitude, she blames Anglo-German 
tension on ignorance and particularly 'those dangerous people who have never been out of 
England but know all about it'. Appealing to the two peoples' likeness and historical ties, 
she argues that these two nations that once fought side by side in Europe are 'related in 
blood and in all the highest virtues of courage, tenacity, and loyalty'.22 It is telling that 
Wylie distinguishes between individual and collective relationships. Even when 
governmental ties between the countries are strained, she is suggesting that a Briton and 
German may get on splendidly on the individual level. But more notably, Wylie appeals to 
the idea of racial kinship to bolster her argument.
Sidney Whitman, a friend of Bismarck's, reminisced in German Memories on his 
more than fifty years' residence in Germany, from his childhood to 1912. Thus, he claims 
to be better informed on the 'inner life' of the country than a 'travelling potentate' or a 
tourist, who 'sees just as much as his limited opportunities may bring within his ken'.23 
Among the features of German life which he recalls fondly are the 'clean aspect of the 
towns, the tidiness and order of the population'. Also, he observes that commuting in the 
tramcars between Berlin and Charlottenburg, 'I have often counted considerably more 
passengers reading books than newspapers'. Reinforcing what the Oxonian in Blackwood's 
Magazine above has related to us, Whitman too recalls that he cannot recall having seen 
'habitual drunkenness' among the working classes. 'This absence of excess of the part of 
the masses', he observes, 'is all the more remarkable since beer, wine and spirits are far 
cheaper [in Germany] than in England'.
Needless to say, the police regulations also do not fail to pass his notice, though 
rather than speak of them disparagingly, he sounds even apologetic, stating that 'many of 
the police prohibitions are conceived in the best interest of the public'. In contrast, he
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alludes to the 'degrading treatment' of people rendered by the 'rigidly enforced’ licensing 
laws in Britain. In his discussion of the German public services, in particular the railways, 
Whitman claims that their efficiency 'could not easily be paralleled outside Germany'.24 
Again, this author leaves behind a generally favourable account of Germany.
Germany, by Mrs. Alfred (nee Cecily) Sidgwick, was published in 1909.25 Her 
peep at Germany has a most idyllic opening, beginning with a chapter on German children 
and relating a story of storks. According to her, storks come to Germany every spring and 
when a baby is bom in the winter or summer, the parents say that 'the stork has brought 
him; for that is what all German children believe'. Her sketches deal mostly with the 
ordinary and routine in German life, her topics ranging from, among others, the Germans' 
food, eating habits, the taste of their rye bread, the age at which a German girl is 
confirmed, the typical design of wedding dresses in Germany, and whether cigars are 
preferred to pipes. In common with most British observers, she also mentions that 
'thoroughness and efficiency are characteristic of Germany everywhere'.26 Regarding 
German manners, her impressions are reasonably favourable. As she explains, 'A  German 
would not sit down at the same table with you in a hotel or even in the same railway 
carriage without making you a polite bow, and when he leaves he will salute you in the 
same way.'27
Sidgwick acknowledges that since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Germany 
has become a more prosperous country. But still holding to the traditional British view of 
Germany as a poor relation, she adds: 'But there are whole classes of well-educated and 
well-born people in Germany who are terribly poor: so poor that they have to consider 
every penny in a way unknown in England and America.'28
As may be expected, there is again no avoiding mention of the German police.
She gives a descriptive recollection of her experience with the seemingly all-pervasive 
regulations and officialdom:
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When you arrive in Berlin, you cannot even go outside the station and 
choose your own cab. An official in uniform gives you a numbered tally, 
and you must find the cab with that number, and take it or none. ... Should 
you be a butcher-boy, you may not walk on the pavement when you are 
carrying m eat... You dare not stay longer than a few days in any German 
town without reporting yourself to the police ... It is best to have a passport 
with you ... if you choose you can satisfy official curiosity by proxy.
She then relates the seemingly ridiculous story of an Englishman who, unable to produce 
his papers, had to send to Yorkshire for his certificate of baptism to be dispatched to 
Germany. When shown the certificate, the police were adequately satisfied, leading 
Sidgwick to conclude that 'any official paper will act like magic' in this 'mandarin-ridden' 
country.29
Nonetheless, it must be noted that Sidgwick is neither mocking nor severe in her 
account. A Briton of German parentage, she had issued Home Life in Germany just in 
1908.30 Though bearing different titles, both these books are similar in content and are 
apparently based on a trip made in 1906-07. Her sketches are valuable precisely because 
they deal with the ordinary and not with such erudite topics as German taxation, naval 
construction, factories, or town planning. As she tells her reader, 'my knowledge of 
Germany, like my knowledge of England, is based on a series of life-long, unclassified, 
more or less inchoate impressions'. Expressing her dismay at Anglicized Germans who 
'deny their descent and their country', Sidgwick reminds us of the 'Germany we know, the 
Germany still there for our affection and delight, the dear country of quaint fancies, of 
music and of poetry' - the Germany which, in her own words, 'has vanished'.31
It is worthwhile mentioning that Sidgwick's views of Germany changed after the
!
outbreak of war in 1914. In her introductory note to the 1914 edition offaome Life, issued
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when war was in progress, she writes that 'hatred and jealousy of Great Britain were rife in 
Germany. I believed then, and have believed for years, that the Germans would make war 
on us when they could'.32 Such sentiments, however, can hardly be detected in the first 
edition of her work. One can only suppose that with the onset of war she, like most 
Britons of German heritage, attempted to assert her loyalty to her adopted countiy by 
speaking out harshly against Germany.
A source that is both entertaining and laden with impressionistic detail is Leonora 
Fairweather's An Englishwoman in Germany, an account of her residence in the country as 
a governess.33 On the whole, Fairweather offers a balanced set of impressions of both her 
compatriots and the Germans. Concerning manners and decorum, for instance, she writes: 
'Here in Freiburg where all kinds of people of different nations attend the mining 
university, the most impolite are the English.' The English, in her opinion, 'lend 
themselves ill to the little courtesies of life'.34 Moreover, she claims, the Germans are more 
prone than the British to observe social niceties, such as the lifting of the hat when greeting 
an acquaintance. And whereas the Germans 'practically all have a military deportment', the 
English slouch along 'with bent shoulders, and hands in pockets, in a most slovenly 
manner'. But on the other hand, she compensates for her almost derogatory remarks about 
Englishmen by observing that the 'blunt honest ways of an Englishman' are after all, 'more 
sincere'. 'They [the English] have a higher standard of honour, and are more moral than 
foreigners.' Even if the French and Germans are more socially skilful and less 'shy and 
awkward' than the Britons are with ladies, she writes, the charm demonstrated by the 
former are 'generally only on the surface'. Betraying a sense of Anglo-Saxon moral 
superiority over the continental Europeans, she claims that 'in his heart the average 
foreigner has a low conception of womanhood'.35
Nonetheless, Fairweather's impressions of life in Germany are useful for our 
purpose of studying British stereotypes of Germans. Constantly betraying a certain sense
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of British superiority and an attitude of condescension, her comments are often ingenuous if 
not insulting. She regards the French people as being 'most artistic’, the Germans 'most 
practical1, and the English 'most comfortable’. Referring to the Germans' 'extraordinary' 
habits, she observes almost contemptuously that in the trains, 'not only do they shut up all 
the windows and contentedly inhale all the microbes exhaled by each other, but it is not at 
all unusual to see them eating their breakfasts in the train as they go to business in the 
mornings’. Breakfasting in the train, inevitably, 'offends the sensitiveness of my nasal 
organ very considerably’. Commenting on the Germans' deficiency in the 'art of eating’, 
she writes: 'I’ve heard it said that bands were introduced into restaurants to drown the 
sound of the Germans eating’.36
No account of German life, not least of all Fairweather's, would be complete 
without a discussion of German efficiency and organization. The German schools, 
according to her, are 'very well organized’ and the social insurance system run 'very 
efficiently’. '[F]or here cleanliness and order reign supreme’, she declares. 'The streets are 
kept beautifully, and no one is allowed to throw anything out of the window as in France.’ 
Fairweather, however, argues that the German 'love of order’ is 'carried to excess'. She 
explains:
No one is allowed to walk or sit on the grass, it is 'verboten'; also it is 
forbidden to cycle through the wood, which is ridiculous, ... for really one 
gets tired of the word 'verboten' in Germany. Notice boards with 
'verboten' are placarded everywhere. Verily Germany is an orderly land!37
Claiming that the Germans 'are a terrible people for noise’ and have 'the heaviest 
feet’, she observes: 'Also the Germans never think of shutting a door by turning the handle, 
it always goes "bang" after them, and the shaking of the house has no effect on their
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nervous system, they continue to sleep, eat, and speak, without turning a hair'.38 So, 
Fairweather's conclusions about Germans are that they have appalling eating habits, are 
noisy and pathologically obsessed with order. Even so, she admits that all in all, the 
Germans 'are a friendly, kindly nation, and personally I’ve met with nothing but the 
essence of kindness from them, and I've never spent so peaceful a time in my whole life as 
among the Germans'.39 In view of her often scathing remarks about Germans, this 
observation represents quite a compliment indeed.
A.D. McLaren journeyed twice to Germany, spending a total of two years in the 
country. In An Australian in Germany he relates his 'first-hand impressions' in order to 
'correct or confirm those second-hand ones'.40 His book not only constitutes first-hand 
impressions from his travels but also examines other aspects of modem Germany, such as 
German imperialism, national insurance, and the north-south divide in Germany.
His chapter on German 'mind and manners' is again revealing in the way in which 
Britons perceived Germans. McLaren acknowledges that the Germans are friendly - that is, 
they 'are not disobliging or inhospitable to the stranger within their gates, far from it'. 
Nonetheless, he finds them possessing an impenetrable 'veil' which they 'themselves call 
their "deepness and inwardness" (deutsche Tiefe und InnerlichkeitY.41 More interestingly, if 
he has to choose one word to sum up the German 'instinct', it is 'order1. He observes:
This Order impresses all visitors, even those who claim no minute 
knowledge of German Volkstum. It is the characteristic that has been 
called the Machine Mind. ... Whence comes the capacity to organize, to 
obey, to become a machine? As well ask why the Italian is emotional, the 
Frenchman volatile, and the Englishman practical. The German is a 
plodder. It is part of the national psychology. The English mind is 
individualistic, the German mind collectivistic.42
So, once again we find a reference to the German love of order. Echoing 
Fairweather, McLaren too dwells on the regulation and discipline of German daily life.
'The printed instructions ... with the eternal warning, "Es ist verboten" (It is forbidden), 
have afforded no end of merriment to visitors ... These instructions are a part of the routine 
mind made manifest in officialdom.'43
We should note that McLaren's commentary is not written in spiteful derision; on 
the contrary, it attempts to give a balanced and informed account of German life based on 
first-hand experience. On the whole, its tone is mild and even friendly. It is illuminating 
that he invokes cultural kinship between Britons and Prussians in his discussion about the 
two halves of Germany. Writing about the warmth and hospitality of southern Germans, he 
asserts: 'The South German has more affinity with the Frenchman, the Northman with the 
Scandinavian or Englishman.' Thus McLaren adds, emphasizing the temperamental 
affinities of the Anglo-Saxon and the northern German:
In one respect there is a strong resemblance between the genuine Anglo- 
Saxon and the Prussian [emphasis added], and just as strong a contrast 
between him and the Munchener. The Englishman, the Berliner, the 
Hanoverian, and the Holsteiner are chary of making new acquaintances.44
Other accounts examined include a brief article that appeared in the journal Modem 
Language Teaching in 1913. Entitled 'Impressions of a First Visit to Holland and 
Germany', the article contains generally positive impressions of Germany, evoking the 
Germans' good dress, clean towns and 'great pride'.45
Favourable impressions of Germany were also recorded by Richard Thomsett, a 
British army officer and author of A Trip through the Balkan States and Impressions of 
Germany and Austria (1909).46 In this book, Thomsett too remarks about the cleanliness of
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German towns and of the German 'humbler classes', noting that 'there is an air of 
respectability and marked cleanliness even among the poor1. The policemen, though 'like 
soldiers’, are nonetheless 'extremely polite and civil1. And while Thomsett observes that 
the German waiter lacks humour, he is deemed to be more intelligent and cleaner than his 
English counterpart.47
In sum, prewar British impressions of Germany were laden with images of 
organizational efficiency and cleanliness. The German people were generally seen as being 
obsessed with order and regulations, well-disciplined, hard-working and humourless, but 
well-mannered and hospitable. Some of the Germans' eccentricities, such as their eating 
habits, were treated with a degree of condescension. This disdain, however, was tempered 
by an overall attitude of respect for Germans, coupled with a feeling of kinship with them. 
Thus the British stereotypical images of Germany were not dominated by 'antagonistic' 
elements.
Germans in Britain
Some of the British accounts examined above viewed Germany with a measure of 
superiority and condescension. Those written by Germans in Britain tended to assume a 
similar attitude. Being works published in Britain, these are relevant and have thus been 
included in this discussion. An anonymous article in the National Review in 1905 is an 
example, though it must be pointed out that this work, along with the others examined in 
this section, is more a commentary than a record of first-hand impressions. The author, 
while acknowledging the hospitality he has enjoyed during his residence in Britain, admits 
his views may be considered 'repugnant' but adds that 'he is the truest friend who speaks 
out plainly and bluntly the truth as he sees it'.48
His first line of attack comes in the field of patriotism, which he accuses Britons of 
lacking. 'The first fact that strikes me is the indifference of Englishmen to their individual
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duties as citizens of a great Empire.’ He contrasts this state of affairs in Britain with the 
martial upbringing prevalent in Germany. 'We Germans are taught and trained in our 
schools from boyhood upwards that our country has a great claim upon us. We are taught 
to glory in Germany, and the noble deeds of German heroes in the past.'49
He then moves on to education, an area of recognized German superiority. 
Castigating the British emphasis on sports, he writes: 'We may not be so good at games as 
you are, but games are, after all, a very unimportant thing in life. You are mistaking the 
means for the end.’ The public schools, he asserts, 'form character’ but 'neglect intellect’, 
while the primary schools train the intellect without paying attention to character. As a 
result, he claims, Britain has created two societies, 'one of which has character without full 
intellectual equipment, and the other a mediocre intellectual equipment without character’ - 
hence, the reason that Britain succeeds in India ('where your men of character govern’) but 
fails at home ('where your men of character are powerless before the characterless mob’). 
More instructive is his observation that 'I have found that boys fresh from Board Schools, 
whom I have employed, have little or no knowledge of the history of their own country.’ 'I 
do not think you would find many Germans of the same age ignorant of Moltke’, he 
insists.50
In this German's view, the absence of compulsory military training has contributed 
to decadence and irresponsibility. 'I miss in your working class the sense of respect, 
cleanliness, punctuality and obedience which military service gives, while I see in it an 
inability to resist the allurements of drink’. Scornfully, he remarks that the British working 
classes 'expect everything to be given to them, and themselves to give nothing.’ His 
derision extends to the politicians as well, whom he accuses of being 'ready to promise 
anything to the working man, provided it is at somebody else’s expense’. Rather than being 
'democratic government’, the British parliamentary system constitutes, in his words, 'rule of 
the nursery’.
With respect to town administration, he compares British incompetence - whereby 
the 'maximum of money is expended for the minimum of effect by a host of jarring 
authorities1 - with the German reliance on experts who treat towns 'as a business and not as 
a matter of politics, or a means of supplying easy work to a number of very lazy men’. He 
cites Manchester ('the most dismal city in the world') and 'miserable' West Ham ('with its 
population of stunted degenerates'), and begs to compare them with the likes of Magdeburg 
and Essen.51
Like the other authors encountered above, he cites insularity and 'haughty 
ignorance of the foreigner' as being fundamental characteristics of the British people. 
Suggesting that British misconceptions of Germany are reinforced by an irresponsible press, 
he also attempts to debunk some myths. As he writes,
To read some of your papers it would appear that Germans live on horse 
and dogs' flesh, working fifteen hours a day and paid infinitesimal wages.
Have the people who talk thus ever seen Mulhausen, Elberfeld, Cannstatt or 
Essen? ... Food is said to be fabulously dear in Germany, yet there are 
thousands of poor English families in my country living there for its 
cheapness.52
Mariano Herggelet had been residing in Britain for fifteen years when his book 
England's Weak Points was published in 1912.53 In contrast to the biting criticism 
unleashed by the anonymous author of the National Review article, Herggelet starts with 
adulatory impressions of Britain, though it is inevitable that his account is also laden with 
simplistic stereotypes of Britons. He writes that among the British, the Scots 'are the 
simplest, the most hard-working, and the most energetic', and 'their language is much 
nearer ours than is English, since in it Anglo-Saxon has been most purely preserved'.
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One must note that Herggelet's words of praise appear mostly to reflect a feeling of 
kinship. Racial overtones pervade his book. He observes:
Blessed with comeliness both of face and person, with proud, erect carriage 
and easy movements, with natural, unaffected, and manly gait, markedly 
tall and markedly slender, ... the Anglo-Saxons are beyond question among 
the finest races on the earth, if not the flower of all. This is to be 
attributed partly to ample nourishment and to the special climate, ... and 
partly, too, to that personal freedom which is the special pride and special 
glory of the Anglo-Saxons.54
His description of Britons certainly contrasts sharply with the population of 'stunted 
degenerates' characterized by the anonymous writer of the National Review article above.
Among the qualities Herggelet ascribes to the British 'character' are 'gentleness, 
good-nature, forbearance, long-suffering, endurance, generosity, ... and goodwill towards 
every one'. 'Tact, refined feeling, and an outspoken preference for what is seemly, fitting, 
and suitable', he writes, 'are innate and instinctive in a Briton.' Consequently, from a 
'purely human point of view', the British 'can hardly find a peer'. He also makes a 
significant observation that 'no one can get on as well with the British, or make friends 
with them so easily, as the Germanic nations, and ourselves especially'.55 Clearly an 
Anglophile, Herggelet was suggesting a racial and temperamental affinity between Britons 
and Germans.
He admits that describing England's weaknesses is 'much less pleasant' and 
'extremely painful, indeed', and wishes to 'deprecate any suspicion of censoriousness'.56 
Hence, Herggelet is from the outset claiming good intentions. Some of the British 
shortcomings which he addresses, however, deal precisely with 'character' and perhaps
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inevitably, take the form of generalizations.
Among the rules of life which the Briton supposedly reveres are 'Never learn a 
foreign language’, and 'Never learn anything about other nations’, again a reference to 
British insularity. On the Englishman's idleness, Herggelet asserts that 'work seems to him 
to be the greatest evil on earth’. Thus, he points out that there are 42,000 Germans in 
London alone working as waiters and labourers because 'such hard work is not for the 
Englishman, who much prefers to be waited on.’ In Britain, Herggelet argues, 'absolute 
idleness’ is considered a 'distinction', and 'the highest praise possible for him [the Briton] is 
expressed in the words: "He is a splendid all-round sportsman!’"57 Again, the British 
preoccupation with sports finds itself an object of German mockery and a fixture in 
German stereotypical images of Britain. As might be expected, the lack of military training 
and discipline in Britain is also mentioned. 'If  anything could save the English,’ Herggelet 
claims, 'it would be sterner training at school and universal service under strict discipline.’ 
In reference to British cultural decay, Herggelet opines that Shakespeare 'is treated as a 
stranger in his own country’. Thus whereas the British view of Germany was of a strict,
martial and militarist society, the German vision of Britain was of an idle, undisciplined
its
and ignorant people, with very little love for even their own literature.58
The time in which Herggelet wrote was the period of Britain's quest for national 
efficiency based on the German model. We will now quote at length a passage from 
Herggelet's narrative which views with derision the incompetence with which that British 
quest for efficiency is carried out. Herggelet observes:
An English town council frequently discovers that some existing 
arrangement is entirely inadequate. ... Then some councillor, who has been 
abroad and has more insight than his fellows, points to Germany. ... [and] 
suggests sending a deputation to Germany, and this meets with approbation.
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A grant of £250 is made amid great excitement, and five of the most 
intelligent councillors start. They are conducted in a sort of triumphal 
progress over half Germany ... They are properly astonished, take notes, are 
received, made much o f ... Then they return home ... and make their report. 
Universal delight and many expressions of the public gratitude. The report 
is published ... And then no more is heard of it all.59
Thus, if from the British standpoint the Germans were efficient and well- organized, the 
British were, from the German viewpoint, ad hoc, clumsy and time-wasting.
Hans Ziegler, a German businessman, issued We Germans and Our British Cousins 
in 1909, in which called for the 'educated people' of both countries to enlighten the masses 
and turn them away from 'music-hall politics'.60 On the one hand, Ziegler was to a large 
degree an Anglophile. As he writes: 'We Germans most unhesitatingly and sincerely admit 
the personal superiority of the British nation in so many things'. Expressing the German 
recognition of British commercial prestige, he observes that a young German businessman 
'with any desire to get on at all has to go over to England'. He further admits: 'we have 
made the study of English obligatory in all our public high schools'. Citing the deep 
appreciation for things British in Germany, he claims:
England is the example and the standard, and is respected by everyone 
connected with the German navy and mercantile shipping. A large number 
of English manufactures enjoy an extraordinary prestige amongst the 
general public in Germany. Whatever you may wish to buy in Germany, 
the shop-assistants will keep on repeating that this or that is 'real English'.61
Yet in extolling German virtues and strengths, Ziegler is less kind to Britain.
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According to him Germany is 'unique', having a 'pronounced instinct for fighting and self- 
sacrifice'. He argues that 'we oppose ... the inflated idea of the superiority of the British 
race, but we are truly fond of the Briton as an individual.' Therefore, in similar fashion to 
McLaren who made a distinction between Germans as individuals and Germans as a 
collectivity, Ziegler too draws the divide and expresses a similar wariness of the collective 
Britain. Whereas he finds the individual Briton 'easy-going' and 'broad-minded', he would 
hesitate to 'express the same enthusiasm when taking the very same men collectively', 
citing as his reason his belief that Britons are 'less complete in their education' and 
generally 'tend to become politically superficial'.62
The Idea of Racial Kinship
One should note that these accounts by Germans, though written as commentaries 
rather than personal journals, were produced first-hand by residents in Britain. Ziegler's 
book was targeted at the 'unsophisticated' bulk of the British people whom he wished to be 
better informed and to 'lose their partly innate feeling of superiority'. Incidentally, though, 
Ziegler also appealed to 'ties of race-affinity, common ideals of culture, and mutual 
respect', suggesting a sense of racial kinship. Thus while criticizing some aspects of British 
life, he was willing to cite the common ground shared by Britons and Germans. As Ziegler 
readily admitted, both countries were 'conscious of their intellectual power and fighting 
strength, both very practical and business-like, both possessing a wholesome individual 
egotism'. As he ponders:
Is it not a thousand pities that these two nations, who in every respect are 
so much alike, who in so many ways supplement each other, did not long 
ago come to a decision to pull together ...?63
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Hence Ziegler, while citing differences between the British and Germans, also points to 
their similarities, appealing to a deeper sense of shared ties, common ideals and cultural 
affinity.
In this period widely known for the rise of the Anglo-German 'antagonism1, it may 
seem incongruous to find the many references made by Britons and Germans alike to the 
idea of common racial origins. As already seen, Wylie and McLaren respectively alluded 
to 'family likeness’ and a bond between the Anglo-Saxon and Prussian. Wylie, referring to 
the Germans as 'cousins’ and citing shared virtues, even called for an entente with 
Germany which in her opinion would be a more 'fitting’ one than the one with France. On 
the German side Herggelet, while criticizing certain aspects of the British character, also 
expressed an affinity of feeling with, and respect for, the Anglo-Saxon race.
This idea of racial kinship can be found also in semi-political commentaries by 
British writers. One instance is an article which appeared in the Fortnightly Review in 
1908. The anonymous writer, 'H1, argues: 'There is far more common ground between 
Britons and Germans than there is between Britons and French, and immeasurably more 
than there ever can be during this century at least between Britons and Russians.’ He adds:
The Germans are a capable, go-ahead race. They are good managers.
They are profoundly serious. They have little aptitude for the lighter side 
of life. In all these ways they are like the English and the Scotch, who 
form the vast majority of the British race.64
Even though the writer finds the 'light-hearted surface gaiety’ of the French nature 'more 
charming’ and 'congenial', and takes kindly to the 'simple non-morality’ of the Russian 
character, he believes that 'the mass of the English and Scotch people would feel entire 
sympathy’ with 'the German view of life’.65 The author evinced little doubt that the British
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and Germans should occupy the pinnacle of the racial hierarchy. 'Beyond question the 
British and the Germans are the two races most fitted to advance the orderly, competent 
administration of the world,' he insists. Hence, away from politics and diplomacy, one can 
detect evidence of British disdain of the French and Russians; the Germans, on the other 
hand, were deemed co-equals, a race fit enough to stand alongside the British in the work 
of civilizing the world.
An appeal to shared racial and cultural heritage was also made by Lady Phillips's A 
Friendly Germany.66 a tract written in response to the growing Anglo-German tension. In 
this work, she argued that Britons and Germans are 'two great peoples' 'fitted by character, 
by blood relationship, and by a mutuality of interests to safeguard civilization'. Britain and 
Germany were, in her opinion, 'the soundest white nations'67 which should combine to fend 
off the coloured races of the world. Her appeal to Anglo-German solidarity indeed had 
strong racial overtones. As 'close cousins' to the Germans, Britons in her view 'are more 
Teutonic than most other European peoples'.68 Not only does she laud the British and 
German races as having sprung from a common stock, she cites as some of their particular 
qualities 'hard rationality', 'grasp of fact', 'quality of purposefulness', and love for a motive 
'grounded in rational purpose'.69 From Lady Phillips's standpoint, then, Anglo-German 
tensions were merely symptoms of a quarrel between blood relations, a quarrel between 
similars rather than opposites.
It is further illuminating that she mentioned the British shortness of memory with 
regard to France and Russia. As Lady Phillips pointed out, less than a generation before 
the British voter had regarded France as a 'misguided foe'; Russia, meanwhile, had been 
'Britain's one and only enemy. The Russian designs on India were manifest. Russian 
diplomacy, Russian cruelty, Russian relentlessness were the themes of every conversation'. 
In sum, she remarks: 'For France and Russia were, according to our augurs, as clearly 
determined on the destruction of the British Empire as Germany is represented to be to­
day.’70
Echoing the same theme, 'FT reminded his readers that barely ten years ago Britain 
had gone to the brink of war with France. 'Yet to-day’, he declares, 'my friend Bullock is 
of opinion that France and England are, ... by their natural instincts, bound to be good 
friends.’ Similarly, as 'H' notes, until recently Russia was generally regarded 'with the 
gravest suspicion and distrust’.71 There was thus little correlation between political 
alignments and popular stereotypes of foreign nations.
In about 1909, the Daily Mail published a tract entitled Our German Cousins, a 
peek at German life and society containing virtually all the cliches already encountered in 
the British sources and aiming to disabuse the reader of commonly held misconceptions of 
Germany.72 The idea of shared kinship and virtues also surfaces in this book. It is argued 
that 'the naval spirit in the Kaiser is due very largely to his English blood’, a hint at the 
German Emperor's own Anglophilism. Indeed, glancing through the chapter entitled 
'German Views of England and the English', one acquires a strong impression of 
Anglophilism among Germans. English tailoring and haberdashery are described to be held 
in extremely high regard in Germany, as is the study of English: 'Every German family 
that can afford it will have an English "Miss’". Moreover, 'nearly all horses and dogs have 
English names' and, echoing Wylie's contention that as individuals the Briton and German 
are practically soul-mates, it alludes to the number of Anglo-German marriages and adds: 
'German naval officers make no secret of the fact that they get on better with British Navy 
men than with the naval officers of any other nation.’ Afternoon tea, the quintessential 
British custom, is 'practically universal’ in Germany; likewise, 'practically all the horse 
trainers in Germany are British’.73
According to this work, then, Britain has had a tremendous influence upon German 
social institutions and cultural norms and is regarded with high esteem in Germany. But 
the book also cautions the reader to 'discriminate carefully between the people's attitude
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towards Great Britain's position in the world and towards English manners and customs'.
In this dichotomy lies the difference between 'deep distrust and frank admiration'.74 
Therefore, in seeking to separate attitudes in politics from those in social customs and 
habits, it is suggesting that we should distinguish the various layers that compose attitudes 
and assumptions. It would indeed be too simplistic to categorize a German as an 
Anglophobe who expresses distrust of the British government while being an admirer of 
British tailoring habits.
Conclusion
In 1911 Katherine Mansfield's In a German Pension appeared on the literary scene. 
The novel, a series of sketches based on her own stay at a pension in Germany, proved to 
be a huge success, going into the third edition within a year. One can understand the 
reason for the book's success. Its German characters are parochial, eccentric, old-fashioned, 
or disagreeable. For instance Frau Fischer, a character based on a real person whom 
Mansfield met at her pension, irritatingly lectures the narrator of the story, who is for the 
time being separated from her husband, that 'Every wife ought to feel that her place is by 
her husband's side - sleeping or waking.' In another scene, one of the German characters 
states arrogantly that she has never been to England but nonetheless declares, 'I have many 
English acquaintances'. 'They are so cold!' she exclaims.75
If this book was meant to be amusing in a sardonic way, it certainly impressed the 
critics. The reviewer for the Daily Telegraph, for instance, commented on the work's 
'touch of impishness'; the Pall Mall Gazette called it 'caustic'.76 The Times Literary 
Supplement, meanwhile, observed: 'These sketches of life at a middle-class pension are 
cleverly observant; but not agreeable. The point of view is jaundiced and the detail 
unpleasant or ugly.'77
So to what extent can one characterize this book as anti-German? Undeniably, it
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helped propagate a negative image of Germans which found favour among its readers. 
Nevertheless, one's assessment of the book must be qualified by a consideration of the 
author's very own moderation, which was manifested subsequently by her refusal to have 
the book republished during the war. Even after the war, once more objecting to a reissue 
of the work, Mansfield remarked that In a German Pension was 'positively juvenile1.78
Any discussion of stereotypes would have to take into account that while 
impressions and attitudes are variegated and complex, commonalities abounded as much as 
the differences. Indeed, there were limits to clear-cut portrayals of 'anti-Germanism' and 
'anti-Britainism'. Generally, the German in the British stereotype was first and foremost 
efficient and sober; he was also ill-mannered, prone to making loud noise, obsessed with 
order, given to stem rules and regulation, lacking in humour, and imbued with militarist 
virtues. On the other hand, the stereotypical German image of Britons was laden with 
impressions of idleness, slovenliness, insularity, fastidiousness in table manners, obsession 
with sports, self-righteousness and complacency. Even if these images may seem 
'antagonistic' and suggest a lack of common ground, the points of differences are not 
absolute for, beneath the polemics and prejudices of the time, the discernible commonalities 
in the British and German impressions of each other are remarkable. British observers 
tended to view Germany with a superior and condescending attitude, while simultaneously 
expressing a sense of respect for German accomplishments. The Germans, likewise, tended 
to regard Britons in a haughty and superior fashion, at the same time evincing fascination 
for British culture and customs. The constant allusions to racial kinship, familial ties, 
shared heritage and virtues, and temperamental affinities, are most striking. We might be 
heartened to note that in spite of the Anglo-German naval and commercial rivalry during 
the prewar period, observers from both sides were still referring to the other as 'cousin'. 
Moreover each side, in viewing the other, tended to distinguish between the collectivity - 
which it regarded generally with reservation - and the individual - which was generally
perceived in a salutary light.
Each side's sense of superiority, desire to be the best, and respect for the other, 
suggest that the strained relations between Britain and Germany may have been rooted in 
the two nations' similarities rather than their differences. In 1907 a group of British 
journalists made a trip to Germany on one of the many exchange visits organized during 
that time. Two of them returned summing up the irony that both Germans and Britons saw 
the other in like manner. As Sidney Low and Percy Bunting pointed out,
Our notion of the Germans ... is that they are eaten up with pride, 
aggressiveness, domineering ambition, ready to use the mailed fist on 
anybody and grasp at anything; in fact, it is very much like the vision 
which many Teutons have of John Bull, who is pictured all teeth and claws 
and muscular grabbing hands.79
Our understanding of the Anglo-German 'antagonism' before 1914 may be enhanced if we 
regard it as a quarrel between relations rather than one between irreconcilable foes. 
Observers at the time certainly regarded it to be as such.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE BETRAYAL?
'The Betrayal (Germany 1914)'
We trusted you;- as one whose spirits tend 
To some adventurous and high emprise,
Who, with low tone and quiet watching eyes,
Unfolds his heart to some beloved friend,- 
So we for peace our labours did expend,
And shared our dearest hopes, scorning disguise,
With you, whom we, more confident than wise,
Held true, despite all warning, to the end.
So be it: you have swept our dreams aside,
And woken us to war,- since fight we must 
When all we held most sacred is denied,
God will defend us: for our cause is just,
And swords against His justice beat in vain.- 
And then,- Christ give us strength to trust again!
P.H.B.L.
Anglo-German academic ties before the war were not confined to members of the 
academic establishment, but extended to statesmen as well. Wilhelm II was awarded an
honorary Doctorate of Civil Law (D.C.L.) by Oxford University in November 1907, in a 
ceremony held at Windsor Castle.1 Having already seen the German Rhodes Scholarships 
established at Oxford in his honour, the Kaiser could thenceforth claim the university as his 
Alma Mater. The significance of the event, and the generally cordial attitude of Oxford 
which it symbolized, should not be overlooked. As Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann has 
noted: 'In 1985, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was refused the same 
degree by a majority of the Oxford dons, but no such opposition was voiced to the Kaiser 
in 1907. ... Whatever the individual feelings in Oxford may have been the Kaiser's political 
stance had not yet created sufficient antagonism to deny him the honour.'2
At Oxford's Encaenia on 25 June 1914, three days before Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, seven persons were conferred honorary degrees, of 
whom no fewer than five were Germans. These five were the Duke of Saxe-Coburg- 
Gotha, Professor Ludwig Mitteis of the University of Leipzig, the composer Richard 
Strauss, the King of Wurttemberg, and the German ambassador to Britain, Prince Karl Max 
Furst von Lichnowsky. The last two in fact were given their awards in special sessions of 
Convocation. Just a hundred years earlier, Wilhelm II's great-grandfather, Friedrich 
Wilhelm III, had also received an honorary D.C.L. from Oxford.3
Although 1914 was to witness the beginning of a long, painful and costly slaughter 
in Europe, to many observers at the time that year was meant to mark the one hundredth 
anniversary of peace - a peace won by the joining of British and Prussian arms at Waterloo 
against the menace of French hegemony in Europe. Just on 11 June, the Oxford Magazine 
was proclaiming Lichnowsky's visit on the 3rd as 'an unqualified success' and signifying 
the 'best international friendships'. 'I f  only we have the like at the Encaenia, to glorify the 
Hundred Years of Peace with our Western kinsfolk!' the paper declared.4 How ironic, then, 
that the Encaenia held on 25 June, at which the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Mitteis, and 
Strauss were honoured, was to herald four years of war with Germany.
In October 1914 the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Thomas Banks Strong, a 
theologian, bishop and the Dean of Christ Church,5 was to express the anguish and 
ambivalence of being at war with Germany. He lamented:
Now we are at war, and we are at war on such terms that it is difficult to 
see how a time of real friendship between the two nations can ever come 
again. Many of us here must have had friends in Germany; one of the first 
names of all the long list of killed in this war was one well-known and 
greatly popular in Oxford and specially in Christ Church, Marschall von 
Bieberstein. I do not think that the man who died so chivalrously was our 
Rhodes Scholar. I think it was an elder brother. ... the first name which 
gave me the shock which we all now dread on opening our papers, was the 
name of a German - now a foe.6
It appears that the Vice-Chancellor may have had difficulty deciding where his full 
allegiance should lie - whether to the political entity which was his country, or to the 
personal ties of friendship fostered throughout the years. The poem above was published in 
the Oxford Magazine on 16 October 1914,7 expressing a sentiment of dismay, betrayal and 
shame. It evokes the image of the German as someone who was trusted and who shared a 
like-tempered spirit of 'high emprise', a member of the same community of ideals. Right 
to the end, he was deemed to be reliable but has now 'swept our dreams aside1. This was 
but one voice among many in Oxford, but it still suggests a point of view and sentiment 
which were probably widely shared in the British academic community.
'As a rule, good works are in German', the British historian Sir John Seeley wrote 
in the nineteenth century.8 One who held German culture and literary achievements in high 
regard, Seeley, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1870 to 1895,
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also owed a great debt to German historiography, having himself been a student in 
Germany in his younger days. Preaching the 'German Gospel' to his fellow Englishmen, 
Seeley regarded Germany less as a rival than as a 'great university', so deeply was he 
imbued with the German influence.9 Commenting on Gustav Rein's work on Seeley, John 
Herkless, in his introduction to the 1987 English translation of the book, notes: 'It is no 
fluke that the only comprehensive treatment of Seeley should be by a German, even less 
that it should have been written shortly before the First World War.'10 Even if Seeley was 
dead by the time the war began in 1914, was the spirit which he embodied necessarily gone 
altogether?
This chapter will be concerned with analysing British academic views of Germany 
before the war through the study of textbooks, focusing on history texts written by British 
historians, and published in Britain, before September 1914. Forming the core of the 
sample are books which were found through a search in the British Library's on-line 
General Retrospective Catalogue. Included in the sample also are works cited at the end of 
Arthur William Holland's A Short History of Germany to the Present Day (1912) which 
were put forth as suggested reading.11 Lastly, this study has consulted books constituting a 
part of the Historical Association's collection of outdated history textbooks, whose titles 
appear in A Catalogue of the Historical Association Collection of Outdated History 
Textbooks First Published before 1915.12
Although German history textbooks are of primary concern, textbooks on European 
history have been examined as well. In all instances, the focus is on the treatment of the 
modem period of German history. In order to obtain a substantial sample of textbooks, this 
study has not confined itself to works published within the 1905-14 period, but has 
included books dating back to the late nineteenth century.
The study of opinion in prewar British history textbooks on Germany has not yet 
been undertaken in the English-language historiography. Valerie Chancellor's History for
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Their Masters examines prewar opinion and attitudes but her work is confined to English 
history texts.13 In German, there is Manfred Messerschmidt's Deutschland in englischer 
Sicht- published in 1955, which deals with the image of Germany in British historiography 
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century.14 This book, however, does not undertake a 
systematic analysis of British history textbooks in the pre-1914 period and, as will be 
pointed out later, Messerschmidt's study contains methodological flaws which render his 
conclusions suspect.
A contribution to the literature on the image of Britain among German intellectuals 
is provided by Charles McClelland in his The German Historians and England. This work 
examines the appeal which Britain's 'national uniqueness' commanded among German 
historians during the nineteenth century.15
The views of British academics, let alone British historians, towards Germany in 
the prewar period have, however, been largely unexamined. Stuart Wallace's War and the 
Image of Germany concentrates on British academics' activities and attitudes during the 
First World War, not before.16 In addition, the use of school textbooks for ideological 
indoctrination in Britain also needs studying.17
But why focus on history and historians? First, historians constituted a significant 
component of the 'intellectual aristocracy' of Britain, perhaps more so than academics from 
other disciplines, especially among those who had received their education in Germany. As 
Noel Annan has demonstrated, the British intellectual aristocracy was a close-knit, and to a 
certain extent exclusive, community consisting of interrelated families that tended to occupy 
a large number of university chairs, fellowships, tutorships and public school masterships.18 
Wallace affirms that: 'Before the First World War British intellectuals were a small group 
bound together by ties of kinship and shared assumptions based on intermarriage and 
common educational background (at the public schools and the older English 
universities).'19
Secondly, history, arguably more so than any other academic discipline, had a 
considerable role to play in shaping public opinion before the war as well as after its 
outbreak. In fact, history was widely regarded to be an important socialization tool 
throughout the nineteenth century. The study of the past, rather than being an end in itself, 
was conceived as a means to higher goals - of building the individual's character, 
inculcating civic-mindedness and engendering patriotism. In short, history was generally 
seen as 'an agent of moral education'20 and the nursery of public virtue. The practical 
function of teaching citizenship through histoiy indeed should not be played down. Seeley, 
for instance, regarded history as the basis for a 'science of politics' and, additionally, as a 
means of socializing man - in his own words, of teaching man 'his place in the republic of 
man'.21 It was Seeley who originated the axiom that,
'Without History, Citizenship has no root; without 
Citizenship, History has no fruit.'22
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the value of histoiy for socialization 
purposes had not diminished. A teaching manual published in 1901 stipulated that 'history 
must be made to teach citizenship' in order to preserve the young people's 'sense of 
national continuity and social unity'.23 Albert Frederick Pollard, founder of the Historical 
Association in 1906, affirmed in a leaflet in 1911 that history 'provides a sound basis of 
politics'. In his opinion, 'everyone has to be a citizen; and he cannot be an intelligent 
citizen if he is utterly ignorant of the history of his country'.24 As late as 1913, there were 
voices from within the profession admonishing that 'unless the younger generation is more 
thoroughly taught the eternal principles of History and Patriotism, the Britain of the future 
must be a declining power'.25 The juxtaposition here of history and patriotism was no 
accident; it is very telling indeed that the two were considered to form an integral whole.
188
On the eve of war, in spite of the existence of moderate voices calling for the 
teaching of 'intelligent, but not blind patriotism’,26it had already become a deeply 
entrenched notion that history was meant to nurture patriotism in children, though there was 
disagreement over how extreme the forms of patriotism should take.27 When war broke out 
in August 1914, the role of histoiy in boosting national feeling took on added importance. 
British historians, more so than academics from any other discipline, took the lead in 
rallying the country around the flag when hostilities broke out. The use of history in moral 
education and character-building, invariably, was to be reinforced during the war.28
At the end of the Victorian era, history was becoming increasingly popular and had 
undoubtedly established itself firmly as an independent academic discipline in Britain, no 
longer a branch of other subjects such as literature or geography. History had in fact made 
great strides since the early 1800s. During this metamorphosis, history also became 
increasingly seen as a science, a branch of learning having its own 'scientific approach’.
The appointment of J.B. Bury to the Regius Chair at Cambridge in 1902 marked the 
triumph of this 'scientific movement’ in history. In his inaugural lecture entitled 'The 
Science of History’, Bury argued that it was possible to lay down laws in history just as in 
the natural sciences.29
History's rise in fortunes and status was confirmed in the Board of Education's 
Code of Regulations of 1904, which included history as one of nine subjects deemed 
essential for elementary school education.30 In that very year, George Walter Prothero, at 
that time president of the Royal Historical Society, co-editor of the Cambridge Modem 
History and editor of the Quarterly Review, took notice of the 'flourishing' of history at 
King's College, Cambridge, which was reflected by the 'improving numbers' of its students 
taking the subject.31 An address delivered by Thomas Hodgkin to the Historical 
Association in January 1908 further attested to history's coming of age in the early 1900s. 
Commenting on history's gaining of 'dignity and importance' during the previous fifty
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years, Hodgkin remarked: 'I can well remember the time when the writing of history was 
looked upon as a literary accomplishment’.32 By 1908, undoubtedly, history had made 
sufficient progress to become more than just a literary venture. In that year also, Pollard 
had occasion to observe that history in the University of London was 'emerging from the 
contempt in which it was formerly ... held’.33
History may have been released from its literary shackles but some old habits, 
norms and deficiencies still died hard. One should note that the Historical Association was 
founded only in 1906, an event which, as much as it signified progress in the development 
of history, was undeniably also a necessary and delayed response to a deepening 
predicament in the secondary schools. The main purpose of Historical Association's 
founding was to bolster history teaching in the secondary schools as it was widely 
perceived to be poor and underdeveloped at that level. Hence, despite the progress made, 
the study and teaching of history before 1914 still had to contend with various 
shortcomings. In 1908 the Principal Assistant Secretary of the Board of Education issued a 
circular conceding that it was still impossible to separate history from other subjects like 
literature or geography in the secondary schools. Another notable problem related to 
textbooks: as they were scarce and difficult to buy or borrow, it became a common practice 
not to use them altogether. As the circular noted: 'In some schools an attempt is made to 
dispense with the use of a text-book, and the instruction is entirely oral. This system has 
often been adopted as a reaction from the use of unsuitable text-books.’34
Because history textbooks were few and far between before the war, their paucity 
accords each one added significance. As John Duckworth notes in his thesis on the history 
syllabus in English schools from 1900 to 1925: 'When we turn to the equipment of the 
schools, and particularly the provision of books, we find ourselves in an educational 
wasteland. It is for this reason that the textbook became so important, it was quite often 
the only book dealing with history in the school.’33 Hence, the history textbook was a rare
and highly valuable commodity when in use, being in many cases the only teaching 
resource available to the teacher - a testimony to the one still underdeveloped aspect of 
secondary-school history teaching at the time. As Duckworth explains: 'Teachers were 
often covering a syllabus in history that they had not drawn up themselves and therefore 
relied almost completely on lecturing to their classes or on using one textbook as a reader.’ 
Indeed, in his study, largely confined to the public schools, Duckworth finds that 'many 
schools had only one textbook for the whole course1.36 The value of the textbook thus 
should not be underestimated.
The history textbook assumes additional importance as a primary source for our 
purposes because it was, and still remains, a vehicle for transmitting values and opinion. 
Whether intended or not by the author, the textbook did serve as a medium for his or her 
unspoken assumptions, values and worldviews. As Chancellor points out: 'O f all school 
subjects, history is perhaps the most obviously a vehicle for the opinions of the teacher and 
the section of society which he represents. It gives scope for the expression of a wide 
variety of political, moral and religious ideas’. Indeed, the expression of personal values 
and bias is intrinsic to the historian’s craft. In the words of George Macaulay Trevelyan, a 
leading historian of this century: 'Because history is not an exact science but an 
interpretation of human affairs, opinion and varieties of opinion intrude as inevitable 
factors.’37 The pupils or students being young minds, textbooks and their opinions are no 
doubt prone to easy acceptance by their intended audience.38 The value of textbooks, and 
the role played by historians, in influencing opinion - and transmitting propaganda - in the 
prewar period should not be overlooked.
Attitudes towards Germany
In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with textbooks published 
between 1880 and 1914. We will begin first with German history textbooks, followed by a
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discussion of texts on European history. The texts will be treated thematically as well as in 
chronological sequenc-
A
according to the year of publication. After examining both types of textbooks, we will 
discuss our conclusions. Our objective also was to focus on Oxbridge writers. In the 
course of research, however, this goal was met by default as a very large number of history 
textbooks examined were in fact authored by historians who either were at that time, or had 
previously been, associated with Oxford or Cambridge. Although these texts in most 
instances do not evince clear-cut value judgement, they do betray hints of 'pro-German' or 
'anti-German' attitudes.
Textbooks on German History
Between 1896 and 1903 Poultney Bigelow published in three volumes his work, 
History of the German Struggle for Liberty. The first volume opens with the story of John 
Palm, a bookseller in Nuremberg who was executed by Napoleon's occupation forces in 
1806, symbolizing the subjugation of Germany by a foreign army.39 The dominant and 
unifying theme of Bigelow's work, then, is the German struggle for emancipation 
throughout the nineteenth century, from the period of Napoleonic despotism up to its 
ultimate realization in 1871.
In 1916, as the Great War was raging in Europe, Bigelow published another work 
entitled Prussian Memories. 1864-1914. In the opening pages, Bigelow cites pro-German 
army and navy officers who, in order to 'prove their social superiority', fill their rooms 
with photographs of the German imperial court - a proud display of Germanophilism.40 
These officers, however, were in fact American. Bigelow and his works are not exactly 
central to this analysis as he was an American historian. He is nonetheless mentioned , 
because he serves as an example of the prewar American historiography that viewed the 
unification of Germany as a liberation, the culmination of a centuries-long strife for
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national actualization. How does Bigelow's analysis compare with British historiography of 
the same period? Was his sympathetic treatment of modem Germany simply a North 
American aberration? Or was it well-placed in the broader Anglo-Saxon historiography 
spanning both sides of the Atlantic, enjoying a fair hearing in Britain no less?
*  *  *  *
In this analysis of the British histoiy texts, one discernible tendency among the 
books was to view the Germany of recent times as a 'new* Germany, different from the 
old. This theme is expressed in Modem Germany by Otto Julius Eltzbacher, who changed 
his name to J. Ellis Barker after the outbreak of the First World War. The first edition of 
Modem Germany was published in 1905 but the 1912 edition evoked the old-new 
dichotomy, distinguishing the idealistic Germany - the 'sentimental' and 'day-dreaming' 
Germany of philosophers, poets and 'backward peasants' - from the new, efficient and 
ebullient Germany, an economic powerhouse. As Barker observes:
Modem Germany is matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning, 
business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality, and sometimes even of 
sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modem Germany and old Germany are 
two different countries. New Germany is an enlarged Prussia. Old 
Germany continues to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and 
under the banner of Austria ...
He then points out that the literary and philosophy figures such as Goethe, Schiller,
Schlegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart and Haydn 'belonged to old Germany and were non- 
Prussians'.41 The implication of this view is that the old Germany was benign and 
idealistic; the new Germany, being an enlarged Prussia, is powerful and militarist, 'hard-
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headed' and 'calculating1.
The Evolution of Modem Germany (1908) by William Harbutt Dawson, an avid 
writer on German life and institutions, echoed this dichotomy between the old and the new. 
Speaking of the 'new spirit' in German national life, Dawson referred to the reign of ideas 
in the early nineteenth century being superseded by 'the reign of matter, of things'. As he 
writes: 'A century ago Germany was poor in substance but rich in ideals; to-day it is rich 
in substance, but the old ideals, or at least the old idealism, has gone.'42
Allusion to racial origins and reverence for the Teutonic race pervade many of the 
textbooks. Emily Hawtrey's A Short History of Germany, which appeared in 1904, starts 
against a backdrop of racial motifs. In her introduction, the author begins with an account 
of the origins of the various races before focusing on the Aryans. She writes: 'The mighty 
Teutonic or German race in Europe did not begin to play its part in history until the decline 
of the Roman Empire'.43
In his work Teuton Studies. Sidney Whitman also evoked racial imagery in 
discussing the Germany of the past, exalting the Germans as 'a  branch of the Teutonic race 
which again belongs to the great Aryan family'. Further describing the great strength and 
contributions of the German race to European civilization, Whitman writes in glowing 
terms that: 'Through centuries we note the old world vainly struggling against the 
constantly renewed force of the German race, tramping through Europe to the din of arms, 
laying the foundations of new peoples and dynasties in Germany, in Italy ... in France ... 
even in England'.44 It should be mentioned that Whitman, who in his youth had been sent 
to Germany for schooling, was a friend of Bismarck and an avid traveller to Germany. He 
once looked back on his early days in Germany as the period during which he developed 'a  
deeper and more thoughtful appreciation of the [German] people as well as the institutions 
of the country'. Here too he was wont to praise the 'Teutonic race' and the country which, 
in his words, 'has done much, and suffered even more, in the cause of human progress'.45
194
Though 'risen in the art of war', the new Germany, in Whitman's opinion, excelled in the 
'arts of peace'.46 From his adulation of Bismarck, and of German life and culture, it is 
clear that Whitman was a faithful Germanophile.
Another theme common to most of the books examined is that the new Germany, 
being the creation of Prussia, had become essentially Prussified. Hawtrey, for instance, 
adopted this Prussocentric view of modem Germany's development in A Short History and 
her earlier work Outline History of Germany (1896), where she stated her aim as that of 
showing how Prussia 'came to hold its present position of importance amongst the 
continental powers of Europe'.47 But not only is Hawtrey Prussocentric, she is also 
sympathetic towards Prussian methods and objectives in her treatment of the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870. Citing the 'bitter jealousy' of the French who 'longed for a war' 
with Prussia, she notes: 'In warring against a common foe, all sectional prejudices were 
forgotten and hearts were knit together in a common loyalty to the Fatherland. France 
forced war upon Germany and ignorantly helped her to achieve unity.'48 Therefore, France 
is viewed as the agent provocateur. Hawtrey's pro-German attitude could not be more 
obvious than when she refers to Bismarck, Wilhelm I, Friedrich III and Moltke as 'men of 
intellect and of indomitable will, and God-fearing men whose faith in the God of nations 
helped them to lay deep and broad the foundations of the Empire'. From Hawtrey's 
standpoint, the new Germany is in fact a force for peace in Europe under the leadership of 
Wilhelm II. 'Germany is a progressive nation and has a progressive Emperor. ... no longer 
do people feel that European peace is imperilled', she claims.49
Hawtrey was by no means the only one to adopt a Prussocentric view. James 
Wycliffe Headlam's Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire (1899)50 explores 
the theme of German nationhood with an emphasis on Bismarck's role. Professor of Greek 
and Ancient History at Queen's College, London, from 1894 to 1900, Headlam was also an 
expert on German history and served as a staff inspector of secondaiy schools for the
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Board of Education from 1902 until the outbreak of the First World War.51 Bismarck, 
viewed as the leading protagonist of German unification, is here treated in very laudatory 
terms. Discussing Prussia's war with Austria in 1866, Headlam claims that 'Bismarck was 
no Napoleon; he had determined that war was necessary, but he did not go to the terrible 
arbitrament with a light heart. ... It was his strength that he never forgot that he was 
working, not for himself, but for others.'52 Thus, Bismarck is portrayed as a magnanimous 
and truly honourable statesman. He is also credited with creating the North German 
Confederation after the defeat of Austria. The constitution of the confederation, according 
to Headlam, 'was his [Bismarck's] work, and it shows the same intellectual resource, the 
originality, and practical sense which mark all he did'53 - providing yet further adulation of 
the man.
Like most other authors, Headlam places the onus of responsibility for the outbreak 
of the war of 1870 on the French who, with 'growing discontent and suspicion', believed 
that the supremacy of France was being threatened by 'this new power', Germany. Is 
Bismarck then viewed as a wanton warmonger? Absolutely not, for he is portrayed as 
having gone to war only as an absolute necessity, and with clear gains for Prussia. As 
Headlam explains: 'We may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone to war unless he 
believed it to be necessary and desirable, and he would not have thought this unless there 
was something to be gained.' According to Headlam, there was one reason that made war 
with France 'almost inevitable': the unification of Germany. Here again, German 
unification is seen as a good and war is implied to be justified in order to bring it about. 
Prussian militarism is not mentioned at all, and the guile of Bismarck in provoking the 
French is not even mildly criticized. According to Headlam, the one way to effect the 
union of the German states 'almost without resistance' was, 'i f  France were to make an 
unprovoked attack upon Germany'- an attack which would arouse the 'strong national 
passion' of the German states and cause them to set aside their differences.54 This
provocation was duly provided by the French government following the 'Ems telegram' 
episode, which Bismarck seized upon to manipulate public opinion in Prussia's favour. It is 
quite obvious where Headlam's sympathies lie. Characteristically, there is little in this book 
which views the new Germany as a threat to Europe's balance of power or an anathema to 
Britain's interests.
Headlam's favourable and supportive view of Bismarck and Germany is echoed by 
W.W. Tulloch in The Story of the Life of the Emperor William of Germany (1888).55 In 
Chapter 4 entitled 'Bismarck', for instance, Tulloch writes that 'Bismarck's presence and 
counsel were a great help to the King in every way. He had now some one with whom to 
share his anxieties.'56 In his discussion of the war with France, Tulloch similarly adopts an 
anti-French position, treating the war as the culmination of French envy and jealousy of a 
new power in Europe. He observes: 'War between France and Germany was only a 
question of time and opportunity. France was eager to try conclusions with a state which 
threatened to usurp her hitherto unchallenged sway as the greatest power on the Continent.' 
At the same time, even if Bismarck is depicted as an opportunist, he is nonetheless 
exonerated by his wish to achieve unification. Thus, though Bismarck and the German 
statesmen 'did not in all probability do anything to hasten the catastrophe', they 'saw that 
their great dream of thorough national unity could be attained in no better way than by a 
war with France'.57 The war therefore was a means to national unity, an end which Tulloch 
implies justified the defeat of France. Again, the emergence of a new power at the heart of 
Europe does not evoke fear in Tulloch. Citing the German Emperor Wilhelm I's speech 
made at the opening of the first Reichstag of the new empire, he embraces the view that 
Germany will preserve the peace of Europe rather than threaten it. As the Emperor stated, 
'Our new Germany ... will be a trustworthy guarantee of the peace of Europe'.58 And with 
this view Tulloch takes no issue. He is no less exultant in his treatment of Wilhelm II, 
referring to him as 'the incarnation of duty, and the soul of honour'. The Prussian army,
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rather than a menace to Europe, is regarded as a symbol of Prussian and German greatness. 
Writes Tulloch: 'I f  Prussia was to become great, it would be by means of her army.'59
*  *  *  *
It is clear that British history textbooks on Germany tended to look upon the 
German Empire with approval, despite its Prussification and alleged hard-headedness. The 
new Germany indeed was not generally regarded with alarm or hostility. James Sime, for 
instance, notes in his History of Germany that the German Empire 'is the restoration of the 
old German Kingdom rather than of the Holy Roman Empire'. From his viewpoint, the 
new Germany does not constitute a threat. 'Some fear lest Prussia should become too 
powerful, and the various German States be moulded too much after one pattern. But 
influences remain to prevent such a result,’ he asserts.60
First published in 1874, Sime's book constituted a volume in the Historical Course 
for Schools series and was issued in a second edition in 1909, the year of the naval scare. 
As was typical of textbooks of that period, his narrative is straightforward and simplistic, 
devoid of analysis and given to generalizations. The first chapter deals with 'Ancient 
Germany’ and it is interesting to note that at the outset he explores the racial origins of the 
Germans, even if in a generalized way, relating their roots in the Aryan race and their 
attributes. The ancient Germans, he mentions, 'were generally tall and strong’. 'They 
could be fierce and cruel; but they were brave, truthful, simple in their manners, and 
hospitable’.6l Another notable feature of this book is that it was revised by Adolphus 
William Ward, 'than whom England can supply no one better fitted to deal with matters of 
German History of all dates', as Sime acknowledges.62
President of the Royal Historical Society from 1899 to 1901 and Master of 
Peterhouse, Cambridge, from 1900 until his death in 1924, Ward was a historian of 
Germany who had spent many years of his childhood in that country. His father, John
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Ward, had been the British Consul-General in Leipzig and Hamburg in the 1840s through 
the 1860s. A Germanophile, Ward had an honorary Ph.D. from Leipzig and was made 
Knight of the Prussian Order of the Crown in 1911.63 As one of his contemporaries 
observed: 'All through his life Ward was anxious to do all that was in his power to 
emphasize friendly relations between the land of his birth and that of his early education.'64 
This commitment to Anglo-German rapprochement was reflected in his membership in the 
Anglo-German Friendship Committee and his efforts in bringing about the visit of German 
journalists to Cambridge in 1906.65 Along with George Prothero and Stanley Leathes,
Ward was co-editor of the Cambridge Modem History, a series inspired by Lord Acton, 
Regius Professor of Modem History at Cambridge from 1895 till his death in 1902.
In the second edition of the book, Chapter 21, by R.P. Mahaffy, was added at the 
end to deal with 'recent events'. Entitled 'The Period of William IT, this chapter could 
hardly be more adulatory in characterizing the Emperor as 'the truly remarkable sovereign', 
an embodiment of 'the energy, the courage, the intellect and the resource of a powerful and 
progressive nation'. This in itself sets the tone for the ensuing narrative of recent events.
In his discussion of the German colonies, Mahaffy refers to the 1890 Anglo-German 
agreement as 'an admirable business arrangement' based on Lord Salisbury's precept that 
'there was room for everyone in Africa'.66 Hence, the book cites the agreement as an 
example of accommodating Germany and bringing positive results to Anglo-German 
relations.
In discussing 'The German Navy', Mahaffy provides primarily a descriptive account 
that traces the origins of the German navy beginning in 1891 through the naval laws of 
1898 and 1900 which laid down the battleship construction programme. The naval 
expansion, he states, 'filled the English nation with anxiety'. Furthermore, Britain by now 
'fully realized1 Germany's growing trade. 'Thus commercial rivalry together with the 
irritation caused by a violent press inflamed English feeling against Germany.'
Nevertheless, the book then points to moderating influences which helped neutralize this 
growing tension. As Mahaffy observes: 'Happily there were other causes which made for 
better, feelings between the two countries.’ Citing 'commercial interests’, he mentions that 
Britain is Germany's 'best customer’, further pointing to the pacific intentions of the British 
and German monarchs who have undertaken efforts in recent times to improve Anglo- 
German relations. Reinforcing the idea of Anglo-German interlinkage, Mahaffy points to 
military ties, particularly the bestowing of the rank of Field Marshal on the German 
Emperor, and Lord Roberts's receipt of the Order of the Black Eagle, 'the most 
distinguished of Prussian orders’.67
Between pages 291 and 292, the book deals with 'A Greater Navy1, predicting that 
the British government 'will be compelled to adopt a programme of construction which will 
outpace even the break-neck programme of the Germans'. This constitutes but a brief 
examination of a thorny and central issue in Anglo-German relations. On page 292, the 
book moves on to the German army, which is described as 'a  very great tax on the people’ 
because of its harsh regimen. Yet, according to Mahaffy, 'the nation’ realizes that 'popular 
or not, a great army is a necessity for Germany, and that the Emperor must be supported as 
the one force that keeps Germany together1.68 Thus, in his analysis, the German army is a 
necessity, tied as it is to the imperial idea. But more importantly, the army is not seen as 
an evil.
Addressing the issue of 'Germany in 1909’, Mahaffy observes that in that year 
Germany had no 'cordial friends' in Europe except for Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, he 
does make a passing remark about the naval crisis of 1909 in stating that Britain was 
'much estranged by the ominous activity of the German shipyards'. This notion is, 
however, moderated by a laudatory view of the German people's industriousness and spirit. 
Germany, he declares, possesses 'one great asset, - the industry, wealth, and prosperity of 
her people’. Referring to Germany's rapid rise during the last thirty years, he writes
reverently of the 'sleepy old towns' which have now turned into 'teeming hives of industry', 
adding: 'That all these things should have been done in thirty years' time is one of the most 
remarkable facts in the recent history of Europe.' Hence, while alluding briefly to the 
Anglo-German naval rivalry, he attempts to temper that view by pointing to the hardy 
qualities of the German people.
Even when examining the 'Position of the Emperor1, the book also evinces a strong 
sympathy with the Kaiser. Apologetically, Mahaffy remarks: 'Like almost all clever men, 
he makes mistakes; but he has a genius for leadership, intense devotion to his country and 
duties, and, on the whole, sound judgment.' Next, Mahaffy portrays Wilhelm not just as an 
Anglophile but as an Englishman. As he argues:
Though regarded in England as the personification of Germanism, he [the 
Kaiser] is, in fact, very much of an Englishman. His large ideas of empire, 
his contempt for idleness and respect of commercial and business success, 
his love of the sea and devotion to the most arduous of sports, are not the 
usual characteristics of a German.69
Lastly, the chapter ends with Germany's cultural contributions to the world. 
Typically, German achievements are applauded. 'During the nineteenth century1, Mahaffy 
declares, 'Germany has maintained in philosophy, science, and literature the high place 
which she has previously won.'70
The timing of the second edition's issuance should not be overlooked within the 
broader context of international political developments. After the naval crisis of 1909, a 
handful of history textbooks on Germany were in fact published in response to what was 
perceived as a heightening Anglo-German crisis. But contrary to what one might expect, 
these books tended to act more as voices of moderation and reason than as instigators of
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hostility. Hence, rather than contribute to the Anglo-German tension, they sought to effect 
a conciliation. This brings us to the question of how historians viewed their roles within 
the broader social context, outside of academe.
Take for instance the afore-mentioned work, A Short History of Germany to the 
Present Day by Arthur William Holland, published in 1912 by the British-German 
Friendship Society - a fact which should alert us to the tone and purpose of the book. The 
direction in which it intends to take its reader is suggested already by the content and tone 
of its Introduction, which delves into the origins of the names of the countries. Explaining 
that 'England' is derived from the Angles, Holland goes on to tackle the origins of 
'Germany' and points out that the three names by which Germany is commonly known - 
'Germani', 'Deutschland' and 'Allamagne' (sic) - are 'the result of accident'. This chance 
origin of the name of the country, Holland suggests, is 'often responsible for wrong ideas'. 
His underlying thesis is that the Anglo-Saxons and Germans share a common heritage 
which is not readily apparent from the name 'Germany'. Britons and Germans, he asserts, 
'belong to the same race, to the race which ... we call Teutonic, or Germanic'. Holland 
adds that
The ancestors of each lived, side by side, on the plains of Central Europe, 
speaking dialects of the same language, with manners and customs, habits 
and ideas, which were very much alike. Now this important fact is very 
often forgotten, partly because there is no connection between the words 
England and Germany.71
Affirming Anglo-German racial ties, he argues: 'The Saxon race has played a great part in 
the history of the German people, and to it we are allied by ties of kinship; nor to it only, 
but to all those tribes whose descendants form the German nation of to-day.'72 Therefore,
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the book begins with the race motif before proceeding to give an account of Germany's 
history from the early period to the present day. It is significant that Holland starts by 
alluding to the link that binds the English and the Germans, rather than the causes of recent 
Anglo-German tension. As we will see, racial kinship was very commonly evoked as a 
unifying factor.
Throughout his narrative, Holland maintains a neutral tone. Even if he does not on 
the surface sound pro-German, neither is he overtly anti-German. Nevertheless, in his 
discussion of the modem period of German history, it becomes evident where his 
sympathies lie, especially when dealing with the formation of the Second German Empire 
in 1871. On the Franco-Prussian War, he observes: 'This great war, waged by Germany 
under the leadership of Prussia, made the union of the whole nation possible ... In the great 
hall of the palace of Louis XIV. at Versailles, on the 18th of January, 1871, William I. of 
Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and the German Empire as it exists to-day was 
founded.'73 Though not exactly jubilant, his account nonetheless comes across as sharing 
an enthusiasm for the new Reich.
Towards the end of the book, the conciliatory intent of the book manifests itself 
more clearly under the heading 'The Germans as a Commercial People', followed by 
'Germany's Place "In the Sun"'. Holland reminds the reader that the Germans are 'first and 
foremost' a commercial and industrial people. 'Their prime interests', he argues, 'are 
neither naval nor military, nor colonial, nor even educational, but commercial, and the 
extent to which the trade and manufactures of the Empire have increased during the past 
forty years is one of the most striking facts in the whole history of industrialism.' Here, 
then, Germany's rapid economic ascendancy is praised. He goes on to assert that 'a 
commercial nation is, of necessity, a peaceful nation,' tenuous as the claim was shown to
t
be in 1914. The basis of Holland's argument is that a war would do more harm than good 
to a commercial nation and therefore, the 'aggressive spirit' displayed by Prussia in the past
is truly a thing of the past. As he explains: 'Prussia, after years of struggle, has attained 
the position which she sought, and Germany, under her leadership, has now no need to 
fight unless it is to protect her great commercial interests, a right which she retains in 
common with every other civilized Power.' It should not be surprising that this book, 
published by the British-German Friendship Society, was evoking the Norman Angellite 
theme of economic interdependence to argue for the peaceful intentions of Germany.
As for Germany's compulsory military service and naval buildup, Holland too 
offers a justification. Military service, he argues, rather than making for belligerency, 
'tends to keep the people peaceable'. He defends the German navy on the ground that 
Germany, with a growing population, has to rely increasingly on imports to feed her people 
and her navy is therefore essential to protect her overseas trade and food supplies. 'She 
[Germany] is now passing through the same experience which Great Britain passed through 
after the repeal of the Com Laws,' Holland contends, and adds: 'No country knows so well 
as our own the vital importance of being able to protect its trade, and more especially its 
supplies of food by means of a large navy; and this consideration is becoming of almost 
equal importance to Germany.'74 One should note here that Holland is attempting to elicit 
the reader's support and understanding by evoking Britain's own dependence on her navy 
and trade routes. Incidentally, the justification he provides for the German navy was the 
official line given by the German government.
This apology for Germany is carried on even further when Holland raises the point 
that Germany has to guard against the Russian menace to her east. 'We, who have carried 
our commerce into all the quarters of the globe and planted there our colonies, cannot 
blame the Germans for perceiving that the price of liberty ... is a sleepless vigilance.' Even 
if Germany's vast expenditure of armaments is to be deplored, Holland suggests, 'we may 
ask Englishmen to bring themselves to look at this matter for a moment from the German 
point of view'. It should not be surprising that he takes the side of the Germans vis-a-vis
the Russians. After all, the Teutons were deemed to belong to the same family as the 
Anglo-Saxons - a notion to which he directs his reader yet once again. 'Let us then 
remember our common origin and the long years of our friendship', he supplicates.75 It is 
only logical then that his next heading deals with 'Education in Germany', an area widely 
regarded to be the envy of Britain. As he notes: 'The German universities are famous, and 
rightly famous, throughout the world.'76
As might be expected, the book concludes by reiterating the ties that bind the 
countries. The Anglo-German naval race and Germany's commercial rivalry with Britain 
are barely touched on - a very telling omission. Closing the book under the heading 'Links 
between England and Germany', Holland does not even attempt to conceal his agenda. 
'Readers of these pages,' he declares, 'and all who have paid attention to the history of 
Germany will perceive how close and numerous are the ties which link the peoples of that 
country and of England, and how unnatural would be any serious or lasting estrangement 
between them.' 'The two peoples are of the same blood,' he reminds the reader. 'Their 
institutions developed side by side.' Ultimately, then, Holland returns to the oft-repeated 
themes in his quest for Anglo-German friendship by citing the characteristics that bind the 
two peoples.77
This book was subsequently issued in a second edition in 1913 with a foreword by 
Norman Angell, who defended the author's aim of presenting the German point of view. 
Insisting on the book's impartiality, Angell argues: 'A knowledge of what it [the book] 
contains is necessary if we are to understand rather than to misunderstand one another.'78 
But given the work's goal of effecting Anglo-German reconciliation, Angell's claim of 
impartiality may indeed seem dubious. Undeniably Holland was taking on the role of a 
publicist. Consequently, the impartiality of the historian can also be called into question. 
These textbooks cast much-needed light on how historians viewed their role in society and 
in the political debates of the day.
That some historians did not regard themselves purely as educators but also as 
policy advocates and propagandists through their specialized medium is demonstrated 
further by the publication of Germany in the Nineteenth Century (1912), by John Holland 
Rose, et al.79 A scholar on Napoleon, Rose was Reader in Modem History at Cambridge in 
1912. This book contains an introductory note by Richard Haldane, who writes that 'such 
forces as we possess and such forces as Germany possesses could, if brought in aid of each 
the other, effect great things for the benefit of humanity at large.’ Haldane asserts: 'The 
call of the hour is for co-operation, and this requires mutual sympathy, and therefore 
mutual study.’80
The book then proceeds with the first part entitled 'The Political History’, written 
by Rose. Observing that the 'strong individualism of the Teutonic nature ever made for 
division’ up to the nineteenth century, Rose upholds and extols Bismarck's role in bringing 
about the unification of Germany. Specifically, he explains that Bismarck has often been 
quoted out of context and misunderstood when called the man of 'blood and iron’, and 
suggests that Germany's annexation of Alsace and Lorraine consequent to the war of 1870- 
71 is justified by her security needs. 'We who live behind the rampart of the sea know 
little (save in times of panic) of the fear that besets a State which has no natural frontiers 
and which then had to reckon with three great military empires on its borders,’ he contends. 
'We must therefore not be too hard on the statesmen of the German Empire which was 
proclaimed at Versailles', Rose pleads.
Sympathy for Germany is further elicited by portraying France as the traditional 
troublemaker in Europe, the aggressor against whom continental coalitions had been built in 
the last century. According to Rose, the Germans after all 'were bent on building a barrier 
against French aggressions'. 'Look at the course of history since the time of Louis XIII,’ he 
urges, 'and you will find that the efforts of British, Austrian, Spanish, and Dutch statesmen 
were directed mainly to building up Barrier-Systems against French aggressions.’ In his
view, then, it is only understandable that the Germans should wish to 'end the French 
menace'. 'Probably, if we had been in their place, we should have done the same,' he 
reminds the reader. Emphasizing the persistence of the French threat, Rose adds: 'For if 
we look at the past, we find that our forefathers dreaded France far more than the wildest 
alarmists now dread Germany. And their dread was with reason. The position of France 
gives her great advantages for an attack on England and English commerce.'81 Not only is 
France presented as a menace to Germany, but the spectre of French perfidy is raised 
against the well-being of British commerce. Evoking the French danger to Britain's 
security, he deflects the possible threat posed by the German Empire.
Rose indeed lays down a series of arguments to defend the German government 
against its common criticisms. He justifies the concentration of power in the Kaiser and 
the Chancellor on the basis that the German Empire, as a confederation, needs a strong 
executive and 'firmness' to conduct its diplomatic and military affairs. Appealing to the 
conservative instincts of his reader, Rose shrewdly evokes the red menace of socialism to 
bolster his case in defence of the Kaiserreich. As he writes:
Of late years the growth of Socialism has furnished another cause why the 
authorities cling, as for dear life, to the control of every wheel of the 
administrative machine. ... It would be impertinent for a foreigner to 
dogmatize as to the wisdom or unwisdom of this procedure.
Not surprisingly, remarking that 'the aims of the German rulers and of their 
Chancellors have been on the whole peaceful', Rose cites Bismarck's support for Britain at 
the Congress of Berlin of 1878 as evidence that 'German policy was far from being as anti- 
British as was often believed'.82 But what about Germany's military power right in the 
heart of Europe? Here, Rose points to the precariousness of Germany's geopraphical
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position, sandwiched as she is between powerful neighbours. 'She has no natural frontiers 
on the East, and poor barriers on the South and West. Her policy', he insists, 'is therefore 
almost necessarily defensive.' Little does he mention, of course, that in spite of her 
geopraphical position, Germany has achieved unification and spectacular military victories 
in the last century. The cause of Germany's insecurity is instead laid at the doorsteps of 
France and Russia. Rose argues that 'Germany cannot well be an aggressive Power so 
long as the Franco-Russian alliance endures', the implication being that the Franco-Russian 
alliance, forged in 1894, is to blame for Germany's armaments, and that France and Russia 
remain the real aggressors. Reiterating Germany's vulnerability, he argues:
Germany accomplished a wonderful work in unifying her people ...; but 
even so she has not escaped from the disadvantages of her situation; by 
land she is easily assailable on three sides; by sea she is less vulnerable; 
but there she labours under a great disadvantage, viz., that her oceanic 
commerce has to pass through the Straits of Dover and down the English 
Channel, within striking distance of the French and British fleets at Brest,
Plymouth, Cherbourg, Portsmouth, and Dover. This is what makes her 
nervous about her mercantile marine. This is what makes her build a great 
fleet; and again, I say, were we in her situation we should do the same.83
His analysis consists in doing nothing more than offering a series of apologies for 
Germany, choosing to emphasize only her disadvantages and the obstacles in her way, 
while totally ignoring the alternative view that her ascendancy in the late nineteenth century 
had been a source of anxiety and unease in Europe. Germany's naval buildup is justified 
on the ground that her commerce is vulnerable; yet again, Rose attempts to draw his 
reader's sympathy by alluding to Britain's own reliance on sea power to guard her trade,
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thereby employing the same ploy used by Holland to justify Germany's battleship 
programme.
It is worth noting that Rose regards German unification as a 'wonderful work’, not 
as upsetting the European balance of power but as conducing to the 'peace of the world'.84 
The German Empire is indeed exalted for, as he claims, 'it is demonstrable that the 
formation of the German Empire has been a gain to Europe and therefore to Great Britain'. 
In Rose's analysis, Germany has exerted a peaceful influence on Europe because, by being 
a strong power at the heart of the continent, she has precluded future wars, and more 
particularly, future invasions by France. As he argues, the wars of unification 'put an end, 
once for all, to the possibility of waging predatory wars against the hitherto unguarded 
centre of the Continent, thereby removing a temptation to war which had so often lured 
France into false courses in the previous centuries [emphasis added]'. It is thus very clear 
that from Rose's standpoint, France still remains the main source of instability and the 
instigator of conflict in Europe; the strong German Empire, a welcome presence in 
checking that French menace, has, in his own words, 'maintained the peace for 40 years'. 
Making an assertion which was to be nullified in 1914, Rose observes that German 
unification 'at one stroke' brought about a balance of power in Europe 'in so decisive a 
way as to make a great war the most risky of ventures'.85
Part Two of the book consists of 'The Intellectual and Literary History', by Charles 
H. Herford, the Chair of English Literature at the University of Manchester from 1901 until 
1921. Here he characterizes early nineteenth-century Germany as 'a  series of discordant 
states, ruthlessly trampled on and dismembered', a reference to the Napoleonic invasion. 
Yet, Herford asserts, from this period emerged the 'culminating moments' of Germany's 
cultural development. 'The poor, ragged Cinderella of Jena and Eylau reappeared as the 
radiant queen of the ball, outshining both the proud elder sisters, though they were too 
proud, and she, as yet, too humble to be aware of it,' he observes.86 The apologetic tack is
carried on further by Herford in his discussion of Germany's intellectual makeup. Though 
conceding that the rigid Bismarckian state has 'some grave defects', Herford claims that 
'this autocratic will is inspired and directed by a powerful if incomplete social sense, and 
precise, if incomplete, social ideas', and it is carried out with 'intellectual competence'.
Even if Herford's essay is supposed to deal mainly with Germany's intellectual 
history, he nonetheless does not desist from countering critics of the Bismarckian state, 
especially where freedom - or the supposed lack of it in Germany - is concerned. 'Let us 
beware of believing that Germany is less free than we in proportion as she is more 
controlled', he pleads, alluding to the divergent conceptions of freedom held by Britons and 
Germans. As he points out: 'Freedom, as ordinarily understood by us, is chiefly a negative 
idea, adequately conveyed in the assurance that we never will be slaves'. But on the other 
hand, he argues, the German idea of freedom 'is a positive and complex ideal, achieved by 
the individual in and through the organized state in which he plays his due part, and only 
fully enjoyed, as Goethe so finely said, when it is daily won'. Subscribing to the 
Rousseauian view that liberty can be achieved only through an individual's total surrender 
to his community, Herford therefore attempts to alleviate the authoritarianism of the 
German state by maintaining that freedom does exist in Germany - albeit in its unique 
form.87
E.C.K. Gonner then contributes 'The Economic History1 in which he too attempts 
to exert a moderating view of Germany. As he points out, by the time of Germany's 
industrial spurt, which came later than Britain's, the German state had already acquired 
'unusual dimensions' and so could 'act consciously' to carry out the country's economic 
development. Referring to the raising of tariffs in 1879, Gonner attempts to vindicate the 
German government's interference in economic matters by explaining that central authority 
and control are natural in Germany, having as she does a different conception of the state 
from the British. He writes: 'The State [in Germany] is expected to intervene and to act in
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economic as in other matters. The only questions are as to the form and sphere of its 
action.' Moreover, Gonner remarks that Germany's economic development during the late 
nineteenth century 'is liable to exaggeration' even if it has been 'extraordinarily great'. He 
further cautions that it would be a mistake to take a country's foreign trade 'as a sure index 
of its industrial advance'.88 The apparent intent of his analysis is to downplay the strength 
of the German economy and thereby also the threat of Germany's industrial competition.
The chapter 'The History of Education', is written by Michael Sadler, Professor of 
the History and Administration of Education at the University of Manchester from 1903 to 
1911. Sadler identifies three periods in Germany's educational development running 
parallel to the periods undergone by Britain. Again, the role of the state is highlighted to 
contrast the developments in Germany with those in Britain. As Sadler notes:
The crucial difference between the history of German education and that of 
English during the nineteenth century lay in the different use which the two 
countries made of the power of the State. In Germany that power was 
exercised unflinchingly, with great forethought and clearness of purpose ... .
In England it was used reluctantly, with deliberate rejection of any 
comprehensive plan of national reorganization and in the teeth of 
opposition which had to be conciliated at every turn.
Parallel to this divergence in the role of the state is a different intellectual tradition. 
According to him, Germany more than England has 'a greater sense of the national 
importance of the things of the mind'.89
Sadler then goes on to discuss Britain's debt to Germany in education and culture, a 
tradition dating back to the days of the Reformation and reinforced in the nineteenth 
century by Samuel Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle, the latter of whom familiarized the
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British public with the German ideas of state-organized education. Matthew Arnold, 
another nineteenth-century British education reformer, is also lauded for his role in 
disseminating and extolling German methods of organization. "Of all foreign influences 
upon English educational thought during the last forty years', Sadler observes, 'the German 
has been, with the exception of the American, the most formative and penetrating. It has 
touched every grade of our education from the Kindergarten to the university.'
As might be expected, Sadler too draws the reader's attention to the ties that bind 
both countries in educational matters, highlighting their shared values and common roots. 
He claims that the British and German systems 'spring from and are governed by closely 
related ideas of life and duty'. Sadler adds: 'They are far more closely akin to one another 
than is either of them to the present educational system of France'. Hence, even in 
education one can detect a strand of thought which identifies a common kinship with 
Germany and which portrays France as an alien, coming from a different tradition and set 
of values. In closing, Sadler takes on the role of an advocate in urging that 'German and 
British education have much to gain from a closer understanding'.90 His generally 
favourable attitude towards Germany certainly bespoke his Germanophilism. An avid 
student of German philosophy and methods in education, Sadler in fact wrote numerous 
reports for the Board of Education expounding the German educational system.
In 1914 there appeared A Short History of Germany and Her Colonies.91 authored 
by Walter Alison Phillips, James Wycliffe Headlam and Arthur William Holland. An 
authority on modem Europe, Phillips was in that very year appointed to the newly created 
Lecky Chair of Modem History at Trinity College, Dublin. This book was reproduced 
from the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), a detail which should 
hardly be surprising, given that Phillips was then the chief assistant editor of the eleventh 
edition of the encyclopaedia.92 The text of the book, therefore, was exactly the same as the 
encyclopaedia's under the heading 'Germany'. This work thus provides insight as well into
the view of Germany which the Encyclopaedia Britannica wished to propagate.
The Short History begins with the Frankish kingdom and the accession of Clovis in 
the fifth century and travels through the Middle Ages and the modem era. More than half 
of the book, however, deals with developments in the post-Napoleonic period. A few of 
the chapters in fact are concerned less with history than with issues of current affairs, 
canying such titles as 'Internal Difficulties', 'Population and Language', 'Commerce and 
Shipping', 'Constitution', 'Local Government', and 'Army and Navy'. In Chapter 16, 
entitled 'Bismarck and German Unity', there is little doubt that Bismarck is to be credited 
for achieving German unification. The authors tend to take a favourable view of Bismarck, 
even while recognizing him as the Prussian minister of 'blood and iron'. From the authors' 
standpoint, 'blood and iron' have more positive connotations than negative ones. Bismarck, 
they write, thought that the German problem 'could only be settled by Austria ceasing to 
influence the German courts and transferring "her centre of gravity towards Budapest" ... 
that the problem could not be solved "by parliamentary decrees", but only "by blood and 
iron'". 'For the supreme moment of this solution he was determined that Prussia should be 
fully prepared', they write reverently of Bismarck. Throughout, the chapter gives very little 
indication that German unification, or Bismarck's diplomacy, was undesirable. The blame 
for the Franco-Prussian War is placed upon France, an envious power 'irritated by the 
enormous increase of Prussian power'. The war is in fact credited for welding 'the 
dissevered halves of Germany together'. The absence of any criticism of Bismarck's 
shrewd and calculating policy is notable. Indeed, German unification is implied to be a 
natural and welcome development, a welding together of the various German states. As the 
authors put it plainly: 'War was now only a question of time, and the study of Bismarck 
was to bring it on at the moment most favourable to Germany, and by a method that should 
throw upon France the appearance of being the aggressor. The European situation was 
highly favourable.'93
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Chapter 17 deals with 'The New Empire', 'a  new era in the history of Germany'. 
This new era is viewed as signalling the end to the 'rivalry of the dynasties'. There is little 
hint that German unification is regarded as a conquest by Prussia. While pointing out that 
'the history of the nation is centred in Berlin', the authors seek a balanced view by stating 
that the states still retain their autonomy and the princes their sovereignty. The fact that 
the German Emperor is far from being a constitutional monarch is also overlooked. The 
book maintains a favourable view of the constitutional arrangements, seeing the constitution 
as a firm bulwark and emphasizing its harmony in operation rather than its defects.94
By 1914 the Anglo-German naval race had certainly become a major issue of 
public debate. But in perusing the Short History, one might be lulled into regarding the 
naval rivalry as only secondary, judging by the scarce attention devoted to it. Chapter 25, 
entitled 'Naval Ambitions', is only three pages long. It starts by discussing the first Navy 
Law of 1898, which was followed by a turn toward colonial affairs. The Boer War, it is 
observed, 'helped to make the nation regret that their fleet was not sufficiently strong to 
make German sympathies effective'. But it is interesting to note that in their discussion of 
Germany's naval construction programme of the early 1900s, the authors do not evoke anti- 
German feeling in Britain, or even view the German navy as a threat. On the contrary, the 
vaunted German effort is implicitly seen as an expression of the strong German character. 
'The same determined spirit which characterized German naval policy was evident also in 
her relations with the other powers,' it is declared.95
In treating the 'Army and Navy' in Chapter 35, the book deals very matter-of-factly 
with the 'nation in arms', which came into being after Prussia's defeat at the battle of Jena. 
The authors discuss briefly the system of military service, the command and organizational 
structure of the army, and provides statistics on recruits. Nowhere are any Prussian 
stereotyped images evoked, nor is Germany's compulsory military service suggested to be 
an evil. The German navy is only briefly dealt with, on one page, the discussion being
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centred on its current size, administration and personnel.96 The book's final chapter carries 
the heading 'German Colonies', signifying that Germany's colonial ambitions still occupied 
top place on the agenda. This book, like all others, allows us insight into the authors' 
agenda by what it includes as much as what it omits, as well as by the manner in which 
what is included is treated.
As seen above, the few years preceding the First World War witnessed the 
publication and reissuing of numerous books on German history.97 None could have been 
more aptly titled than John Arthur Ransome Marriott's essay of 1911. The Problem of 
German History.98 as if suggesting that Germany and her history were a dilemma which 
had to be addressed and resolved. Marriott, at that time a Lecturer and Tutor in Modem 
History and Political Science at Worcester College, Oxford, laid down the problem of 
German history as being that Germany achieved political centralization late, only in 1871. 
But even so, according to him, 'unity has never yet been attained' as even in 1911 there 
still remained twenty-five sovereigns in Germany. In Marriott's view, the triumph of the 
centrifugal principle over the centripetal in Germany's past constitutes 'the central problem 
of Germany'.99 The 'forces of disintegration', however, slowly crumbled as a result of the 
Napoleonic wars, which 'evoked the latent spirit of nationality1, finally climaxing in what 
Marriott calls the 'national uprising' of 1871 when German unification was achieved.
There is little doubt that the attainment of German nationhood is seen as a positive
i
development. Marriott claims: 'That uprising and the results that flowed from it are the 
crown and climax of German history. ... At last Germany has attained to nationhood; at last 
the German people have a common fatherland.' On this note, the book ends. German 
unification again is implied to be a positive development in Europe.
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Textbooks on European History
This study will now turn briefly to textbooks on European history, which generally 
showed similar patterns in their treatment of Germany. Writing on European history, 
Walter Phillips's treatment of modem Germany was not much different from the 
discussions in his German history texts. In Modem Europe. 1815-1899 (1901) he repeated 
the same fundamental themes, seeing the Franco-Prussian War as marking the 'triumph of 
the principle of nationality'.99
Take J. Holland Rose as another example. In his book The Development of the 
European Nations. 1780-1878. first published in 1905, Rose devoted a chapter to Germany 
entitled 'The German Empire', opening it with the coronation ceremony of the German 
Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on 18 January 1871, and sharing in the 
celebratory mood surrounding the event. As Rose writes: 'the descendant of the Prussian 
Hohenzollems celebrated the advent to the German people of that unity for which their 
patriots had vainly struggled for centuries'.100 Evoking the idea of a new Germany 
supplanting the old, Rose notes that the days of 'quiet culture and happiness are gone', 
replaced by 'a  straining after ambitious aims'. Nevertheless, expressing a very supportive 
attitude towards the new empire, he hails German unification as 'the greatest event in the 
history of the Nineteenth Century'.101
Rose had also authored an earlier book on European history entitled A Century of 
Continental History, first issued in 1889 with the fifth and final edition appearing in 1906. 
Here too he compared the 'eager competition and strenuous life' of the new Germany with 
the 'far deeper and more truly refined’ life of the Germany of Goethe and Schiller. In the 
1906 edition, he added three chapters dealing with recent events up to 1900, one of them 
being a chapter on 'The German Empire’. While characterizing the new Germany as 'a  
great industrial and military arena’, Rose also upheld Bismarckian diplomacy as 'the 
strongest that the world has ever seen'.102 Alluding to the recent settlement of Anglo-
German colonial questions, Rose, hinting at racial kinship, in effect made a plea for 
peaceful relations between Britain and Germany. As he writes: 'it is surely time for the 
two great Teutonic peoples to cease from mutual recriminations, which in the main are the 
outcome of ignorance or misplaced jealousy'. One should note that he grouped Britons and 
Germans together as members of the same race, the Teutonic race. Calling for an end to 
their 'petty bickering’, he regarded the current Anglo-German 'misunderstandings' as 
'altogether unworthy of great and intelligent nations'103- yet another instance of a 
historian's intrusion into the public arena of current affairs in an effort to stem the tide of 
Anglo-German tension.
In 1902 F.A. Kirkpatrick of Trinity College, Cambridge, edited a series of lectures 
under the title Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century. These lectures, delivered 
at the Cambridge University Extension Summer Meeting held in August 1902, were 
focused on recent developments in the major countries of Europe, and given by natives of 
those countries so that 'the most intimate and essential points of view might be 
presented'.104 The contributors sound familiar enough: among them were Adolphus Ward 
who delivered 'Some Aims and Aspirations of European Politics in the Nineteenth 
Century', and Rose, who lectured on 'England's Commercial Struggle with Napoleon'.
The lecture on Germany was given by Erich Marcks, Professor of Modem History 
at the University of Heidelberg. His lecture, not surprisingly, took a Prussocentric view of 
recent developments, being entitled 'The Transformation of Germany by Prussia'. Marcks 
also evoked the old-new dichotomy, the nation of power superseding the nation of thinkers, 
and the ascendancy of centripetal forces, finally culminating in the attainment of unity. 
More importantly, though, he also viewed the new German Empire as basically a Prussified 
Germany. Germany, as he points out,
has risen from disruption to unity, from weakness to strength; the whole
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national character seems to have altered. The nation of poets and thinkers 
has become a nation of power and business. ... Germany has become 
Prussian.
In tracing Prussia's lead in bringing about the unification of Germany, Marcks suggests that 
Prussia was bound to play the leading role as she was 'the only great power among 
German states and so the only one mighty enough to carry through unification in the face 
of Europe'.105 Nonetheless, he insists that, despite the Prussification of Germany, the 'old' 
Germany is still alive. 'What is German and old, continues to thrive, along with the new 
and the Prussian.'106
Chapter 6 of the book consists of another lecture by Marcks, entitled 'Bismarck', 
which traces Bismarck's life and career. On the whole, as might be expected, the lecture 
adopts a complimentary tone and tends to adulate the Prussian statesman. Bismarck is 
viewed as the embodiment of the new empire and 'the hero of the nation'. 'Never was 
Germany so guided and enriched by a single hand,' Marcks proclaims.107
Marcks, it should be noted, also attempted to play a role in similar manner to some 
of the British historians in allaying Anglo-German tensions. In 1900 he had issued 
England and Germany, which appeared in both German and English. In this work he 
adopted a conciliatory tone, emphasizing the centuries-old historical ties that bound the two 
countries, their shared cultural heritage, and their past political cooperation, to argue for an 
improvement in Anglo-German relations.108 This invocation of the past to put forth 
arguments relating to the present was, as we have seen, a common 'scholarly' tack 
employed by historians in a propagandist capacity.
A.J. Grant's Outlines of European History (1907), dealing with events up to around 
1900, also had kind words to say about the new German Empire, characterizing it as 'the 
great example of a state, strongly and efficiently organized upon a monarchical basis'.109
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One should also not overlook the treatment of Germany by the Cambridge Modem History. 
the voluminous work on 'universal history' planned by Lord Acton and recently described
n
as 'the monument of the English-speaking historical profession’ of the late nineteenth 
century.110 In volume 11 entitled The Growth of Nationalities, of the five chapters 
examining the political aspects of modem Germany, two were written by Adolphus Ward 
who, as already mentioned, was also co-editor of the series. In view of his 
Germanophilism, one could hardly expect Ward's chapters, dealing with the revolution of 
1848 and its aftermath, to be anti-German.111 Even in the other three chapters, the narrative 
is mostly devoid of bombast, undeniably more subdued in tone than some of the other 
books examined.112 This 'dryness' in the text was certainly in conformity with Acton's 
desire for what he termed 'impartial reserve' and his proscription against 'needless utterance 
of opinion'. So keen was Acton on impartiality that he insisted: 'Our scheme requires that 
nothing shall reveal the country, the religion, or the party to which the writers belong.'113 
Yet it is still possible to detect hints of a generally sympathetic attitude towards Bismarck 
and Germany in this volume. For example, in Chapter 16 G. Roloff, of the University of 
Berlin, as though offering an apology for Bismarck, claims: 'it can easily be shown that it 
was not in Bismarck's power to avoid the war, since Napoleon had long been making 
careful preparation for it'.114 Writing on 'The Franco-German War' (chap. 21), Frederick 
Maurice affirms that the victory over France 'made of Germany a united nation', enabling 
her to 'proudly claim to be the first military Power of the world'.115
J.A.R. Marriott's The Remaking of Modem Europe. 1789-1878 (1909), while 
viewing the course of nineteenth-century German history as the Prussification of Germany, 
treated the triumph over France in 1870 as a historical necessity and a positive 
development in Europe. In contrast to the French Second Empire, which in Marriott's 
opinion was 'bom in dishonour ... and perished in political penury, the Second German 
Empire is portrayed as representing 'the long-delayed consummation of an historical
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evolution', corresponding to a 'genuine national necessity1. Even though Marriott's tone is 
generally neutral, it is quite indisputable that his sympathies lie more with Bismarck and 
Germany than France. Marriott too evokes racial imageiy to extol the triumph of 1870, 
even using the word 'folk' as though conjuring up the German notion of Volk. As he 
argues: 'The whole Teutonic folk were united against the foe who had laboured for three 
centuries to keep Germany divided and impotent.' Conforming with the book's central 
theme of the rise of nationalism during the 1815-78 period, Marriott confers full import on 
the attainment of German unification as the seminal event of the century, the triumph of the 
idea of nationality. He asserts: 'The year 1870-71 is the culminating point of the political 
history of the nineteenth centuiy.’116
Similarly to Marriott, L. Cecil Jane's From Mettemich to Bismarck (1910), evinced 
a pro-German and anti-French attitude in his treatment of the Franco-Prussian War. The 
French Second Empire, he claims, was 'founded upon deceit and maintained by fraud'.117 
Bismarck, on the other hand, is cast in radiant terms as a 'god-fearing hero', the 'restorer of 
unity to a long-divided race', and 'conqueror of his country's hated foe'. Here again, 
German unification is implied to be a welcome development, and Bismarck is presented as 
a noble statesman. Jane explains, perhaps too simplistically: 'The Emperor of the French 
had attempted to deceive on too great a scale; ... The Prussian Chancellor was a less 
soaring exponent of the deceptive art, and his humility gained its reward.'118
This lauding of Bismarck was carried out as well by G. Burrell Smith in his Scenes 
from European History (1911), a companion to English history for the middle forms.119 In 
a chapter entitled 'Bismarck', Smith, true to the spirit of the other works analysed above, 
adopted a pro-Bismarck attitude. The blame for the Franco-Prussian War is laid squarely at 
the feet of the French, who in his view 'had determined upon war* with Prussia.
Concluding the chapter, Smith glorifies Bismarck as the 'last of the "Makers of History"'.120
In 1911 Reginald Jeffery issued The New Europe. 1789-1889.121 On the whole,
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Jeffeiy's discussion of the Franco-Prussian War is neutral in tone. Nonetheless, in his 
exposition on 'Europe since the Treaty of Berlin, 1878-1889’, he evokes the spectre of a 
European war, highlighting the period's national rivalries and the existence of a 'peace 
founded upon fear’. War, Jeffery warns, has become the 'preoccupation of Europe’ and has 
hung like a 'black thunder-cloud over the northern Continent since 1878’.122
Jeffery's observations on the post-1878 period bore a similarity to Jane's assessment 
of recent developments. Jane too wrote of the 'ever-present danger of storm' threatening to 
devastate Europe.123 Their analyses of the recent era were certainly gloomier than that 
offered by George Peabody Gooch who, in his History of Our Time. 1885-1911. 
emphasized the interdependence of the modem nation-states and the 'shrinkage of the 
world' as the main features of recent times. 'We can now look forward with something 
like confidence to the time when war between civilized nations will be considered as 
antiquated as the duel', Gooch wrote sanguinely.124
In 1913 Elizabeth Levett issued Europe since Napoleon. 1815-1910. a work 
intended for the middle forms as an introduction to nineteenth-century history. As she 
explains in her preface, her aim is more to trace the growth of nations than to examine the 
development of the European situation. Thus she ignores a great deal of diplomatic 
history.125 It is manifest from the start, nevertheless, that the dominant theme and influence 
of nineteenth-century Europe, in her view, is Napoleon. As Levett claims: 'The history of 
the nineteenth century might very well be called "What Came After Napoleon".' According 
to her, 'the influence of Napoleon has not passed away; in fact, we may still see it at work 
all over Europe’.126 It is noteworthy that in spite of the rapid ascendancy of Germany in 
the late nineteenth century, Levett still considers the period from a Francocentric point of 
view. The central theme of the book, then, rests on the French Revolution and its 
aftermath, these events being seen as the defining elements of Europe in the nineteenth 
century.
Chapter 5, entitled 'Bismarck and the Making of the German Empire’, places 
Bismarck at the centre of German unification. Levett’s discussion of the Franco-Prussian 
War is brief and adopts a neutral tone. She writes: 'Having thus subdued and crippled her 
enemy, Germany was left the chief military power in Europe, and free to turn her mind to 
the peaceful settlement of internal difficulties’.127 It is evident that Levett regards the new 
German Empire as the chief military power in Europe but still tending to promote the 
peace of the continent. As a satiated power, Germany can now devote her attention to 
internal development.
Chapter 6, dealing with 'Germany since 1871’, begins with a quote that 'We 
Germans have ceased to be the nation of thinkers, of poets and dreamers, we aim now only 
at the domination and exploitation of Nature’128 - again, reflecting the theme of a 'new', 
practical and driven Germany superseding the 'old' Germany of thinkers and poets. In this 
chapter Levett addresses Germany's growing naval power, recognizing the Navy League in 
Germany as one of the strongest organizations in the country. Her tone nevertheless is 
apologetic. Rather than tackle the issue of Germany's naval buildup head-on, Levett skirts 
the question by declaring her book to be an improper arena in which to carry out such a 
debate. 'This is not the place to discuss the question of Germany's intention in this rapid 
extension of her navy', she argues. Nonetheless, she is quick to defend Germany's 
acquisition of a modem fleet: 'it must be admitted that a nation which aspires to be a great 
colonial or commercial power is necessarily obliged to develop her naval resources'. Thus 
she is sympathetic to Berlin's naval ambitions, seeing naval power as a necessity for 
colonial and commercial greatness. Further stating her belief in Germany's pacific 
intentions, Levett confidently claims: 'Germany has kept the peace for the past forty years; 
there is no reason why she should not do so for another forty.'129 Evidently, Levett viewed 
the new Germany less as a threat than as the bastion of peace in Europe - this barely a year 
before the outbreak of war.
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'Revisionism' at the Outbreak of W ar
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, British historians seemed no less infected 
by the outpouring of patriotic feeling. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, 
they did in fact play an active role in the public debate on Anglo-German relations during 
the prewar years. After 4 August 1914, that role did not at all diminish. In fact, the 
historians now assumed an even more active and prominent role in influencing public 
opinion and rallying the country around the flag by publishing tracts justifying Britain's 
entry in the conflict and asserting the rightness of Britain's case. Richard Lodge, then the 
Chair of Modem History at Edinburgh, viewed the historian's role as being particularly 
germane during the country's hour of need. 'It has suddenly become obvious', he observed 
in October 1914, 'that the teaching of history, systematically fostered and directed, may 
exercise a decisive influence upon public opinion, and through this influence may 
determine the policy of a great state and the fate of a continent.'130 Lodge wrote these 
words in his introductory note to the second edition of Elizabeth Levett's Europe since 
Napoleon, the timing of whose issuance, just two months after the outbreak of hostilities, 
cannot be considered a mere coincidence. Obviously, Lodge believed historians had a 
broader social task to fulfil beyond the confines of the university.
One can perceive a form of revisionism taking place soon after the outbreak of war 
when the British historians became increasingly anti-German. Whereas Prussia/Germany 
had generally been viewed favourably before August 1914, she was now treated with 
apprehension and hostility. In September 1914 the Oxford Modem History Faculty 
published Why We Are at War: Great Britain's Case, the stated purpose being to set forth 
the causes of the war on the basis of 'historic evidence'. It should come as no surprise that 
by September 1914, the Germans, who had previously been generally hailed as having 
sprung from the same racial stock as the British, were now referred to pejoratively as 
barbaric 'Huns'. The name of the German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, became the
catchword of the day, as his writings on the theory of state power and on the idealization 
of war were held up for vilification. Treitschke's philosophy, the Oxford historians argued, 
'seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old days when mere might was 
right'.131
These Oxford historians were not alone in carrying out their historic, patriotic and 
polemical duties. A succession of works were assiduously put out by other historians - all 
with an express and deliberate purpose. In September 1914 also Herbert Albert Laurens 
Fisher, formerly Warden of New College, Oxford, and at that time Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Sheffield, published The War: Its Causes and Issues, condemning the evils of 
Prussian militarism and the Germans' worshipping of war. 'Prussia has been made by the 
sword,' Fisher claimed, in very absolute and sweeping terms. 'That is one of the 
unalterable facts of history graven upon the mind of every German schoolboy, and shaping 
his whole outlook on the world.' He added that 'whereas we regard war as a great 
calamity ... the general view in Germany is quite otherwise'. In sharp contrast to the 
general adulation conferred upon Bismarck before the war, as seen in our analysis of the 
history texts, the German statesman was now castigated and shown in a negative light. As 
Fisher argued: 'The two architects of modem Germany, Frederick the Great and Bismarck, 
are perhaps chiefly responsible for this deplorable attitude of German public opinion in the 
matter of international good faith.'132 Therefore, whereas Bismarck's method of 'blood and 
iron' had previously been extolled as reflecting the sturdy virtues of the German character, 
it was now, with the onset of Anglo-German hostilities, upheld as symbolizing German 
brutality.
Undeniably, 'blood and iron' now took on negative connotations never seen before, 
as further reinforced by Richard Lodge. In his attack on Bismarck's use of 'brute force', he 
opined: 'Bismarck, the founder of modem Germany, preferred to found the German Empire 
upon the foundation of force, or of "blood and iron” as he termed it.' Instead of being wars
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of liberation, the German wars of unification in the 1860s and 1870-71 were now presented 
as wars of conquest, 'deliberately waged to erect the imposing edifice of modem Germany', 
Lodge argued.133 Evidently, German 'brute force' became an issue only after the outbreak 
of hostilities in 1914. Prior to that, Prussian military might, as we have seen, tended to be 
admired and glorified.
George Prothero, Professor of Modem History at Edinburgh from 1894 to 1899, 
followed suit with his tract, Our Duty and Our Interest in the War, issued in the autumn of
1914. Published by the National Patriotic Organization, this work was very evidently 
intended to appeal to the reader's sense of duty and honour. Stating the defence of national 
honour and the British people's national existence as among the reasons for which the 
country was at war, Prothero warned of the insatiable German quest for global domination. 
He declared: 'Germany has staked her all upon one great throw, with the object of 
establishing a supremacy which would surpass that of Napoleon in his palmiest days, ...
And after Europe, America; there are no limits, except those of the planet, to German 
ambitions.'134 The Liberal government was truly well served by academics such as 
Prothero, who assumed the role of propagandist with such seeming ease, passion and skill.
At the height of the July crisis, Prothero had in fact shrewdly anticipated the 
outbreak of a European war and firmly believed in the need for Britain to intervene. As 
his journal entry for 24 July - the day on which news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 
reached Britain - suggests, he already had a keen appreciation on that day of a 'ser[iou]s 
danger of Europ[ea]n war'. By 3 August, he was noting down his disappointment that the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was not being dispatched to France immediately. He 
was convinced that Britain 'must go in now'; remaining neutral, he thought, would be 'fatal 
to Gr[eat] Brit[ai]n'.135
Prothero also was one of the first in August 1914 to publicly express his concern 
about the need for propaganda to mobilize the masses and sustain the war effort, as well as
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his fear that major sections of the British populace were lacking in enthusiasm for the war. 
Writing in The Times on 20 August 1914, barely two weeks after the war broke out, he 
argued that 'large and influential sections' of the population did not regard the war 'with 
whole-hearted approval, or, indeed, approved at all'. The 'vast masses of the working 
people in the north and centre of England', Prothero claimed, needed enlightening as to 'the 
true character of the struggle'.136 This member of Britain's intellectual aristocracy truly had 
an unshakable faith in the need, and in his duty, to rally the masses. Shortly afterwards, 
Prothero helped form the Central Committee of National Patriotic Organizations, whose 
aim was to 'unify and co-ordinate the work of the several leagues and associations already 
engaged in educating and arousing the country as to the reason, justice, and necessity of the 
war'.137 Clearly, then, Prothero saw his professional duties as lying beyond the bounds of 
the academic community - and he was not alone in this regard.
Indeed, the historians' response - and Prothero's no less - in August 1914 is 
illustrative of the patronizing attitude which these custodians of the ivory tower, in their 
self-appointed role, assumed towards the rest of society. They saw themselves as having a 
responsibility to educate the masses in support of the war effort. Charles Grant Robertson, 
then a Fellow of All Souls' College and Tutor in Modem History at Magdalen College, 
Oxford, openly declared the need to educate the 'working class and other audiences' on 'the 
truth' about Germany, citing specifically the academic's 'professional duty' to impart his 
knowledge to the public at large. In a letter to The Times appearing on 26 August, 
Robertson expressed his support for public lectures, which he believed would act as forums 
for a 'serious and dispassionate' discussion of the 'issues at stake for British civilization'.138
J. Holland Rose shared a similar commitment to enlightening the masses.
Endorsing Robertson's proposal, he too invoked the historian's 'duty to a larger public'. As 
Rose argued: 'Let us who know the facts better than the general public can, undertake to 
explain them.'139 In September 1914, the fourth edition of his book The Development of
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the European Nations was issued. In his preface to the new edition, Rose noted that his 
work could help 'form a healthy public opinion so that the errors of the past may not be 
repeated’.140 Having written glowingly in 1912 of Germany's diplomatic and militaiy 
achievements under Bismarck, Rose issued How the War Came About in October 1914.141 
This tract was published by the Patriotic Publishing Company, an obvious indication of the 
patriotic intent of the work. Rose opened his case by invoking Germany's violation of 
Belgium's neutrality and Britain's historic role in protecting the neutrality of the Low 
Countries. As one might suppose, Germany was now presented in an entirely different 
light from that in his earlier work. Germany in the Nineteenth Century. 'The Germans 
have striven hard to mislead public opinion in their own land and in America as to the 
cause of this war,' he contended. Britain's struggle in the conflict is cast in lofty terms. As 
he urged: 'We are ... fighting not only for the security of Europe from a great conqueror, ... 
we are fighting for the sake of the independence of the Belgians, ... for the security of the 
Dutch'. The freedom of the Serbian and Balkan peoples were also at stake, Rose pointed 
out.142
His efforts did not end there. In late 1914 Rose issued two other works: The 
Origins of the War and Why Are We at War?.143 The former consisted of lectures 
delivered at Cambridge in the Michaelmas term of 1914, all directed at explaining the root 
causes of the war. That the historians, in addition to writing popular pamphlets, willingly 
changed their teaching programmes and tailored them to meet the war effort reflects the 
dual purpose of what they regarded their profession to serve: of being publicists at large, 
and simultaneously, propagandists in the academic community shaping their students' 
opinions in the classrooms and lecture halls. That their academic agenda after August 1914 
was unmistakable and purposeful is confirmed by J.A.R. Marriott, who later affirmed that 
'we substituted for our usual lecture-subjects courses which had a direct bearing upon the 
war, its antecedents and issues'.144 A.F. Pollard in September 1914 also talked of being 'in
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communication with Prothero about his lecture-scheme', reflecting a concerted campaign of 
sorts by the historians in the fight to win the hearts and minds of the British people.145
Rose later wrote the introduction to Jules Claes's The German Mole, a book 
appearing in 1915 concerned with Germany's 'pacific penetration' of western Europe before 
the war. Here, Rose's propagandists efforts were to manifest themselves once more. He 
warned of the grave danger to civilization which would result from 'the triumph of the 
Teutons'. 'Life under the ascendancy of Napoleon a century ago would have been 
Purgatory,' he argued, showing little self-restraint. 'Life under that of William II would be 
Hell,' he insisted.146
John Kirkpatrick, by then Emeritus Professor of History at Edinburgh, was also not 
to be left out in this campaign to shape public opinion. In the autumn of 1914, Kirkpatrick 
issued War Studies, in which he characterized the German government as 'mediaeval', 
implying barbarism and anachronism.147 The 'heart-rending atrocities' committed in the war 
by the Germans, he contended, had been 'premeditated in cold blood for many years past'. 
Likewise, Prussian methods are now viewed in negative terms. The 'overbearing arrogance 
of Prussia' is cited as the cause of Germany's 'lamentable decline'. The Franco-Prussian 
War, rather than being the seminal event marking the triumph of Germany's long struggle 
for freedom, is presented as the turning point where the rot set in, ushering in the 'new era 
of blood and iron'. The Prussian victory of 1870 indeed is alluded to disparagingly as the 
'spoliation of France'.148
In December 1914 Kirkpatrick issued another work entitled Origins of the Great 
War, or the British Case, in which he argued: 'We are fighting in order to crush a military 
despotism which aspires to worldwide conquest and empire.1149 As had become the fashion 
by then, he too traced the root causes of the war to the actions and philosophy of 
Bismarck, Nietzsche and Treitschke.
It is worth mentioning that the historians were not alone in catching the anti-
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Treitschke fever. A scrutiny of the Times Educational Supplement, for instance, reveals 
that the paper too was inclined to join in the literary crusade against German militarism.
On 1 September 1914, the paper printed a piece entitled 'Pan-Germanism', carrying the 
sub-heading 'Influence of Treitschke’, which proceeded to criticize the role of the German 
professor in German politics.150
In late 1914, conforming with the academic spirit of the time, James Headlam 
issued a tract entitled England. Germany and Europe, in which he laid down Britain's case 
for entering the war. Headlam may not have been as prolific as some of his fellow 
historians in churning out pamphlets, but that should not detract from his contribution to 
the war propaganda effort. Unlike most of his colleagues who wrote in a civilian capacity, 
Headlam was enlisted into governmental propaganda work under the aegis of Charles F.G. 
Masterman, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster who, in August 1914, was entrusted 
with the task of setting up a propaganda machinery, subsequently located at Wellington 
House, headquarters of the National Insurance Commission. On 2 September the first 
meeting took place there which has been described as 'probably the most important 
gathering of creative and academic writers ever assembled for an official purpose in the 
history of English letters'.151 Besides historians, prominent figures from the literary and 
journalistic fields were mobilized for the new Department of Propaganda's operations based 
at Wellington House. Among them were William Archer, Hilaire Belloc, Arnold Bennett, 
G.K. Chesterton, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, Ford Madox 
Hueffer (who was to Anglicize his name in 1919 and consequently become better known as 
Ford Madox Ford), John Masefield, Gilbert Murray, George Trevelyan and H.G. Wells.152 
One of the earliest results of Headlam's labours at this new assignment was The History of 
Twelve Days, a detailed study of the July crisis which appeared in 1915. Headlam (who in 
1918 became Sir James Headlam-Morley) indeed was to remain in public service for the 
duration of the war, serving in the Political Intelligence Bureau of the Department of
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Information and subsequently joining the Foreign Office. In 1919 he attended the 
proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British delegation.153
Incidentally, Headlam was not the only historian or academic to flourish in 
government service during or after the war. Others included James Bryce, at one time 
Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford and British ambassador to the United States from 
1907 to 1913. Made Viscount Bryce of Dechmont as recently as 1 January 1914, he was 
appointed in September of that year to preside over the commission set up to enquire into 
German atrocities in Belgium, and which subsequently issued the Bryce Report in May
1915. Arnold Toynbee, a Fellow of Balliol College, was also a member of the British 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Lewis Namier worked as an advisor on Polish 
and Austrian affairs in the Foreign Office and was to become a leading British historian 
after the war. Robert William Seton-Watson, a graduate of New College, Oxford, and 
future president of the Royal Historical Society (1945-49), also acted as an advisor on 
eastern Europe during the Great War. H.H. Joachim, Tutor in Philosophy at Merton 
College, Oxford, was recruited into Wellington House.154 The activities of Harold 
Temperley during and after the war further exemplify the incursion of academic life into 
the practical affairs of politics. As John Fair notes, Temperley, even as a young Cambridge 
don, 'exhibited passion, energy, and an affinity for affairs of the world outside the confines 
of Academe'.155 In similar fashion to Headlam and Toynbee, he was a delegate to the 1919 
peace conference, championing the Balkan peoples' right to national self-determination. 
During the interwar period, he collaborated with George Gooch in putting together the 
British Documents on the Origins of the War. 1898-1914 (1926-38), an eleven-volume 
collection of official documents published by the government. Prothero too attended the 
peace conference in 1919, as historical advisor to the Foreign Office. Not surprisingly, he 
also had a role to play in government during the Great War. Working jointly with the 
Admiralty and the War Trade Intelligence Department, Prothero helped produce handbooks
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between 1917 and 1919 which were subsequently used to brief the British delegates at the 
peace conference.156 Not to be forgotten also is H.A.L. Fisher, who was appointed 
President of the Board of Trade in 1916. This constitutes only a brief overview of British 
academics' employment in government service during the war. As Wallace has shown, the 
British government's wartime mobilization of academics from all disciplines was indeed 
quite extensive.157
The historians' continued involvement in the wartime propaganda campaign, 
whether in a private or official capacity, should not be overlooked. Long after the outbreak 
of war, their publishing activities were to continue. Headlam, for example, issued The 
Truth about England in a Letter to a Neutral and The Issue in 1915 and 1916 respectively. 
In similar vein Pollard came out with The War. Its History & Its Morals: A Lecture in 
1915, and Prothero published German Policy before the War in 1916. The 'mobilization of 
intellect* in Britain proceeded unhindered, and the historians' activities can be seen as part 
of a broader and elaborate wartime effort to promote 'enlightened patriotism'.158
The Oxbridge Connection
We should now take a moment to consider the background of the authors of the 
works analysed above. The influence of Oxford and Cambridge, Britain's two oldest 
universities, is only too telling. John Kirkpatrick, Professor of History at the University of 
Edinburgh from 1889 to 1901, obtained his M.A. from Cambridge.159 Headlam was 
educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge,160 as was Prothero. Prothero subsequently 
taught at Cambridge as well, being made a history Tutor at King's in 1876 and then 
University Lecturer in 1884, before taking up his appointment at Edinburgh in 1894 to the 
newly created Chair of Modem History. His connection with Cambridge, however, was to 
remain strong throughout the years, as co-editor of the Cambridge Modem History (1901- 
12) and also as Rede Lecturer.161 Richard Lodge, who was appointed the first Professor of
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Modem History at the University of Glasgow in 1894 and who succeeded Prothero at 
Edinburgh in 1899, was educated at Balliol College, Oxford. Made a Lecturer and then 
Tutor in Modem History at Brasenose College, he went on to become Vice-Chancellor of 
Oxford in 1891 before departing for Glasgow. Lodge, along with Charles R.L. Fletcher, 
A.L. Smith and A.H. Johnson, was instrumental in developing Oxford's Honour School of 
Modem History during his time there.162
J. Holland Rose, though beginning his higher learning at Owens College, 
Manchester, where he came under the influence of Adolphus Ward, eventually moved to 
Christ's College, Cambridge (1875-79). Ward similarly moved to Cambridge in 1900 to 
take up his Mastership at Peterhouse. In 1903 Cambridge awarded Rose the Litt.D. and in 
1911 appointed him to the university's newly created Readership in Modem History. In 
1914 he was made a Fellow of Christ's College.163 Walter Phillips received his education 
at Merton and St. John's Colleges, Oxford, even though he would later teach at Trinity 
College, Dublin.164 Another Oxford product was J.A.R. Marriott, educated at New College, 
where he stayed on to become Lecturer in Modem History as well as a Fellow. He was 
also appointed a Tutor at Worcester College.165 Another New College man was H.A.L. 
Fisher, who began as a student of the college only to later become a Fellow and then its 
Warden.166 Fisher, together with Philip Brown and L.J. Wickham Legg who were both at 
that time at New College, also had a part to play in revising and correcting the text of 
Reginald Jeffery's The New Europe.167 Jeffery of course was also associated with Oxford: 
he was at Brasenose when his book was published. A.F. Pollard, though establishing his 
teaching career at University College, London, and becoming Professor of English History 
of the University of London, was no less an Oxford product: he was a student at Jesus 
College in the late 1880s and was also appointed a Fellow of All Souls' College.168
Considering that Oxford and Cambridge, as the oldest institutions of higher 
learning in the country, were also the oldest centres of historical studies in Britain, it is
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only natural that the bulk of the historians in our sample should have come from, or in 
some manner been associated with, either university. After all, the commanding position of 
the two older universities before the war, and even today, is undeniable. As Eric Ashby 
observes:
In England higher education was dominated by the influence of Oxford and 
Cambridge ... And although the new institutions of higher education which 
were established in England were in part a protest against the exclusiveness 
of Oxford and Cambridge, nevertheless they had to live under the 
hegemony of these ancient universities. They acquired, by a process of 
social mimicry, some of the prevailing assumptions about higher 
education.169
It has been shown that of approximately 2,000 university teachers in Britain in 1900, close 
to 800 worked at Oxford and Cambridge.170 Moreover, many of the chairs in the Welsh, 
Scottish and English provincial universities and colleges were occupied by former fellows 
of Oxford and Cambridge. Oxbridge's dominance of the British academic establishment 
and the 'aristocracy of the intellect' needs no reemphasizing. A scrutiny of the distribution 
of Fellowships in the Royal Society and the British Academy would clearly reveal the 
commanding heights of the Oxford-Cambridge axis. In 1910, for instance, close to 40 per 
cent of the Fellows of the Royal Society were affiliated with Oxford and Cambridge. In 
the same year, those attached to Oxbridge accounted for almost three-quarters of the 
Fellows of the British Academy.171 By the dawn of the twentieth century, the academic 
establishment - and with it Oxford and Cambridge - had undoubtedly become firmly 
entrenched in the British intellectual aristocracy, and was to remain so for at least the next 
half-century. As has been noted, up to the Second World War 'the academic professions
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were a small isolate of professional life, ... enjoying a social prestige which reflected the 
"magic" of Oxford and Cambridge’.172
The importance of the Oxbridge connection lies precisely in the prestige of the two 
institutions and their dominance of the British academic establishment - being in effect at 
the summit of Britain's intellectual elite. That a majority of our sample of texts should 
have had origins in Oxford and Cambridge only attests to both universities' supreme 
position in the British cultural hierarchy, and to their central role in the dissemination of 
ideas and values. The viewpoints expressed in the prewar texts and the wartime pamphlets 
were to a large degree Oxbridge viewpoints, confirming the universities' academic as well 
as social importance.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, one may conclude that the 'passivity of British academics in 
the prewar Anglo-German debate should be reconsidered. The above analysis indicates that 
in the prewar period, British historians were in fact actively engaged in that debate. Many 
regarded themselves not only as educators in an ivory tower, confined to within the bounds 
of the academic community, but as policy advocates and polemicists, expressing their views 
and opinion through their medium, the textbook. Their impartiality as historians can thus 
be called into question.
But rather than being actively anti-German in the prewar debate, the historians 
tended to take on the role of moderators. Assuming the attitude of an enlightened elite, 
some published works with the express aim of lessening public ignorance about Germany, 
which was widely perceived to be a cause of Anglo-German misunderstanding. Therefore, 
they participated in the propaganda campaign in their self-appointed role as voices of 
enlightened rationality.
This belief in the historian's duty to educate persisted and became more pronounced
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after the outbreak of war when, in effect, 'these patriotic scholars took it upon themselves 
to educate the nation through public lectures and written pamphlets’.173 The polemics 
emerging after 4 August 1914 generally revealed a sharp contrast to their prewar attitudes 
towards Germany. Rather than maintain a stance of moderation, these historians joined the 
wartime propaganda campaign embracing the cause of Crown and country. Writing works 
aimed at justifying Britain's fight against Germany, they threw their intellectual weight 
behind the state and in effect, quite unashamedly, became apologists for the British cause.
This rallying around the flag during the country's hour of need further reveals an 
inherent conservatism within the British academic elite. As Noel Annan suggests, the 
paradox of the British intelligentsia was its tendency to conform with, rather than rebel 
against, social and institutional norms. As he points out, this intellectual elite, largely 
upper-middle class in origin and assuming its shape in the early nineteenth century, was 
characterized by its innate stability, and was 'wedded to gradual reform of accepted 
institutions and able to move between the worlds of speculation and government1.174 This 
instinctive stability, solid and dependable, was - as demonstrated by the example of the 
historians - to prove a valuable fount into which the British government could tap after 
August 1914. The merging of 'the world of speculation' with government was indeed 
effected with relative ease. But this 'dependability' of the intellectuals in throwing in their 
lot behind the state, it should be pointed out, was not a purely British phenomenon. The 
German academics, who 'greeted the war with a sense of relief, evinced a similar attitude, 
rallying around their state with optimism and enthusiasm.175 In France, likewise, the 
intellectuals were effectively mobilized by their government after the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1914.176
The conclusions reached here would refute the view put forth by Manfred 
Messerschmidt that British historiography in the pre-1914 period tended to move in parallel 
with political trends - that is, that the British historians' views of Germany assumed
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increased hostility as diplomatic tensions between the British and German governments 
escalated. Messerschmidt argues that a turning point can be discerned in the 1894-1908 
period when, according to him, British historiography began to treat Germany in 
increasingly negative terms.177 The evidence which he presents, however, is neither 
adequate nor convincing. First, he relies on a very limited range of sources to support his 
argument. Secondly, even within this narrow sample, a majority of the works were 
published after the outbreak of the First World War. Though William Dawson's The 
Evolution of Modem Germany (1908) and J.A. Cramb's Germany and England (1914), both 
of which Messerschmidt cites at length, were issued before the start of the conflict, the 
other notable works came only later. For instance, Lewis Namier's Germany and Eastern 
Europe. J.A.R. Marriott's The Evolution of Prussia and Arnold Toynbee's Nationality and 
the War and The New Europe, all appeared in 1915. G.P. Gooch's Studies in Modem 
History, which he cites on page 71, was published only in 1931. Likewise, Adolphus 
Ward's Germany 1815-1890. and Headlam-Morley's The German Chancellor and the 
Outbreak of War were issued in 1916-18 and 1917 respectively.178 The evidence cited by 
Messerschmidt, therefore, is unreliable as a means of assessing prewar views of Germany. 
In fact, he overgeneralizes the entire period from the 1890s to the 1930s.
As this analysis has demonstrated, British historiography on Germany tended to go 
counter to the tide of Anglo-German governmental relations during the pre-1914 period. 
Given that a discernible change in attitude towards Germany came with the outbreak of 
war, it would not be sound to infer prewar views of Germany from books written after 
August 1914, as Messerschmidt does.
But even where his evidence predates the outbreak of the war, it is still not 
sufficiently convincing in showing the onset of'anti-German' attitudes, or increased 
hostility towards Germany. Take Dawson's The Evolution of Modem Germany, for 
instance. It is true that, as Messerschmidt points out and quotes, Dawson wrote that: 'the
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only politic spirit in which to meet Germany's competition is the spirit of inflexible good- 
humour, combined with an equally inflexible determination not to abandon ingloriously 
fields of enterprise upon which so many victories of peace and civilization have been won 
in the past1.179 But this passage, understood in its proper context, is more an affirmation of 
the effectiveness of time-tested British methods than an invective against German 
efficiency. In fact, Dawson's book is far from being a call to arms against Germany. As 
Dawson observed:
This book is not intended to be either a glorification or a 
disparagement of Germany from the standpoint of industry and labour. It 
seeks to show the Germans as a trading nation just as they are; to describe 
their efforts, energies, successes; to tell British readers what they ought to 
know ... if they would understand how it is that Germany has gone ahead 
so rapidly during recent years, not, however, by way of discouraging but of 
reassuring them.180
It would be overstating the case to argue that Dawson's book was hostile towards 
Germany. His work fitted into the framework so commonly employed by him before 1914 
of focusing on economic issues and using Germany as the model of efficiency from which 
Britain could learn. His works of such a nature were certainly numerous before the war. 
Their titles included The German Workman (1906), Industrial Germany (1912), and Social 
Insurance in Germany. 1883-1911 (1912), among others.181 In 1914 itself, shortly before 
the outbreak of war, he issued Municipal Life and Government in Germany. Here he 
wrote:
Most Englishmen at heart prefer the worst of amateurs to the best of
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experts, and would rather be wrong with the one than right with the other.
... I shall be satisfied if what is said in these pages should serve to secure 
for the German system of administration by trained officials greater 
consideration than it has yet received.182
These words hardly seem indicative of any antagonistic attitude towards Germany. One 
should indeed understand the source of Dawson's high regard for German methods of 
organization. Educated at the University of Berlin, he married twice - and twice a German 
woman.183 Any accusations against him of a deep-seated anti-Germanism would certainly 
be misplaced.
Similarly, one has to revise Panikos Panayi's claim that negative images of 
Germany had become dominant in British history books before 1914. As he argues: 'In 
academic study, we can point to history where the focus upon the early history of England 
and the invasion of the Angles and Saxons died away as an area of interest, replaced by the 
history of modem Germany viewed as a threat.'184 But virtually all the texts examined 
above tended to regard the unified Germany as a beneficial presence in Europe, an 
embodiment of the liberal ideal of liberation and unification, a guarantor of the European 
balance of power and the bastion of peace at the heart of the continent. As the above 
analysis demonstrates, the view of Germany as a positive influence in Europe was still 
quite prevalent in the British historiography up to 1914. One could suggest that modem 
Germany as a threat only became noticeably dominant after the war had begun when, with 
the benefit of hindsight, a reinterpretation of modem Germany's development emerged. 
Admittedly, our understanding of the continuity, or discontinuity, of historiographical trends 
in the post-First World War period would still be greatly enhanced by further study.
It may also be necessary to put into proper light Stuart Wallace's assertion that 'a 
dividing line cannot be drawn through August 1914'. He argues that the polemical and
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propagandists writings of British historians during the war 'were often very similar in then- 
content to works published before the war which sought to explain German culture or 
Britain's role in Europe'.185 Unfortunately, Wallace is too general and does not cite 
particular works. But this study demonstrates that many of the historians' works before the 
war indeed differed in tone from their wartime publications. Thus a dividing line can in 
effect be drawn through August 1914.
In essence, the assessment arrived at here accords with Peter Firchow's view that 
the First World War represented a cultural watershed in modem Europe, the turning point 
which confirmed with 'tremendous force' the rise of negative stereotypical images in the 
British conception of the German national character. As Firchow argues: 'By 1915, ... the 
German cousin was dead, never again to be resurrected except by cranks and Nazi- 
sympathizers at the fringes of British political life.'186
It would appear that the shift in the historians' views of Germany after 4 August 
1914 marked a significant change in attitude. This study may enhance our understanding 
of the anguish expressed by the Oxford Vice-Chancellor, Thomas Strong, whom we quoted 
at the start of this chapter. It could also bring into sharper focus the title and wording of 
P.H.B.L.'s poem, 'The Betrayal', cited at the beginning of this chapter. Given the British 
historians' attitude towards Germany, as indicated by the prewar history texts, these 
members of the British intellectual aristocracy would have been justified in feeling betrayed 
by the outbreak of war. 'We trusted you', the poem begins, a sentiment which may be 
fittingly applied to the British historians' outlook on Germany, the country created with 
'blood and iron', possessed of admired Teutonic virtues, and generally perceived to be the 
guarantor of peace in Europe, the bulwark against French aggression. How treacherous and 
galling, then, the German decision for war in August 1914 must have seemed to many of 
Britain's academic elite.
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CHAPTER 7
THE AMBIVALENCE OF BEING AT WAR
Hail in the name of ancient friendship,
Friends we never shall forget;
Truth and Trust and Peace abiding,
These shall be our glory yet!
Blood is of all bonds the strongest,
- One the Saxon blood we share;
So let Britons join with Germans,
And be brothers eveiywhere!
Hochstadt, Dettingen and Minden 
Drank the life-blood of our veins;
And this memory doth bind us 
Closer than with forged chains.
The Duke of Argyll1 »
£
In the previous chapter the words of Thomas Strong, the Vice-Chancellor of 
Oxford, were cited, expressing his anguish of being at war with former brethren numbering 
among them Rhodes Scholars who had become the enemy after the night of 4 August 1914. 
Over at Cambridge, the other seat of the British intellectual aristocracy, Henry Montagu 
Butler, the Master of Trinity College, was similarly distressed at the thought of a war with
25 0
Germany. When war loomed ominously, Butler wrote on 1 August: 'How I detest the 
thought of possible war with Germany. It seems a monstrous paradox - wholly unnatural.' 
Once war had begun, he regarded it as 'very horrible'. 'I had been brought up from 
boyhood with almost a romantic regard for Germany,' avowed Butler, 'due, I suppose, to 
my Father's visit to Schiller in 1797 and later.'2 Butler evidently held German culture in 
high regard, a circumstance sustained by many years of intimate and personal ties with 
Germany. His Germanophilism was certainly not exceptional, as admiration for German 
scholarship was deeply entrenched in the British academic community in the prewar era.
In this chapter, this thesis will probe the notion of Anglo-German kinship by 
considering Germany's special place in the prewar British academic establishment as well 
as the myth of racial Anglo-Saxonism in nineteenth-century Britain. The limits to anti- 
Germanism among the British academic elite will also be investigated. Then, this chapter 
will undertake case studies of three Germanophile Britons - one of them an academic - who 
had strong personal German ties and who were involved in the Anglo-German friendship 
movement before the war. One purpose will be to examine the limits to their ability to 
prevent war in 1914.
The Limits to Anti-Germanism
It has been demonstrated that British historians played a major role in mobilizing
public opinion after the outbreak of hostilities and contributed greatly to the Anglo-German
a
debate by acting as publicists on behalf of the British state. As we have seen, the 
pamphlets put out by Marriott, Pollard, Headlam, Rose, Fisher and Kirkpatrick after 4 
August 1914 left little doubt as to which side they believed right to be on.
As polemicists they acquitted themselves commendably in carrying out their duty to 
Crown and country. Nonetheless, in studying their attitudes, it may be necessary to 
distinguish between their personal thoughts and the opinions which they propagated for
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mass consumption. A closer examination of the evidence would suggest that there were 
certain limits to their hostility to Germany even after the outbreak of war.
The writings of William Dawson illustrate this ambivalence of being at war with 
Germany. As already mentioned, Dawson was before the war a keen writer on Germany. 
Though not a historian, Dawson too, after August 1914, wrote on behalf of the British 
cause. In 1915 he issued a tract called What is Wrong with Germany?, in which he laid 
the blame for the war on the emergence of a new Germany and her new ethos, the 
teachings of Treitschke, and Prussian militarism - a tried and tested tack by that time. Yet 
in this very work he avowed, 'This is the first book upon Germany which I have written 
without pleasure.'3 This suggests that, though a participant in the propaganda campaign 
against Germany, Dawson undertook the task with regret and misgivings.
It is apparent that Michael Sadler also underwent a change of heart after August 
1914. As we recall, Sadler contributed a chapter to Germany in the Nineteenth Century 
(1912), co-authored with J. Holland Rose, in which he wrote glowingly of German 
educational methods and organization. Like Dawson, Sadler in the prewar period looked to 
Germany as the model for emulation. In his preface to the English translation of Friedrich 
Paulsen's work Die deutsche Universitaten und das Universitats-Studium (1902), Sadler 
cited the academic freedom and scientific method of German universities as the sources of 
German excellence in education. He observed: 'It is the inner tradition of German
ft
university life, ... that most deserves study and excites our admiration.'4 That tradition, in
j
his view, included the German notion of a 'personal obligation to the claims of the state'. 
By 1915, however, Sadler was adopting a much different attitude in his treatment of the 
German educational tradition and the German concept of subservience to the state. In an 
essay entitled 'The Strength and Weakness of German Education', he argued that the state 
administration of German education 'has weakened its moral independence'. While 
conceding that German education was 'exacting in its intellectual standards', Sadler
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maintained that it 'has evidently produced intellectual impressionableness rather than 
independence of mind'.5
The 'Two Germanies'
Interestingly, after the outbreak of war Sadler came to form a dual image of 
Germany consisting of a 'good' Germany as opposed to a 'bad' one. As he remarked: 'O f 
the two Germanys the one which you and we love is not responsible for this wickedness, 
except so far as it has not had the moral or physical courage enough to stab its Junkers in 
the face long ago1.6 In What is Wrong with Germany? Dawson also evoked the concept of 
the 'two Germanies' in drawing a distinction between the German government and the 
German people. Though arguing that the entire German nation bore responsibility for the 
war, he conceptualized three different layers of culpability, the government being the party 
primarily to blame, followed by the 'professional war party' and 'Chauvinists', and lastly by 
the German people, who in his scheme were the least responsible as they were 'duped by 
their rulers, mesmerized and overborne by the war-makers'.7
This two-Germanies conception was shared by others in the academic community, 
not least by a few of the historians examined in the previous chapter. John Kirkpatrick, for 
instance, while inveighing against Germany's 'monstrous ambitions' in War Studies, also 
distinguished the German people from their ruling classes, and in so doing separated the
t
'good' from the 'bad' in Germany. As Kirkpatrick stated, one of his aims was to 
'differentiate the Prussian military caste, headed by the Kaiser, from the German people, 
the vast majority of whom, had they been constitutionally governed, would certainly have 
voted against the war*. Thus in very similar vein to Dawson, he viewed the war as the 
work primarily of a small minority of Prussian military hawks surrounding the Kaiser. The 
bulk of the German people, in his conception, were peace-loving but being victims of 
deception, they had been dragged into the war by Kaiserism, the 'evil spirit' which had
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seized Germany.8
This apparent moderation on Kirkpatrick's part would be better understood if we 
took into account that he was a recognizable Germanophile before the war. As he once 
remarked to Karl Breul (who will be examined further below) in 1912: 'I have always 
loved Germany & the Germans'. Kirkpatrick on that occasion affirmed that T have 
experienced an immense deal of kindness, generosity, & hospitality from many old German 
friends.' Finding it 'distressing' that the German press seemed to be 'on the war-path1, he 
expressed strong support for Breul's 'German entente society', a reference to the Anglo- 
German Friendship Society of which Breul was an active member. Kirkpatrick further 
invoked what he called the 'beautiful old German' concepts ofBiederkeit and 
Gemutlichkeit (uprightness and sociability), which he feared were going to be extinct.9
Another one of Kirkpatrick's prewar letters sheds further light on how he viewed 
the French compared with the Germans. As he related to Breul, he considered the French 
to be in every respect far behind the English and the sociable, good-natured Germans ('ach 
du liebe Zeit, sie stehen in jeder Hinsicht den Englandem und den lieben gemiitlichen 
Deutschen sehr weit zurtick!').10 Indeed, Kirkpatrick's wartime rantings in War Studies 
should not detract from his prewar Germanophile tendencies and Francophobic views.
Even though Albert Pollard acted as a propagandist for the British cause, he in 
similar vein tempered his denunciation of Germany by making a distinction between the
ft
militarist Germany and the idealist Germany of old, between the aberrant and the authentic,
i
between the 'bad' and the 'good'. As he claimed: '[General Friedrich von] Bemhardi and 
Treitschke ... represent only one school of German thought, which obtained the ascendant 
through the support of the Emperor and his militarists. A great defeat for them would 
mean the revival of the older Germany of Schiller, Goethe, von Ranke etc.'.11 This line of 
thinking suggests that the ascendancy of the militarist school was an aberration and that, 
from Pollard's standpoint, the true essence of Germany lay in her poets and intellectuals. It
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is interesting that he harked back nostalgically to the old days when Germany was the land 
of poets and dreamers - which he longed to see rejuvenated.
One should not doubt Pollard's commitment to Britain's entiy in the war and to the 
ultimate defeat of Germany. During the July crisis, he viewed Austria-Hungary's harsh 
ultimatum to Serbia as 'a  monstrous and wanton provocation'. Referring to the German 
treatment of Belgium, Pollard noted that 'the extortion from Brussels is a precedent which 
Germany will have cause to regref and one which, in his view, 'will have to be repaid with 
interest'.12 Meanwhile predicting, quite accurately, that there would be no decisive victory 
on the battlefields in France, he was counting on the Russians to deal the German 
government its final blow by driving into Germany and seizing Berlin.13
Nevertheless, one can gain a fuller understanding of Pollard's views of Germany by 
considering his benign attitude towards German civilians in Britain who had by then 
become enemies of the state. Here too he differentiated between the German people and 
their government. In reference to the former, he observed compassionately that: 'The poor 
creatures are suffering from the conduct of their government, and their chances of 
employment in England will be bad for some time to come.' Seeing no reason for the 
Germans to be resettled elsewhere, he remarked that 'it is difficult to see what harm they 
could do here'.14 Thus while denouncing the German government and its militarists for 
causing the war, Pollard was willing to accord the German 'enemy aliens' a large measure
ft
of sympathy, suggesting the continued strength of his cultural affinity with Germany. 
Obviously he did not regard the conflict as a war against German society as a whole, 
suggesting limits to his wartime 'anti-German' invectives. Pollard's personal 
correspondence, by providing us with insights into his private and candid thoughts, lends a 
useful balance to the opinions which he disseminated in his role as a propagandist. It is 
clear that his public polemics did not totally mirror his personal sentiments.
Moderating influences were evident as well in James Bryce's attitude towards
25 5
Germany after the outbreak of war. In his Neutral Nations and the War (1914), he blamed 
Bemhardi and Treitschke for threatening to bring Europe back to the age of 'primitive 
savagery'.15 Yet Bryce also declared that 'I have been one of those who for many years 
laboured to promote good relations between Germans and Englishmen, peoples that ought 
to be friends, and that never before had been enemies'. Repudiating the notion that Britons 
regarded Germans with hatred, he evoked the idea of the two peoples' shared racial 
heritage. 'The two nations,' he asserted, 'German and British, were of kindred race, and 
linked by many ties. To the German people, even now we feel no sort of enmity.'16 
Needless to say, Bryce was an exponent of the two-Germanies view.
It would be worthwhile considering some of Bryce's prewar apologies for Germany. 
Decrying the 'deplorable' Anglo-German press wars in 1912, he commented to his friend 
George Prothero that the British publications - and he singled out theNational Review - 
were as much to blame as the German press for inciting Anglo-German tensions. In 
Bryce's opinion, Treitschke, though a mischief-maker, belonged to 'a  noxious element on 
that side which has been no stronger than a similar noxious element on our side'. It is 
interesting to note that in this instance, before the war, Bryce was willing to downplay 
Treitschke, dismissing him as 'an isolated phenomenon' while expressing support for 
Germany's desire for commercial and naval expansion. Comparing Germany's situation 
with Britain's own, he argued:
Should we have acted differently? Should we not have tried to expand?
Have we not gone on doing so when there was far less need? I dislike 
many of the tendencies of very modem Germany, but find no cause for 
complaint in their wish to develope [sic] their trade and to have a strong 
navy[.]17
Bryce's prewar Germanophilism would help explain his wartime moderation 
towards Germany. A keen admirer of German culture, he was awarded the order of Pour 
Le Merite by the Kaiser before the war, the highest honour which the German Emperor 
could bestow. Bryce's attitude towards Russia also offers insights into his Russophobia in 
contrast to his pro-Germanism. On 30 June 1914, just a little over a month before the 
outbreak of war, Bryce had a conversation with C.P. Scott, the Liberal editor of the 
Manchester Guardian, during which they 'talked a good deal about Russia'. Apparently, 
Bryce feared that Russia was becoming a 'menace' to Europe owing to her rapid population 
growth and economic prosperity. As Scott noted down in his diary, Bryce believed that 
Germany, in order to counter the Russian threat, 'was right to arm and she would need 
every man'.18 It is obvious, then, that Bryce's affinities lay with Germany and that Russia 
was regarded as inimical. One can only appreciate the irony of his position after 4 August 
1914 of being at war on the same side as the Russians - against the Germans. Thus, 
though appointed to head the commission to investigate German atrocities in Belgium, 
Bryce still maintained 'a  sense of proportion in his view of Germany’.19 His ambivalence 
about being at war with Germany had occasion to express itself two months into the 
conflict, when he voiced his doubts to H.A.L. Fisher about whether 'the German learned 
class, or the commercial class - or the people in any sense - were really pervaded by the 
Treitschke[-]Bemhardi system of doctrines'.20 Clearly, Bryce was not wholly convinced of
t
the reach and strength of Prussian militarism. His commitment to the war against Germany 
was certainly not absolute.
Fisher also tempered his condemnation of Germany by invoking the racial motif 
and expressing respect for German contributions to the arts. In his propagandists tractThe 
War: Its Causes and Issues. Fisher denounced Prussian militarism and the German political 
mind which made a 'sacred virtue of war*.21 Nevertheless, like Kirkpatrick, Fisher 
subscribed to the two-Germanies school, which distinguished between the German people
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(the embodiment of good) and their government (the symbol of evil). Thus, even while 
fulfilling his duties as a polemicist on behalf of the British government, he was still able to 
admit that: 'I  am the last man to draw up an indictment against a whole people of whose 
contributions to the great causes of humanity I am keenly sensible, whose poetry I read and 
love, of whose great masters of historical learning I count myself to be in some measure 
the humble disciple.1 Evidently, this academic still held a high regard for the Germany of 
ideals and high learning, and betrayed a sense of reservation and regret at being at war with 
her. As he claimed, 'I can take no pleasure in contemplating the ruin of any civilized 
country under the barbaric processes of war*. Notably, hinting at the dreadful prospect of a 
civil war with this 'civilized country', Fisher conceded: 'in this struggle between two great 
members of the Teutonic family there is to me something fratricidal and therefore 
peculiarly terrible'.22
Obviously, then, Fisher viewed Britons and Germans as belonging to the same 
'great' Teutonic race. He was by no means unique in seeing the war as 'fratricidal' and 
'peculiarly terrible'. In spite of his ardent wartime publications (which have been 
examined), George Prothero too regarded the war as 'a  sort of civil war'.23 Interestingly, it 
must be noted, Prothero was married to a German, just as Dawson was. This fact ought to 
temper any presumption of deep anti-Germanism which Prothero's propagandists activities 
after the outbreak of war may call to mind. Incidentally James Headlam who, as one may
i
recall, was recruited into Wellington House after the outbreak of war, also had a German 
wife; he had met her while studying in Germany in the 1880s.24 Charles Herford, Professor 
of English Literature at the University of Manchester who, as seen in the previous chapter, 
was co-author of Germany in the Nineteenth Century (1912), suffered a similar personal 
dilemma after August 1914: his wife was German as well. Though foremost a scholar in 
English, Herford, who had studied at Berlin, also took a keen interest in German literature, 
especially Goethe. In 1885-86 he had helped found the English Goethe Society.25 By
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wartime Herford too became a subscriber to the two-Germanies idea, even going so far as 
to expound his concept of dividing the German people into 'two alien hosts’. As he 
contended, on the one hand were the 'thinkers, the idealists, the science-workers, the 
musicians, and the millions of kindly men and women1; but on the other, the 'brutally 
aggressive military caste’.26 Separating Germany into two 'alien hosts' may have been 
Herford's way of reconciling himself with the reality of being at war with the Germans.
This belief in the 'two Germanies’ casts useful light on the academics' ambivalence of 
being at war with Germany.
William James Ashley, Professor of Commerce at the University of Birmingham, 
may not have articulated the two-Germanies view but nevertheless did show himself to 
have mixed feelings about being at war with Germany, an attitude no doubt compounded 
by deep Germanophile sympathies. Soon after the outbreak of war, he was commissioned 
to write a propagandists pamphlet called The War and Its Economic Aspects. In this work 
he argued that he was 'convinced' that Germany was 'in the wrong’ and that it was every 
Englishman's 'bounden duty’ to bring about Germany's 'complete defeat'. Yet Ashley 
admitted that the war represented 'a  special and personal grief. Reminiscing on his many 
years' personal ties with Germany, Ashley opened his work by 'unburdening himself of his 
grief27 and betraying a sense of dismay. 'For many years ... I have had a warm place in 
my heart for the German people,' he avowed, declaring his fondness! for their 'cheerful
ft
simple kindliness' which he had encountered during his time in that country.28 Here, again, 
was a propagandist who undertook his task with a certain reluctance and expressed regret at 
being at war with Germany.
The German Factor in the British Academic Community
The personal quandary in which Kirkpatrick, Biyce, Pollard, Fisher, Prothero, 
Headlam, Herford, Ashley and others found themselves after August 1914 may be better
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understood if one considers the stature of German scholarship within the British academic 
establishment during the prewar period. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a 
'new ferment' occurred in German universities, resulting in higher standards of learning and 
research. From about 1840 to 1866 a new spirit emerged in German higher education as 
'the ideal of Wissenschaft was extended beyond the confines of a few innovative 
universities to become the leading principle of German universities’.29 Translatable into 
English as 'science1, Wissenschaft had far greater connotations in meaning, implying a 
scientific method of acquiring knowledge, rational understanding and personal fulfilment. 
This ethos had a strong impact on the spirit of learning in North America and the rest of 
Europe, not least Britain, where the new thread of 'education through training in science 
and scholarship' gained a foothold.30 In the latter half of the century, the German example 
of learning and educational organization, centred around the idea ofLehrfreiheit. was 
responsible for inspiring a 'knowledge revolution' in Britain, one marked by 'the search for 
new knowledge'.31 The result was the 'institutionalization of the German influence'32in 
British education. It is no coincidence that the impetus for educational reform in Britain 
grew during this period, along with the professionalization of academic disciplines, 
including history, which saw the creation of its first professional journal, theEnglish 
Historical Review, in 1886.
We have already noted Fisher's publicly avowed respect for German contributions
ft
to culture and civilization as well as Sadler’s admiration for the German educational
a
tradition. The prestige which German universities commanded in British intellectual circles 
before the war cannot be underestimated. As Fisher would later recall: 'To sit at the feet 
of some great German Professor ... was regarded as a valuable, perhaps as a necessaiy 
passport to the highest kind of academic career.' He adds that
Every year young graduates from our universities would repair to Berlin
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and Heidelberg, to Gottingen and Bonn, to Jena and Tubingen. The names 
of the German giants, of Ranke and Mommsen, of Wilamowitz and Lotze, 
were sounded again and again by their admiring disciples in British lecture- 
rooms.33
Affirming the value of a German education, Alexander James Carlyle, the Oxford historian, 
testified in 1911 that 'the position of the great German nation in philosophy, science and 
literature was so powerful that students were bound to study German and go to Germany if 
they were of any promise'.34 Respect for German scholarship was echoed by Bryce who, 
while ambassador to the United States, remarked to an American audience in 1908 that 
German universities 'led the world in the completeness of their teaching organization' and 
in their research facilities, thereby setting 'an example to the world’. 'The level of learning 
among the teachers [in Germany], ... is perhaps higher than anywhere else', he declared.35 
Even in wartime, Sadler could profess that 'the educational achievement of Germany has 
been unequalled in the world'.36
If a German education was deemed to be the passport to high scholarly 
achievement, then the pursuit of learning in Germany was certainly an established tradition 
among British academics. Among the historians examined in Chapter 7, the German 
connection is obvious. We have already mentioned Adolphus Ward's formative years in 
Germany, growing up as the son a British consul based in that country. Raised in 
Germany between the ages of three and sixteen, Ward spoke German like a native and, 
reflecting the influence of his German masters, became 'one of the earliest and best of the 
interpreters of German scholarship to English readers’.37 Walter Phillips similarly spent 
some of his early childhood in Germany, as his family moved to Weimar in 1871 when he 
was seven years old. There his family had a friend in Ottilie von Goethe, daughter-in-law 
of the great poet. Although Phillips returned to Britain in 1875 for his schooling, he was
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back in Weimar between 1888 and 1891 to study music and painting.38
The German connection is no less apparent among the other historians. After
completing his degree at New College, Fisher enjoyed a stint at the University of Gottingen
in 1890.39 Kirkpatrick received a doctorate in law from Heidelberg.40 In 1873-74, Prothero
attended Bonn University, where he studied under Heinrich von Sybel and became
acquainted with the works of the distinguished German historian, Leopold von Ranke, the
first volume of whose Weltgeschichte Prothero would translate in 1883.41 Headlam, as
mentioned above, spent some of his youth in Germany. Besides perfecting his German and
meeting his future wife there, he studied at Berlin University under Hans Delbriick and,
quite ironically, Treitschke - the same Treitschke who was to be vilified by his British
counterparts after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.42 In similar fashion Bryce, then a
newly appointed Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, went to Heidelberg in 1863 to study law
under Karl Adolf von Vangerow.43 Later in wartime, when writing about the Prussian
militarist spirit which he thought had infected all of Germany, Bryce would look back on
these earlier days with nostalgia. 'There was nothing of this kind in Southern Germany
when I knew it fifty years ago,' he lamented.44 W.J. Ashley studied both at Gottingen and
Berlin, coming under the influence of Adolf Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller and, after
the outbreak of war, would pay tribute to the formative influence ofWissenschaft on his
pursuit of knowledge. As he wrote in 1914: 'Like many other young Englishmen, it was in
»
Germany I first caught the infection of the scientific spirit'.45 Other British historians who
i
studied in Germany before 1914 included J.B. Bury and R.W. Seton-Watson. Historians of 
course were not the only academics to make it a practice of pursuing their studies in 
Germany. As Stuart Wallace's study demonstrates, numerous British scholars in theology, 
the classics and philosophy also went to Germany before 1914.46
Lord Acton, the Regius Professor of Modem History at Cambridge from 1895 to 
1902 who was responsible for the Cambridge Modem History, can be characterized as the
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embodiment of this German influence in the British academic establishment. Bom John
>
Emerich Edward Dalberg in Naples in 1834, he was of German descent and studied as well 
in Germany. Acton's mother, Countess Marie Louise Pellini de Dalberg and his father's 
second wife, was descended from a branch of the Habsburgs and was heir to the family 
estate at Hermsheim, Bavaria. In 1848 Acton began his six years of study at Munich under 
the tutelage of the eminent scholar, Ignaz von Dollinger, with whom he also lived.47 
During his apprenticeship in Germany, Acton 'was fired with a passion for the scientific 
study of history'48 and came under the influence of Barthold Niebuhr and Ranke.
The German stamp on Acton's scholarship was to be revealed in later years.
Besides helping to launch the English Historical Review, he contributed an article to its 
first issue which appeared in 1886. It should hardly be surprising that this article, coming 
immediately after the editor's prefatory note and in effect opening the inaugural issue of 
Britain's first professional journal for history, dealt precisely with 'German Schools of 
Histoiy'.49 There was apparently no escaping the pervasiveness of the German hold on the 
British historical profession. In recognition of the preeminence of the German historical 
schools, Acton acknowledged that German historians 'are ahead of other nations by twenty 
years'.50
Given this link with Germany, one may better understand why Henry Montagu 
Butler regarded war with Germany as a 'monstrous paradox'. But although admiration for 
German learning was profound within the British academic establishment, the high regard
i
for Germany was not motivated purely by her scientific, technical or educational 
excellence. Another factor which bound the British academics with Germany was the 
concept of racial identity. One must bear in mind that Germany was a model of excellence 
largely because she was a Teutonic nation.
Racial Anglo-Saxonism
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The limits to the historians' 'anti-Germanism' after the outbreak of war in 1914 
may indeed be explained by the strength of the idea of racial kinship. As mentioned 
above, Fisher and Bryce invoked the notion of common racial origins to suggest a natural 
affinity between the British and German peoples. Ashley also alluded to the likeness 
between Britain and Germany, asserting that 'our two nations possessed many traits in 
common'.51 The analysis of textbooks in the previous chapter further revealed a general 
tendency by historians to cite race as a source of common identity and familial linkage 
between Britain and Germany. The examination of stereotypes in Chapter 5 similarly 
demonstrated the vitality of the perception of, and belief in, shared Anglo-German heritage.
The importance of race as an element in popular and elite attitudes during the early 
twentieth century must be duly appreciated. Doctrines expounding racial superiority may 
nowadays be deemed racist, scientifically unsound, socially unacceptable or 'politically 
incorrect', but just a hundred years ago these 'racist' ideas and attitudes were very much in 
vogue, being the foundation of eugenic theories and practices, for instance. One need only 
consider the subsequent articulation and implementation of the Final Solution in Europe to 
grasp the strength and relevance of racial ideas as a fundamental component of Western 
mental ites all the way through the 1930s and later.52 Though we may today dismiss as 
'myth' theories on the origins of the Aryans and the purity of superior races, these myths in 
earlier days enjoyed a considerable audience and were widely accepted as 'truth'.
h
The idea that Britons and Germans were descended from a common stock was
i
certainly pervasive in Britain in the prewar period, especially among the educated classes. 
One instance can be seen in Joseph Chamberlain's oft-quoted speech in Leicester in 1899, 
in which he appealed to racial affinity when calling for 'a  new Triple Alliance between the 
Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race'.53 In Chamberlain's 
worldview, the Anglo-Saxon races of Britain and the United States and the Germans 
belonged to the same family.54 As noted in Chapter 4, Cecil Rhodes found similar
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inspiration in the belief in familial links between the Anglo-Saxons and Teutons. Kaiser 
Wilhelm II himself had a propensity to think in racial terms, especially in terms of shared 
Anglo-German racial ties. He once remarked that the British and Germans 'are of the 
same blood and they have the same creed and they belong to the great Teutonic race which 
Heaven has entrusted with the culture of the world; ... there is no other Race left for God 
to work his will in and upon the world except ours'.35
The concept that Britons and Germans shared a common ancestry formed the basis 
for what is today known as racial Anglo-Saxonism, a myth which first emerged in the 
sixteenth century, matured through the following three hundred years, and attained its 
heyday in the late nineteenth century when Britain ruled the seas and was the world's 
foremost imperial power. At its inception in the sixteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism was 
formulated to extol the Anglo-Saxon period of English history, mythologizing that period as 
the golden age of freedom. Though Anglo-Saxonism then was still non-racial - that is, it 
did not show an interest in racial attributes or features in Anglo-Saxons which rendered 
them superior to other races - it emphasized the links between the Anglo-Saxons and their 
Germanic ancestors, who were understood to have brought their freedom over to England 
from their forests in Germany. The freedom-loving Germans and independent Anglo-Saxon 
institutions thus became fused as one. Through this myth the notion was evolved that:
'The love of liberty, a trait of the Germanic peoples ... had been transposed by the Anglo-t
Saxons in England into a system of free institutions.'56
The racial factor only began to supersede institutional definitions of Anglo- 
Saxonism in the early nineteenth century with the onset of linguistic nationalism and the 
Romantic spirit emphasizing pride in the past, in language, race and national identity, as 
well as the rise of philology and ethnology in Europe. The first half of the nineteenth 
century in fact witnessed the emergence of racial ideas in 'scientific' and learned jargon as 
well as a sharp growth in ethnological publications in Britain and the development of
eugenic theories.37 During this period, racial hierarchies were established attributing 
different innate characteristics and capacities to different races, with the concomitant 
ascribing of superior capacities to the Caucasian race. Thus by the 1840s, 'the importance 
of race, of "blood", was assumed in a manner quite unlike that of one hundred years 
before'.38 A revolution in thinking and attitudes indeed was taking place which would have 
a lasting impact on the Zeitgeist of the remainder of the century. The stage was set for the 
consummation of racial Anglo-Saxonism in the mid-nineteenth century. As Reginald 
Horsman explains:
Those ideas of Anglo-Saxon freedom that had persisted in English thought 
since the sixteenth century were now melded, on the one hand, with the 
ideas of Teutonic greatness and destiny developed by the comparative 
philologists and German nationalists, and on the other, with the ideas of 
inherent Caucasian superiority developed by those interested in the science 
of man.39
Typical were the words of Robert Knox, the British anatomist, author ofThe Races of Men 
(1850-62), and a leading eugenicist of the day, who wrote in 1850: 'With me, race or 
hereditary descent is everything; it stamps the man.'60 But the emergence of racial Anglo-
i
Saxonism was not merely symptomatic of the rising stature of theorists such as Knox, it 
showed the potential of the myth as an enduring force over the general population. As 
Donald White observes, the 'belief that the origins of England's greatness ... lay in a sturdy 
Germanic insularity struck a responsive chord in the hearts of most Victorian Englishmen. 
That they subsequently became inordinately fond of their Germanic ancestors is a 
commonplace'.61
It was during this period, in 1859, that Charles Darwin issued his seminal work,
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The Origin of Species, which was to lead subsequently to the rise of Social Darwinism and 
bring into vogue the notions of 'natural selection' and 'survival of the fittest1, thereby 
bolstering the strength of racial ideas. Lending further legitimacy to this late nineteenth- 
century preoccupation with racial ideas were other phenomena such as imperialism, 
nationalism and right-wing patriotism. Rudyard Kipling, who popularized the idea of 'the 
white man's burden' in the late nineteenth century, reflected the spirit of his age when he 
stated, 'Truly ye come of The Blood',62 a remark showing the close identification of race 
with patriotism.
By 1900 racial Anglo-Saxonism had reached its pinnacle. It contained four basic 
premises - namely, that
1) Germanic peoples, owing to their unmixed origins and universal civilizing 
mission, are inherently superior to all others.
2) The English are of mainly Germanic origin and their history begins with 
the arrival of Hengist and Horsa at Ebbsfield, Kent, in 449.
3) 'The qualities which render English political and religious institutions the 
freest in the world are an inheritance from Germanic forefathers.'
4) 'The English, better than any other Germanic people, represent the 
traditional genius of their ancestors and thereby carry a special burden of leadership in the 
world community.'63
The importance of this myth is not just that the English people were believed to 
have sprung directly from Germanic roots, but also that the English and Germans, being of 
Germanic descent, were superior to all other races. This myth thus held, as its central 
tenets, that both peoples were of the same family, shared a common civilizing mission in 
the world, and belonged at the top of the racial hierarchy. The 'lingering Germanism' in 
the conception of England's Anglo-Saxon heritage persisted into the first half of the
twentieth century.64 Proper account should therefore be taken of the sustained importance 
of England's Germanic roots in the myth of the country's ancient past.
The British academic elite not only shared in the tenets of racial Anglo-Saxonism 
but became its leading proponents as well, not least among them the historians. As Hugh 
MacDougall points out: 'O f all professions none served the cause of progress and Anglo- 
Saxonism more faithfully than historians.'65 These nineteenth-century academic propagators 
of the myth of England's proud Germanic heritage numbered among them scholars in 
England's Anglo-Saxon period, such as Sharon Turner and John Kemble. They included 
other authorities in English history such as Lord Macaulay, Thomas Arnold, Thomas 
Carlyle, John Green, James Anthony Froude, Charles Kingsley, Edward Freeman and Lord 
Acton66 - all centred at Oxford and Cambridge. Indeed, one must not overlook the 
prominent role played by historians in developing the myth of racial Anglo-Saxonism. 
Turner, with his History of the Anglo-Saxons (1799-1805), pioneered the study of the 
ancient origins of England. Kemble, the next historian to make a major contribution to 
Anglo-Saxon studies, issued his Saxons in England in 1849, which 'placed English-German 
kinship on a firm scholarly base'.67 However, it was Carlyle who, acquiring his inspiration 
from Germany, was 'the first great British writer to view Saxon triumphs as clearly a 
product of racial superiority' - and especially, the superiority of the Teutonic race.68 
Freeman, who established his reputation as a scholar with his six-volume History of thet
Norman Conquest (1867-76), once wrote: 'I will assume that what is Teutonic in us is ... 
the very life and essence of our national being'. He added that 'the Parliament of England 
can trace its unbroken descent from the Teutonic institutions of the earliest times', 
reflecting a basic tenet of the Anglo-Saxon myth.69 One of the most eloquent assertions of 
Anglo-German racial kinship and the Teutonic origins of English institutions was perhaps 
provided by William Stubbs, Regius Professor of Modem History at Oxford from 1866 to 
1884. As he claimed:
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It is to Ancient Germany that we must look for the earliest traces of our 
forefathers, for the best part of almost all of us is originally German: 
though we call ourselves Britons, the name has only a geographic 
significance. The blood that is in our veins comes from German 
ancestors.70
In Stubbs's view, then, the English and Germans were practically one and the same.
The racial factor and the importance of racial Anglo-Saxonism in the British 
academics' attitudes towards Germany should thus not be overlooked, even as late as 1914. 
The myth of England's Germanic roots can be properly understood as providing a broader 
context for the academic elite's admiration of German culture and civilization. The strength 
of racial Anglo-Saxonism may help explain the limits to anti-Germanism evinced by 
academics such as Bryce, Fisher, Kirkpatrick, Pollard and Sadler. Moreover, the 
significance of race as a fundamental concept in prewar historical studies must not be 
overlooked. As a teaching manual issued in 1901 suggested, 'The history of a nation ... is 
the history of a particular race; ... The chief factor is, doubtless, the racial type'.71
*  *  *  *
This chapter will now examine three Britons from different professional 
backgrounds who had strong German ties and who may to a large extent be considered 
'pro-German'. The aim here is not to write their biographies but to focus on the German 
connection in their lives, and how this connection motivated them in their attempts to 
improve Anglo-German relations during the ten years or so before 1914. Consequently, 
one may also gain a better understanding of the limits to what they could achieve 
individually in their efforts to promote Anglo-German detente. The first person examined 
will fittingly be an academic, Karl Breul.
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Karl Hermann Breul
As seen in Chapter 4, Karl Breul played an active part in the founding of the King 
Edward VII British-German Foundation, providing advice to Sir Francis Trippel and 
championing his cause, the Anglo-German institute. Breul was truly an Anglo-German, a 
German by birth who spent most of his life in his adopted country, Britain. He was bom 
in Hanover on 10 August 1860, being a mere child when the Second Reich was proclaimed 
in 1871. At eight years of age, he was enrolled at the Lyceum II in Hanover where the 
study of Latin, Greek, French and English was compulsory; Breul was thus introduced to 
English at a very early age. After obtaining his leaving certificate in 1878, Breul moved to 
Tiibingen and then headed to the University of Berlin in October 1879, earning his Ph.D. in 
1883. His dissertation, on the old English epic Sir Gowther. was subsequently published as 
a book in 1886. From Berlin he went to Paris in the autumn of 1883 to research on the 
legends of 'Robert le Diable' and 'Richard sans Peur1. During his time in Paris, he also 
translated, in conjunction with a friend, the book Vom franzosischen Versbau alter und 
neuer Zeit (French Versification in Old and Modem Times') by Professor Adolf Tobler, 
from German into French. This translation appeared in 1885.
Breul in Britain
Breul's contact with England began in 1882 when he visited the country as an 
undergraduate for research purposes. In May 1884 he returned to Britain and in June of 
the same year was appointed the first University Lecturer in German by the University of 
Cambridge, which had just founded the Mediaeval and Modem Languages Tripos. Two 
years later Breul received an honorary M.A. from Cambridge and was also made a member 
of King's College. A few years later he became a naturalized British subject and was to 
remain in Britain for the rest of his life. Flourishing at Cambridge, he was awarded the 
Litt.D. in 1896, and was three years later made University Reader in Germanic. During his
27 0
time at Cambridge, in addition to being a University Lecturer, Breul served as Lecturer in 
Germanic and German Language and Literature at Girton and Newnham Colleges. For 
several years, he also acted as Director of Modem Language Studies at St. John's College. 
Reflecting his rising status among the ranks of Germanists in England, he was in 1902 
appointed one of the first two Professors of German Language and Literature to be 
nominated by the University of London. Breul, however, turned down the appointment.
A prolific writer, he published numerous articles and books in his lifetime, among 
them 'Schiller as an Historian' and 'Herder1 in the Modem Language Quarterly. 
contributions to Die Neueren Sprachen. and A Handy Bibliographical Guide to the Studv_of 
the German Language and Literature for the Use of Students and Teachers of German. 
Between 1887 and 1899, he wrote ten volumes of German Classics under the Pitt Press 
series. These volumes 'seemed to us the last word in German literary scholarship', as one 
of Breul's students would later testify in acknowledgement of Breul's outstanding scholarly 
reputation.72 Cassell's A New German and English Dictionary, compiled by Elizabeth 
Weir, was revised and enlarged by Breul in the 1906 edition. Cassell's German and 
English Dictionary, issued in 1909, was also Breul's product.73 This dictionary made it to 
its eighth edition in 1963 which, though revised and enlarged, was still based upon Breul's 
edition. Although not a historian, Breul was nonetheless asked to contribute to the 
Cambridge Modem History: his piece, entitled 'German Literature (1840-70)', appeared as a
section of Chapter 15 in the eleventh volume of the series which was published in 1909.74£
His publications, however, were not limited to the field of language and literature. 
Being a member of King's College and teacher at Cambridge, he also showed an interest in 
student affairs. In 1908 his Students' Life and Work in the University of Cambridge 
appeared.75 Two years later Breul wrote Willkommen in Cambridge: Schlichte Antworten 
auf kluge Fragen. an account of life in Cambridge directed at a German audience.
Breul's Academic and Anglo-German Friendship Activities
A role which he relished was that of advocate and authority in modem-language 
teaching methods. His endeavours in this area also resulted in a few publications. In 1898 
Breul issued The Teaching of Modem Foreign Languages in Our Secondary Schools, a 
work which went into its second edition in 1899 and became widely used in Britain. In 
this book, he called for more time and training to be devoted to the study of modem 
languages and, while admitting that there existed no 'true method' of language teaching, he 
urged that modem language teachers in Britain 'should have a much longer and better 
training* for their profession than they generally possessed at the time. Here also, Breul 
was departing from the more conventional notions of language instruction for, in his view, 
modem languages should be taught differently from what he called the 'ancient languages’, 
with the object of imparting culture and history as well. As he argued, 'in teaching 
Modem Languages we aim at teaching the principal features of the life, character and 
thought of great foreign nations’.76 In 1906 the book was revised, enlarged and issued in its 
third edition under a new title, The Teaching of Modem Languages and the Training of 
Teachers-
Breul also promoted foreign language teaching through the Modem Language
Quarterly, a journal established in 1897 of which he was co-founder and co-editor. The
journal was, however, superseded by the Modem Language Review and Modem Language*
Teaching in 1905. In 1910 Breul was made president of the Modem Language 
Association, a tribute to his many years’ service to the organization, the foundation of 
which in 1892 he had also been prominent. Active in the advancement of German 
language and culture, Breul helped found the English Goethe Society in 1886 and served as 
its vice-president as well.77
The crowning of his teaching career came with his appointment in March 1910 as 
Schroder Professor of German at Cambridge. The creation of this chair was made public
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as early as July 1909 when J. Henry Schroder & Co., announced its offer of an 
endowment, made through Baron Bruno Schroder, for a permanent professorship of 
German at Cambridge which was to carry the name of Schroder.78 Bruno Schroder, one 
may recall, also served on the council of administration of Ernest Cassel's King Edward 
VII British-German Foundation. The link thus comes full circle again: the network of 
academic and business ties manifests itself here once more, with a 'pro-Germanism' at the 
heart of its purpose.
Just as the King Edward VII Foundation was established with the aim of fostering
better ties between Britain and Germany, Breul too was an ardent activist in the Anglo-
German friendship movement. He was one of the founding members of the Anglo-German
Friendship Committee which grew out of the Caxton Hall meeting in December 1905. In
subsequent years, his endeavours in this area were to prove to be untiring. In 1911 when
the Anglo-German Friendship Committee was superseded by the Anglo-German Friendship
Society, Breul drew up a pamphlet for the new organization.79 By this time, of course, he
had spent over twenty years in Britain and was caught in the middle of the mounting
Anglo-German diplomatic difficulties. A friend remarked to Breul in 1907 that he had
become 'practically English, or at least as much so as is possible without losing your own
nationality’.80 This circumstance of being an Anglo-German must have posed a most
difficult personal dilemma, considering that he was honoured by the German government
%
with the Prussian Order of the Red Eagle in 1908. Over three months into the war in£
1914, one of Breul's German friends living in England wrote to him expressing his ’heart­
felt sympathy1 for Breul in those 'cruel times' and. complimented him for having been 'the 
leading spirit' in the quest for Anglo-German friendship before the war. '[I]t is 
heartrending that all these efforts have availed so little,' his friend added, no doubt sharing 
the same sense of despair which Germans such as himself and Breul must have felt at the 
onset of war.81
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The connection between the academic community and the Anglo-German friendship 
movement is reflected also in Breul's personal relations. Francis William Fox, the Quaker 
whose efforts at the fourteenth Universal Peace Congress in Lucerne of 1905 led to the 
Caxton Hall gathering, had in fact been a pupil of Breul's. It may not be a mere 
coincidence that both men shared the same outlook on and commitment to bettering Anglo- 
German ties. Even though we cannot ascertain how close their relations were in later 
years, it is clear that Fox still sought Breul's help when he had difficulties with German. In 
early 1914, for instance, Fox wrote to Breul asking him to read over a text in German 
which Fox intended to submit to German newspapers. Breul also appears to have been on 
close terms with Sir Francis Trippel, Cassel's associate who was one of the originators of 
the King Edward VII Foundation.82
The Teaching of German in Prewar Britain
During the prewar period, the teaching of German in Britain was generally still 
rudimentary. Modem languages, as a recognized discipline, had been established only in 
the 1880s. The 'direct method' of language instruction, coming into its own in the 1900s, 
still faced considerable resistance from the traditionalists. Recounting his early days as a 
student of German before the First World War, Walter Bruford, a Germanist who studied 
under Breul at Cambridge and, following in his teacher's footsteps, later became Emeritus 
Schroder Professor of German at Cambridge, could attest that virtually all of his masters at 
the Manchester Grammar School were graduates in the classics. Consequently Bruford, 
who began the study of German at the school in 1906, recalls: 'Our masters had a great 
contempt for anything resembling the "play way" in education, and that is how the Direct 
Method, which aimed at teaching a boy to speak by imitating what he heard, with little 
conscious effort and analysis, no doubt appeared to men trained in the study of dead 
languages.' The shortcoming of the older masters was, as Bruford explains, that they 'did
27 4
not pretend to make us fluent speakers'. It was not until Bruford's last years in school that 
the direct methodists began replacing the retiring masters.83
Even so the Manchester Grammar School, under the direction of its High Master, 
J.L. Paton, represented one of the few schools in the country at that time which actively 
attempted to promote the study of modem languages. Though a classicist, Paton had a 
keen interest in German, having himself been educated in Germany. He developed the 
teaching of modem languages at the school and in 1910 initiated a pupil exchange 
programme with the Musterschule in Frankfurt, where the headmaster, Max Walter, was 
also a pioneer of the direct method of modem language teaching. Paton, moreover, 
arranged for his pupils to stay with German families during their holidays in Germany and 
even helped with expenses. It appears that he was also a friend of Breul's, at one time 
agreeing to offer himself as a referee for Breul's son. Praising Breul for his work at 
Cambridge, Paton remarked in 1914, 'What a great gain it is for these lads like Bruford to 
have you.'84 It was largely owing to Paton's efforts and generosity that Bruford, before 
attending Cambridge, was able to travel to Germany for the first time in the summer of 
1911. Giving the 1979 Bithell Memorial Lecture at the Institute of Germanic Studies in 
London, Bruford reminisced fondly of the trip:
My sharpest early memory of Germany is of that welcome meal, the
»
bewilderingly ample Speisekarte. the waiters hurrying with great trays, the*
acrid smell of German cigars. I have no memory of any military display,
and we did not hear till our return about the Agadir Crisis of that summer,
one of several war-scares which heralded the Great War.85
It should not at all be surprising that Bruford went on to pursue his study of 
German at Cambridge under Breul, a friend of Paton. Bruford first met Breul in 1911 at
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the oral examination for the entrance scholarship for which he was competing. Describing 
Breul as looking 'venerable' with his grey moustache and short beard, Bruford recalls: 'His 
smile and kindly manner put candidates soon at ease'.86
In promoting modem languages, the Manchester Grammar School was indeed more 
the exception than the rule. Generally, modem languages still had some ways to go in 
holding their own against the classics. A reliable indicator of the prewar position of 
modem languages is provided by Bruford's account that in 1911-12, the year for which he 
competed, out of 440 awards given by Oxford and Cambridge colleges, 205 went to the 
classics and only eight were allocated to modem languages.87 Even within modem 
languages, German still tended to rank second to French in popularity. Writing in Modem 
Language Teaching in 1906, a school master, urging the promotion of German, complained 
that French had 'nearly killed' the teaching of German in British schools.88 Hence, German 
had to contend not just with the classics but with French as well. Breul himself was 
acutely aware of the state of neglect of German-language teaching in British secondary 
schools. In 1911 he lamented:
The danger does not consist in any invasion of this country by Germany,
but in the gradual extinction of the teaching of German in the schools of
Great Britain, and consequently in the grave danger that the rising
I
generation of British boys and girls of the upper middle classes may in
i
most cases grow up without the least knowledge of the German language.89
There were, nonetheless, encouraging signs, for voices were increasingly making 
themselves heard in favour of German and, characteristically, the racial motif was evoked 
even in the advocacy of the German language. One such voice, for instance, arguing that 
the English and Germans 'are really one race', used this premise to assert the linguistic
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affinity between the two peoples and to suggest the preferability of German over French as 
the primary modem foreign language to be taught in schools.90
But if German language and studies were poorly developed in the schools, the 
universities left even more to be desired. As Bruford reminds us: 'The state of German 
studies in our universities was in 1914, with one or two exceptions, even less satisfactory 
than in the schools, and as an independent branch of British scholarship, the subject had 
very little work to its credit.'91 There is certainly evidence from British academics of that 
period to support Bruford’s assessment. A colleague at the University College of North 
Wales, for example, informed Breul that 'the study of German does not exist here at 
present', a rather frank but grim admission. In 1906 John Kirkpatrick complained that the 
study of German was ' lately so languishing' at Edinburgh.92 Cambridge, however, would 
appear to be one of the exceptions which Bruford mentions, thanks in no small part to 
Breul. The Schroder Professorship, indeed, was set up about ten years before a similar 
chair in French was created at Cambridge.93 Nonetheless, significant as the Schroder Chair 
was, one should not overlook the relative lateness of such a major step - occurring as it did 
only after the turn of the century - in the teaching of German at this, one of Britain's two 
oldest and most prestigious institutions of higher learning. Oxford was no farther ahead 
than Cambridge in the advancement of German, for the former's first Taylorian Professor of 
German, Dr. Hermann G. Fiedler, was elected only in 1907. In 1909 Sir Julius Wemher 
(of Wemher, Beit & Co., which has already been :dealt with in Chapter 4) donated £2,000 
to the university to be used to raise the stipend of the Taylorian Professor by annual 
payments of £200 for the following ten years. Here is yet another instance of Wemher's 
involvement in education, on this occasion in the promotion of the German language.94
There can be little doubt that the study of German was lagging behind in Britain.
It was widely accepted in the prewar period that Germans knew more of Shakespeare than 
Britons did of Goethe, and that the study of English language and literature in German
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schools and universities was more extensive than the study of German in British schools 
and universities. Generally also, relatively few British university students pursued their 
studies in Germany. As a contemporary observer lamented: 'So few English students are 
found in German universities.'95 In fact, from the 1880s to the 1900s there was a drop in 
the percentage of Britons constituting foreign students in Germany.96 Like the Anglo- 
German friendship movement to which Breul belonged, the study of German in Britain in 
the prewar period was an elite - though not necessarily an elitist - activity, confined to a 
relatively small number of people. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was this underdeveloped 
state of German learning in Britain which the Albert Committee, presided over by Lord 
Avebury, sought to rectify.
Like Avebury, Breul too sought to promote German language and culture in Britain 
as a means of increasing Anglo-German understanding. But given the backwardness of the 
teaching of German in Britain, it is hardly surprising that popular affinity with Germany 
was lacking at the grass-roots level. It was not just that Breul belonged to a narrow elite 
movement, but bicultural 'Anglo-Germans' such as himself were also in a minority. The 
limits to what he could achieve in promoting German and Anglo-German friendship should 
thus be properly understood.
Richard Burdon Haldane*
We now move to the merging of politics with education. As seen in Chapter 4, 
Haldane played a major role in the founding of Imperial College of Science and 
Technology, otherwise known as the 'London Charlottenburg'. Trained as a lawyer,
Haldane entered politics in 1880, joining the Liberal Party and in the same year becoming a 
member of the Albert Grey Committee, set up to bring together young speakers of the 
Liberal Party. In 1885 Haldane won his first seat in the Commons representing East 
Lothian and remained in politics until his death in 1928. When the Liberals came to power
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in December 1905 he took charge at the War Office as Secretary of State for War. Made a 
peer in 1911, Haldane became Lord Chancellor in 1912, marking the pinnacle of his legal 
career.
The commemorative plaque on the house at 28 Queen Anne's Gate, London, where 
Haldane once lived, reads 'Statesman, Lawyer, Philosopher1, a summation of the man's 
public career and private interests. A Scotsman who hailed from Edinburgh, he was bom 
in 1856, the second of five children bom to Robert Haldane, an ardent Calvinist, and his 
second wife, Mary Burdon Sanderson, also a deeply religious person. A lawyer, Robert 
Haldane was known as a writer to the signet, a position of high status in Scottish law. 
Throughout his childhood, Richard Haldane spent his time between their home on Charlotte 
Square, Edinburgh, and the family estate at Cloan (known at one time as Cloanden). He 
received his early education at the Edinburgh Academy, remembered as 'never an 
interesting period to me1, during which time Haldane also first came to question his 
religious teachings.
At age sixteen, Haldane was sent to the University of Edinburgh. By this time, 
Haldane had become deeply sceptical of the 'essential foundations of Christianity1 and 
turned to German Idealism and metaphysics in the search for truth. As he writes: 'The 
divines to whom I turned for personal guidance in those days could not help me much, for 
they had not themselves gone deeply enough down. I was .driven to look to the 
philosophers, and I then began the study of metaphysics.' At Edinburgh he came under the 
tutelage of John Stuart Blackie, Professor of Greek who, having himself been a student at 
Gottingen and Berlin, persuaded him to further his study of philosophy at the University of 
Gottingen under the renowned German philosopher, Hermann Lotze.97 As Haldane 
confided to his uncle in March 1874, he considered himself at that stage to be someone 
who knew 'very little of the world and of himself. Realizing that he had a duty to do 
good for humanity, Haldane saw the study of philosophy as a way of attaining that object
in life. He wrote: 'I have prepared myself so far for my studies in Gottingen next month, 
where I expect not only the course of work, but the solitude which is always congenial to 
me will have a beneficial effect.’98
Haldane in Germany
Thus Haldane set off for Gottingen in April 1874, just three months short of his 
eighteenth birthday. Upon arrival, his impression of the city was one of a 'fairy tale’, a 
natural reaction for a young lad in a foreign land for his first time. Haldane was further 
struck by what he perceived to be an 'old fashioned’ town which had not changed for 400 
years. 'I can imagine myself gone back into the age of the Reformation and Luther’, he 
imparted to his mother, futher remarking about Gottingen's narrow and winding streets and 
tiny houses that reminded him of Swiss cottages. His initial impression of Germans was 
punctuated by images of their quaint habits: Haldane found that they 'smoke cigars 
incessantly, sleep on every possible opportunity, and appear to have a strong objection to 
fresh air, & cold water*. He also took particular notice of their custom of eating raw meats 
and fish, a habit which he gladly abandoned hardly a couple of weeks after his arrival in 
Germany.99
His letters to his mother are rich in details comparing life in Gottingen with 
conditions in Scotland. He noted that the German houses had no carpeting on the floor, 
and that instead of using blankets, the common practice in Germany was to place one 
feather-bed on top of another - 'a  plan I am not quite sure of, he complained.100 An aspect 
of British life which he sorely missed was having afternoon tea, which he described as a 
'luxury' enjoyed only very rarely, the only occasion during his stay in Gottingen being 
recalled fondly as 'an event to be remembered’.101 The German tea, being 'dreadful to 
taste’, 'straw coloured’, and 'more like boiling water than anything else’, obviously left 
much to be desired to the Scotsman’s taste-buds.102 Nonetheless, by the end of his first
month Haldane had managed to settle into his new surroundings and lifestyle.
On 23 April Haldane presented Professor Lotze with his letter of introduction from 
Blackie. Haldane recalled: 'I had a very pleasant conversation with him about 
Metaphysics, and he asked as I was going away to come and see him often in the course of 
the session.’103 Emancipated from his 'religious depression’, Haldane with Lotze’s help 
embarked on his search for the truth about 'God, Freedom, and Immortality’.104 One of the 
first things Lotze did was to set Haldane to read the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte.
Many years later, Haldane would speak reverently of Lotze as a great teacher and moral 
figure who stood above all the other masters at Gottingen.105 Besides attending lectures at 
the university and coming under the influence of Lotze, Haldane took German lessons from 
Fraulein Schlote, a person well versed in Goethe who remained a close friend and whom he 
visited often in subsequent years until she died - killed by 'the grief of the War1, in 
Haldane's own words.106
In August 1874 Haldane returned to Edinburgh, whereupon, finding more leisure on 
his hands, he directed his energy towards studying Immanuel Kant and Fichte.
Subsequently, he was to turn to Georg Friedrich Hegel as well. Despite losing weight 
while at Gottingen, he would later recall fondly that his time in Germany had developed 
him intellectually where he had degenerated physically. 'I had been taught to study 
systematically, ... [and] that if a book is really worth reading it must be read carefully 
through, and its standpoint mastered.’107 Intending? to broaden his horizons even further, he 
went on to study law at the University of Edinburgh, a new passion springing from 'the 
engrossment of abstract and academic topics’.108 He was admitted to the Bar in 1879, 
whereupon he moved to London and shortly thereafter his entry into politics was to take 
place.
Haldane's Impressions of Germany
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One aspect of home life for which Haldane craved in Gottingen was the strict 
observance of piety on Sundays. Rather than being a day o f quiet solemnity and pensive 
rest, Sunday in Gottingen was filled with public activity and celebration - a seeming 
novelty to Haldane. As he observed, the town reeked of beer and tobacco, was resplendent 
with military music, and the people were 'either dancing, playing billiards, or playing 
cards'. He confided that 'one feels themselves [sic] away from home with all its comforts 
and associations, the "religio loci”, more on Sunday than any other day when one lie [sic] 
engaged in study1.109
But even if he might have felt home-sick on Sundays, his time at Gottingen no 
doubt held the roots of his well-known 'pro-Germanism1, for which he paid the price in 
May 1915 when, in the throes of war, he was removed from office. As testimony to the 
deep impact which Gottingen had on his outlook and intellectual growth, Haldane wrote to 
his German friend, Hugo Conwentz, about his yearning to return to Germany - just two 
months after leaving. He had these critical thoughts about Britain:
I actually dislike my own Country now. The peopOe seem to think of 
nothing but how to make money and never how to attain to a high culture.
I dislike going into the streets even because everybody is so much dressed 
out. ... I wish I had been bom a German for Germany suits me far more 
than here, where life is literally a struggle after position etc. instead of the 
path to the blessed life of Culture. One dare not here even express one[']s 
religious opinions if one is not orthodox, and nobody studies anything but 
the 'Brotwissenschaften'. I have only one friend to* whom I can talk in this 
whole city, and him I see very seldom.110
No doubt youthful musings of a man who had just returned from his eye-opening foreign
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travels, these words were nonetheless met with a cold shower from his friend Conwentz, 
who pressed upon him to take heart and see the good side of British society. Conwentz 
suggested that Haldane's view of Germany was skewered as he had been exposed only to 
the outer facets of German life.111 Still, it is obvious that Haldane returned to Edinburgh 
deeply impressed by his experiences in Germany.
Haldane in Education and His Admiration of Germany
While at Gottingen, Haldane was struck by the general level of erudition of the 
German students, remarking that they 'study well, but not so much as they get credit for 
with us’, and that it was customary for soldiers to wear a shoulder stripe to indicate their 
having passed an exam in Greek or Latin, thereby rendering them eligible for an exemption 
of two years of their military service.112 While some German students might have shown a 
proclivity to laziness, Haldane observed that 'most of them have learned a great deal at the 
Gymnasium ... and ... far more than we do at our universities'. As he added in one of his 
letters, testifying to the superior quality of German learning: 'Even an ordinary [German] 
student laughs at 4 out of 5 of the working students who come from Oxford or 
Cambridge.'113
This appreciation for the merits and achievements of the German system of 
education formed an important basis for Haldane's future involvement in British educational 
reform. That involvement came as early as 1889 when, as a junior Liberal M.P., he spoke 
in the House of Commons on a Bill dealing with the reform of Scottish universities. In the 
1890s, he became an active participant in the campaign to remodel the University of 
London as a teaching institution (already dealt with in Chapter 4). In collaboration with his 
friend Sidney Webb, Haldane was instrumental in steering the London University Bill 
through Parliament, finally resulting in the London University Act of 1898. Subsequently, 
his efforts in higher-learning reform were extended to a broader movement aimed at
establishing new universities in England and Wales, and he became a leading advocate for 
the establishment of a university in Liverpool as an independent entity divorced from 
Victoria University, which up to then was the umbrella university for the teaching colleges 
of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. By an Order in Council of February 1903, charters 
were granted for the universities of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. Haldane's role in the 
founding of Imperial College has of course been examined in Chapter 4. Later, as 
chairman of the Royal Commission on University Education in London, Haldane was able 
to exert his influence on the tone and direction of the commission's proceedings.
Addressing university students at Aberystwyth in 1910, Haldane declared that 'it is 
in the Universities, with their power over the mind, ... that we see how the soul of a people 
at its highest mirrors itself. In this very speech he cited the examples of Lotze and Kant 
as 'typical figures' distinguishing the soul of modem Germany, her idealism and culture.114 
The German stamp on Haldane's own philosophy, reflected in his emphasis on the mind 
and the power of ideas, is undeniable. His attitude towards educational reform in Britain 
was certainly also rooted in his grounding in German philosophy and his admiration for 
German culture and achievements. 'Our people have no genius for Education such as the 
Germans have,' he once complained.115 His sense of despair with the state of education in 
Britain went hand in hand with his praise for the German attitude towards education.
During a trip to Konigsberg with his brother in 1901, Haldane noted: 'we have been 
contemplating the University buildings in the moonlight & wishing that our Government in 
England would see to the housing of our Universities as is done here'.116
Haldane's role in education was not confined to the area of reform, for he also 
acted as a lecturer and speaker on philosophy and law. During 1903-04 he gave the 
Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews centring on the meaning of reality, no 
doubt an area for which he was suitably qualified. These lectures were subsequently 
published as The Pathway to Reality.117 After the First World War, Haldane was to
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continue on the lecture circuit giving talks on university education and philosophy.
Haldane's Army Reforms
Important as his efforts in educational reform were, Haldane has nonetheless 
become better known perhaps for the reforms in the British army and the War Office that 
were undertaken during his tenure as War Secretary. When the Liberals came to power in 
December 1905, the office that Haldane coveted most was the Lord Chancellorship, a post 
offered, however, to Sir Robert Reid (Lord Lorebum). Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
the Liberal leader, initially proffered Haldane the Attomey-Generalship, a position which 
did not command cabinet rank, and only subsequently suggested that Haldane take up the 
War Office.
The War Office was arguably the least coveted cabinet posting, having a reputation 
for being what one author has described as a 'political graveyard’118- and for good reason. 
When Haldane assumed his post, the War Office was in shambles and disarray, having seen 
in recent years the departure of two successive heads, St. John Brodrick (1900-03) and 
Hugh Amold-Forster (1903-05), who had been thwarted in their attempts to overhaul the 
army. Upon taking office, therefore, Haldane had a considerable task before him where his 
predecessors had failed.
Incidentally, Haldane had in fact been involved with War Office work even before 
1905 when, following the catalogue of disasters in the Boer War, he had a private 
conversation with the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, who appreciated the need 
to conduct a 'special investigation’ into explosives and propellants then in use and 
appointed Haldane to serve on the newly formed Explosives Committee.119 Established in 
1900 under the chairmanship of Lord Rayleigh, the committee was entrusted with the task 
of investigating and recommending the best smokeless propellant powders to be adopted by 
the army, among other things. Sitting on and off for four years, it provided Haldane with
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insight into the War Office and the technical problems of explosives.120 It is coincidental 
that the Anglo-German link in explosives manifests itself again in the person of Haldane.
The pressure for War Office reform had indeed been mounting since the Boer War 
which, besides exposing glaring weaknesses in the organization and equipment of the 
British regular and auxiliary armies, demonstrated the military's lack of, and need for, 
strategic planning and a General Staff. Between 1901 and 1904, various commissions and 
committees were established to review the performance of the army in South Africa and 
recommend reforms and reorganization of the War Office. Among them was the Esher 
Committee, which recommended that the CID, which had been established by Balfour in 
December 1902, be given a full-time secretariat and permanent staff. In order that policy­
making, administration and command could be separated, the committee further proposed 
that the position of Commander-in-Chief be replaced by a policy-making Army Council, to 
be assisted by administrative directors and an Inspector-General. In addition, it called for 
the creation of a General Staff. These reforms, endorsed by Balfour, were implemented in 
1904.
Thus when Haldane took over at the War Office vowing to create his 'Hegelian 
Army1,121 a set of reforms was already in place dealing with a reorganization of the War 
Office. The task at hand was to reorganize and reform the army. Undaunted, Haldane was 
by January 1906 already boasting of having drawn up 'a  great Army Scheme' involving 
potentially 'sweeping changes'.122 One of such changes, which he laid down in his package 
of proposals in the summer of 1906, pertained to streamlining the auxiliary forces which, 
when Haldane took office, consisted of the Militia - known also as the 'old Constitutional 
Force' - the Yeomanry and the Volunteers. All three were in some measure poorly 
organized, equipped and trained. The inability of the auxiliaries to support and expand the 
first-line forces during the South African war had swelled the impetus for reform. By the 
Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, the Volunteers and Yeomanry were superseded
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by a new Territorial Army, and the Militia was refashioned into a corps of reserves for the 
first line of the army, thus conforming with Haldane's notion of a two-line army.123
Another major component of Haldane's army reforms was the creation of the BEF, 
which was launched also in 1907, comprising six divisions and one cavalry division, 
numbering approximately 160,000 men. At the same time he reduced the size of the 
regular army by 20,000. The BEF indeed reflected Haldane's adoption of a Continental 
strategy, which in turn mirrored shifts in the European alignments and in Britain's strategic 
position and requirements in Europe. These changes, we may recall, had already begun 
before the Liberals took office when Britain and France signed the accords of April 1904 
giving rise to the Anglo-French entente.
Although the BEF was not created for the express purpose of fighting a land war 
with Germany, it would have been obvious to any astute observer that, based upon Britain's 
diplomatic realignment with France, and the army's subsequent war plans and preparations, 
the 'expeditionary' force was for all intents and purposes meant to be deployed in a 
European war in which Germany figured as the most likely opponent. As a subscriber to 
the 'blue water' school, Haldane believed in the primacy of naval power for home defence, 
the implication being that the regular army would have mainly an overseas role. As he 
claimed: 'The first purpose for which we want any army is for overseas war. The Fleet 
defends our coasts.'124 Therefore, his reforms were designed to fulfil the army's strategic 
overseas role.125 Over the course of the few years leading up to 1914, exchanges were 
carried on between the British and French General Staffs. General Sir Henry Wilson, the 
Director of Military Operations from 1910, played" a leading role in consulting with his 
French counterparts in the preparation of British war plans. After the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1914, the BEF was dispatched to the Continent in support of the French forces 
on the Western Front. By November 1914, however, it was virtually wiped out at the first 
battle of Ypres.
The German influence in the army reforms could be seen especially in the creation 
of the General Staff. When Haldane took charge in 1905, the General Staff, being in its 
embryonic form, was in operation only in the War Office. Subsequently, by the Army 
Order of 12 September 1906, it was constituted throughout the army, in the commands and 
districts.126 It should be noted that emulation of the German idea of a General Staff was 
already in vogue even before Haldane's arrival at the War Office. In March 1905, 
spearheading the campaign to build up the General Staff, Sir George Clarke, Secretary of 
the CID, remarked that General Sir James Grierson's 'knowledge of the German system 
enables him to understand our meaning'127 - testimony to the value placed on the German 
model of military organization by the British army reformers. Not surprisingly, Clarke 
(later to become Baron Sydenham) also based his idea of the General Staff on the 
Prussian/German example. In a memorandum submitted to Haldane in February 1906, he 
argued that the General Staff system 'lay at the root of German efficiency'. The absence of 
such a system in Britain, Clarke maintained, represented a 'serious obstacle to well-ordered 
progress'.128
Assisted by Colonel Gerald Ellison, whom on Lord Esher's recommendation 
Haldane appointed to be his military private secretary, Haldane spent the first few weeks of 
office in solitude isolation at Cloan, ruminating on the future army reforms. Ellison, who 
during this time of seclusion 'was closer to Haldane than any other adviser',129had the task 
of tutoring him on aspects of military organization. It was during this period that Haldane 
deepened his interest in the General Staff, poring over works dealing with that very subject, 
such as Spenser Wilkinson's The Brain of an Army and The Duties of the General Staff, by 
Bronsart von Schellendorf. The relevance of the German model to Haldane's thinking on 
army reform is evidenced also by his trip to Berlin, between 29 August and 4 September 
1906.130 During that visit Haldane had discussions with Count von Moltke, the Chief of the 
German General Staff, gained first-hand knowledge of the German military machinery, and
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'saw much in German methods that commended itself to him'.131 It cannot be doubted that 
Haldane's quest for efficiency in the British army was influenced in no small part by 
German methods of organization.
Haldane's Attitude towards Germany
It is only ironic that the 'Hegelian Army' which Haldane set out to create was 
ultimately deployed against the country which he greatly admired and from which Hegel 
hailed. In the prewar period, Haldane had a reputation in the cabinet for wearying his 
colleagues with his 'long harangues on the contribution of Germany to civilization'.132 Yet 
he was also largely responsible for building up the British army's preparedness for 
offensive action against Germany. Extolling German virtues, organizational skill and 
technical prowess, Haldane was willing and ready to borrow precisely from the German 
example of efficiency in warfare to fashion a fighting force to be used against the Germans.
The irony, however, is mitigated when considered in light of the fact that Haldane, 
as much as he admired German literature and philosophy, remained a patriot and a 
statesman charged with carrying out the duties of his office. Haldane's position as a 
politician and statesman and simultaneously a Germanophile, can probably be best 
characterized as a duality. Having already set in motion his army reforms and raised the 
efficiency of the British military machine for a possible war with Germany, he took on the 
role of a peace emissary in February 1912 when he made a secret trip to Berlin in what has 
become known as the 'Haldane mission'. Bringing about Anglo-German reconciliation had 
in fact been Haldane's 'personal mission' since at least 1907.133 The purpose of the 1912 
visit to Berlin, coming just a few months after the Agadir crisis, was to smooth Anglo- 
German relations and 'to talk over the ground’ with the German government with regard to 
a possible political agreement.134 As both Grey and Churchill declined to undertake the
trip, Haldane was asked to go, being the ranking cabinet member who spoke fluent 
German. But as Berlin was obdurate in its desire to increase the number of war-ready 
capital ships in its fleet and Whitehall reluctant to give the guarantee of neutrality in a 
European war which the Germans desired, Haldane's mission failed in the end to secure an 
agreement.135
Haldane's views of Germany and Germans can be summed up as reflecting a 
duality and perhaps ambivalence. His image of Germany was certainly far from being 
simply black and white. It is indicative of Haldane's attitude that when Whitehall received 
an unconciliatory cable from the German government in March 1912, following his 
abortive mission to Berlin, he characterized the telegram as an 'ungracious' document, 
written 'in real Prussian style'.136 Therefore, while on one hand a keen admirer of German 
culture, Haldane was nonetheless alert to the ugly side of the German character and was 
wont to identify it as a Prussian trait.
This duality of feeling was apparent in his holding on to the belief, during his 
tenure as War Secretary and Lord Chancellor, that there existed a 'war party' in Berlin. In 
this conception, Anglo-German tension was the work of a small group of malicious hawks, 
led by Admiral von Tirpitz and the naval people surrounding the Kaiser and Bethmann 
Hollweg. The notion of a war-mongering naval group overwhelming the more pacifist 
civilian leadership in Berlin was a consistent strand in Haldane's understanding of the 
German government. Writing to his sister in March 1912, Haldane reasoned that the 
German Chancellor's intransigence was not deliberate or due to evil intent but was the work 
of the hawks in Berlin. As Haldane explained: 'It is plain that the naval people in Berlin 
have been too strong for Bethmann [Hollweg]'.137 At the outbreak of war in August 1914, 
Haldane still clung to this view, believing that the Kaiser was a well-intentioned man who 
was duped and overpowered by the 'war party. 'It is pretty plain', Haldane argued on 4 
August 1914, 'that the German War Council has been planning this war sometime past, &
has overcome Bethmann Hollweg & probably the Kaiser.'138 Later, looking back on the 
period from 1906 to 1915, he was to recall: 'Right throughout I have known of the 
existence and danger of this War Party, but I took the view that until a very late period it 
was not really the dominant party in Germany.'139
The ambivalence in Haldane's attitude towards Germany was evident even during 
his younger days. Writing the above-quoted letter to Hugo Conwentz in October 1874 
having only recently returning from Germany, he must have felt a pining for Gottingen and 
therefore reminisced nostalgically. While still in Germany, however, he was wont to feel 
alienated occasionally. He once referred to Germans as 'either careless beer drinkers or 
materialists', remarking that, 'Truly this is a curious country, very different from our 
own.'140 Visiting Germany again in the summer of 1876, Haldane wrote from Leipzig 
admitting to feeling 'lonely' in that country 'where one knows no one, and the customs & 
language are so different from one's own'.141 Yet these variations in customs and language 
did not prevent him from admiring German culture and philosophy or from being an ardent 
and devoted visitor to the country. Indeed, the annual pilgrimage to Germany became a 
permanent routine for Haldane. In later years, he was to undertake these yearly 
expeditions, almost without fail, with his good friend P. Hume Brown, Professor of History 
at Edinburgh and disciple of Goethe.142
Being one who had had close contact with Germans and who understood the 
German mindset, Haldane was able to appreciate their strengths as well as their flaws. As 
he observed in his Autobiography: 'They are a difficult people because the "abstract mind" 
predominates with them.1 But having said that, he also conceded that 'that very quality 
makes them exact and reliable in their dealings when an agreement has once been arrived 
at'.143
As an advocate of educational reform, he often upheld the German model of 
excellence in technical education and training. But even in that capacity, he was under no
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illusion as to the nature of the challenge posed by Germany's economic progress and 
technical advancement. A champion of free trade, he saw Britain's economic disadvantage 
as lying in the fact that the application of science to industry in Britain was less developed 
and intensive than that practised in Germany. 'Our real danger was not one of German 
invasion,' he contended, 'but one of German permeation of our markets by the employment 
of scientific knowledge.'144 Though a pro-German, Haldane was not blind to the German 
threat. But rather than see Germany's rise as being outright incompatible with British 
interests, Haldane viewed Germany's scientific advances as providing a spur to the 
development of British manufacturing.
On 3 August 1914, when Germany was already at war with Russia and Britain's 
entry in the conflict was only hours away, Haldane wrote of his 'sense of crushing personal 
sorrow’, brought on by the prospect of inevitable war with Germany.145 That he should 
have felt thus is understandable, though just three days later he could just as confidently 
declare, as though still speaking as the War Secretary, that: 'Our mobilization arrangements 
have come off splendidly ... & the machine is working beautifully. Everyone knows just 
what he has to do.'146 Though an advocate of a better understanding between Britain and 
Germany, Haldane was nonetheless resigned to having a war with Germany - the land of 
Goethe, Kant, Schiller and Hegel - if one had to be fought. One should note that, in 
similar vein to some of the academics examined above, Hajdane too subscribed to the two- 
Germanies view, distinguishing between the German people and their government. 'The 
nations themselves,' he later asserted in Before the War, 'taken as aggregates of individual 
citizens, ... desired the continuance of peace'.147 In his view, then, it was the rulers of 
Germany who were responsible for the war.
It is also worth mentioning that throughout the July crisis Haldane, though the 
architect of the BEF, was far from being a hawk. The prospect of war with Germany was 
accepted as an unavoidable fate - and accepted with deep resignation. 'It is horrible here -
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war with Germany is drawing near,1 he remarked on 3 August, adding that 'it is all like a 
horrid dream'.148 Thus, much as he had embraced the Continental strategy and created the 
BEF for a possible showdown with Germany, at the decisive moment in 1914 he still 
lacked a genuine desire for a war with Berlin. His attitude during the July crisis, a period 
which he described as 'the most trying time’ since the Liberal government had taken office 
in 1905, is indeed very telling.149 It appears that right to the end, Haldane hoped for the 
crisis to be resolved peacefully. As late as 29 July, he clung to the belief that there was 
still hope for peace.150 It has been argued that it was not until 1 August that Haldane was 
won over to the side of intervention by his fellow Liberal Imperialist, Sir Edward Grey. 
The decisive event supposedly was Grey's offer of neutrality to Germany in return for 
Berlin's promise not to invade France, and the Germans' rejection of the offer, thereby 
making it seem to Haldane that every chance for peace had been tried and exhausted, and 
that Britain had little choice but to intervene.151 Given Haldane's pro-Germanism and his 
deep sense of 'crushing personal sorrow1 felt at the prospect of war with Germany, it is 
hardly surprising that he gave in only at the last hour.
Ernest Joseph Cassel
As mentioned above, Haldane undertook his abortive mission to Berlin in February 
1912. This mission was facilitated by Sir Ernest Cassel, fqunder of the King Edward VII 
British-German Foundation, prominent City banker, financial contributor to Imperial 
College, and business associate of Wemher, Beit as well as of Cecil Rhodes.
Cassel was bom in 1852 in Cologne, the youngest child of three in a Jewish family 
with a strong tradition in banking.152 At age fourteen, he began work at the banking firm 
of J.W. Eltzbacher & Co. before leaving for Liverpool in 1869. There he found 
employment with Blessing, Braun & Co., German grain merchants, but in April 1870 he 
became a clerk at the Anglo-Egyptian Bank in Paris. At the outbreak of the Franco-
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Prussian War in 1870, Cassel left France and returned to Britain, this time securing a 
clerkship with the merchant banking firm of Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt. He was not 
yet even twenty.
Cassel's rise at Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt was meteoric. In recognition of his 
business acumen and negotiating skills, particularly with regard to the firm's dealings in 
Constantinople and high-risk loans in Latin America, his employers made him manager in 
1874, with an annual salary of £5,000. Throughout the 1880s, he established his position 
in international finance with ventures in Swedish iron ore-mining and transportation, as 
well as American and Mexican railways. Further widening his global network, Cassel also 
arranged loans for the governments of Egypt, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.
As one may recall from Chapter 3, Vickers, Sons & Co. acquired Maxim 
Nordenfelt as well as the Naval Construction & Armaments Company Ltd. at Barrow in 
1897. The financing for these takeovers was provided by Cassel, himself a friend of Albert 
Vickers. At around this time also, Cassel moved into his own offices at 21 Old Broad 
Street in the City, and made inroads into the financing of projects in Egypt, notably the 
Aswan Dam. In 1898 he established the National Bank of Egypt. An avid investor in 
South African diamond- and gold-mining enterprises, Cassel also had a sizeable stake in 
Rand Mines Ltd., the holding company floated by Wemher, Beit in 1893. Besides Julius 
Wemher and Alfred Beit, Cassel had links with Cecil Rhodes. These men formed a loose 
but interconnected grouping which, as we have seen, was active in promoting Anglo- 
German linkage during the pre-1914 period. Among Cassel's other business associates, 
those with whom he developed particularly close ties were Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb & 
Co. of New York, and Carl Meyer, Rothschild's agent in South Africa.153
In 1895 Cassel secured a loan for the Chinese government with the support and 
encouragement of the Foreign Office, which was keen on maintaining Britain's influence in 
China and thus desirous of shoring up that government's financial position. With this
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episode began Cassel's association with the Foreign Office, which in a rare instance showed 
itself willing to enlist the aid of finance in pursuit of political objectives.154
Cassel's involvement with affairs of state was maintained in later years during his 
attempts to play a part in improving Anglo-German relations, one example of which was 
manifested by the Haldane mission of 1912. The origins of the mission remain 'an 
historical mystery, though it was 'most likely' Cassel's friend, Albert Ballin, the German 
shipping tycoon, who made the initial approach to the German government.155 As the 
surviving records indicate, both men had been engaged in discussions on naval 
disarmament at least as early as 1909, when they broached proposals for Anglo-German 
naval spending cuts.156 Anglo-German talks were begun in December 1911 with a view to 
a possible settlement of such issues as the Baghdad railway and the Portuguese colonies in 
Africa, with Cassel or Ballin probably acting as the 'unofficial channel' between London 
and Berlin.157 The upshot of these initial exchanges was a proposal to send a British 
cabinet member to Berlin for further consultations. Shortly before Haldane's departure for 
Berlin on 7 February, there was a flurry of activity between himself, Churchill and Cassel 
in preparation for the trip. Not only did Cassel serve as an 'unofficial channel' in the 
London-Berlin exchanges, he also had a role in formulating the points which Haldane was 
to talk over with the Germans.158 So intimately involved was Cassel in the proceedings 
that he accompanied Haldane on the trip to Berlin. In recognition of his contribution, 
Haldane praised Cassel for his 'tact and skill' and’ referred to their work as 'our joint 
labours'. But the Germans' 1912Novelle. which Haldane characterized as 'formidable',159 
called for an additional squadron of the German High Seas Fleet to be placed at war 
readiness, thereby increasing the size of the active fleet.160 The Novelle inevitably caused 
alarm in London and proved to be a major stumbling block to securing an Anglo-German 
agreement. Thus in spite of Cassel's and Haldane's efforts, the mission to Berlin did not 
bear fruit.
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To conclude, connected as Cassel was to both the British and German governments, 
there was little he could do to achieve a settlement between the two powers when the 
divergence between their political interests proved too wide, and when they were incapable 
of compromise. Though a man of tremendous influence in financial circles, a member of 
King Edward VII's entourage, and one who had access to the Kaiser, Cassel could not in 
the end surmount the obstacles posed by the governments' lack of flexibility and their 
unwillingness to reach an accommodation. He could act as an emissary, provide advice 
and help shape policy, but ultimately governmental decision-making still rested in the hands 
of the politicians and statesmen. Cassel's ability to influence political outcomes was 
limited, as was the power of high finance, and of the City, in public diplomacy, especially 
where economic and political interests did not intersect.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
'W hat... fools[.] We've all been believing that Germany 
w[oul]d never go for us! Poor Haldane & all the pro 
Germans among whom I have always counted myself!’
Margot Asquith to Lord 
Rosebery, 1 September 19141
In August 1914 erupted the European conflagration which has become known to
subsequent generations as the Great War or the First World War, an armed struggle initially
pitting the powers of the Triple Entente - Britain, France and Russia - against the Central
Powers: Germany and Austria-Hungary. Extending around the globe, this truly 'world'
conflict, Europe's first 'total' war and 'the war to end all wars', has affixed the slaughter of
the trenches forever in the annals of modem memory. To borrow Sir Edward Grey's
phrase, the lamps went out all over Europe2 during this four-year-long conflict, which saw
the effective deployment of mustard gas, the tank, the fighter plane and the submarine.
The deadliness of armed warfare was raised to frightening and unprecedented heights.
»
The July Crisis
The July crisis of 1914, which triggered the war’s outbreak, has already been 
sufficiently recounted.3 Briefly put, the crisis began on 28 June when the Austrian 
Archduke and heir to the Habsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated 
by Bosnian revolutionaries in Sarajevo.4 Determined to put an end once and for all to its 
'south Slav’ menace, the Austro-Hungarian government decided to take vigorous action 
against Serbia, believing that inaction would place the Dual Monarchy's survival as a Great
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Power in mortal peril.5 During 5-6 July, in what amounted to an offering of a "blank 
cheque', the Kaiser promised the Austrians Germany's "full support1, even in the event of a 
war with Russia.6 Having secured Germany's firm backing, Vienna resolved to crush 
Serbia by force. On 23 July it delivered an artfully crafted ten-point ultimatum to the 
Serbian government, which was given forty-eight hours in which to reply.7 The harsh 
Austrian terms were designed to be unacceptable to Belgrade. The Serbs nevertheless met 
the forty-eight-hour deadline and accepted all but one of the Austrian demands. Using the 
Serbian rejection of its ultimatum as a pretext, Vienna proceeded to declare war on Serbia 
on 28 July.
If the Austrians proved determined to adopt a firm line in this crisis, so too did the 
Russians. Rather than remain an idle spectator, the Russian government resolved to stand 
by the Serbs and face the risk of war.8 Reflecting its hardened attitude, St. Petersburg 
decided on 25 July to proclaim "the period preparatory to war1, thus setting in motion a 
series of premobilization measures which were carried out along its Austrian and German 
frontiers. In response to the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, Russia ordered 
partial mobilization on 29 July, and on the next day the Tsar decided on general 
mobilization, which was proclaimed on 31 July.9
Germany, meanwhile, proclaimed the "state of imminent danger of war* on 31 July, 
and declared war on Russia on 1 August. Constrained by the demands of the Schlieffen 
Plan, which called for a quick, decisive campaign s against France followed by a 
concentration of German forces in the east to face the onslaught of the Russian steamroller, 
the Germans had to act with speed.10 In the evening of 2 August, Berlin dispatched an 
ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of passage for German troops in the impending 
offensive against France. The German ultimatum, expiring on the morning of 3 August, 
was rejected by the Belgian government. On the same day Germany declared war on 
France and her troops crossed into Belgium in force on 4 August. The First World War
had begun.
Describing scenes of panic, pandemonium and euphoria, Sir Francis Oppenheimer 
has left behind a vivid account of those last days of peace in July and August 1914. Bom 
in London in 1870 to a family of German-Jewish heritage, Oppenheimer was appointed 
British Consul-General in Frankfurt in 1900. He left the Consulate Service for the 
Diplomatic Service in 1912 when he became the Secretary of Embassy in Berlin, in effect 
discharging the duties of a commercial attache.11
Oppenheimer left Germany barely before the outbreak of Anglo-German hostilities 
in August 1914. He departed from Berlin on 30 July, just hours before the German 
proclamation of the 'state of imminent danger of war1. The railway station was, in his 
words, 'one mass of humanity’. Five passengers were crammed into his first-class carriage 
which was intended for four. The chaos around him bespoke the tension and excitement 
arising from the imminent approach of war. 'The atmosphere charged as with electricity,’ 
Oppenheimer observed. Describing the German crowds, he remarked: 'They believe War 
has been declared & ... a cheer - the whole station chimes in - no one knows why he is 
shouting - but cheering is like a relief to the tension of the nerves ...’ Arriving in Frankfurt 
on 1 August, he saw that there were 'no porters - platforms block[ed] with people - 
crowded with Pyramids of luggage’. Later in the same afternoon, the station seemed to him 
'One mass of people’ as throngs of foreign travellers scrambled to head for the ports. 
Leaving his wife behind for fear that the journey might be too hazardous, Oppenheimer 
boarded the jam-packed train for Flushing in difficult conditions that were compounded by 
the sweltering August heat. As he recorded: '... train packed: gangways of corridor 
carriage impassable.- No dinner.’ He added: 'So crowded have to open door of W.C & 
three women stand in there - the heat & crowd & smell of luggage quite unbearable.’ 
Despite these circumstances, Oppenheimer was able to board the steamer at Flushing and 
arrived at Folkestone on the morning of 2 August, finally reaching London's Victoria
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Station seven hours late - and without his lost luggage. By 6 August, when Britain was 
already at war, he took notice of the electricity in the London air that was generated by the 
public’s enthusiasm for the war. Describing scenes of mob hysteria, Oppenheimer wrote: 
'Vast crowds are presenting themselves at the Recruiting Office off White Hall. Six 
Policemen on horseback have to keep the crowd in order. Every one tries to be the first to 
enter the recruiting office.’12
These public scenes which Oppenheimer witnessed might suggest a spontaneous 
popular response to the country's call of the hour. The British government's path to war, 
however, was arduous and punctuated by agonizing indecision and cabinet tussles. The 
cabinet's decision-making during the July crisis has indeed been sufficiently recounted and 
need not detain us here.13
A lack of enthusiasm for war was also noticeable among an important segment of 
the non-governmental elites: the business and financial interests. While the Liberal cabinet 
deliberated and procrastinated, the July crisis wreaked havoc with the City of London. On 
25 July, the day on which Serbia replied to the Austrian ultimatum, the London Stock 
Exchange recorded a sharp fall in prices. By 27 July, the following Monday and first 
business day of the new week, panic had broken out in the stock exchanges across the 
Continent as well as in New York. By 29 July, though nominally still open, 'the 
Continental Bourses had practically ceased to function’. Consequently, the London market 
bore the brunt of the massive sales of securities that were precipitated by the panic.
Besides the collapse of stock prices, the foreign exchange market, which proved to be the 
'weak point', also foundered.14 Unable to cope with the deluge of 'unwanted securities of 
the world's markets', the London Stock Exchange was finally forced to close, for the first 
time in its histoiy, on 31 July. By a royal proclamation of 3 August, a moratorium was 
imposed on the payment of certain bills of exchange.15 Meanwhile, a financial breakdown 
of a different order was occurring with the massive run on money provoked by the crisis,
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when notes were being redeemed in huge quantities for sovereigns. In the two days of 30- 
31 July alone, the Bank of England’s gold reserves fell by about £6 million.16 Evidently, 
'business as usual’ could not be maintained for long.
Given this enormous disruption, the City’s aversion to a British entry into the 
European war was understandable, even predictable. Testimony by British marine 
insurance companies before the CID in 1911 had already given an indication of the 
business circles' questionable zeal for any British armed conflict with Germany. As firms 
such as Lloyd's testified in 1911, they considered themselves bound to fulfil their 
contractual obligations to their German maritime clients, and to cover their losses incurred 
in an Anglo-German war for damages inflicted by the Royal Navy, provided that those 
obligations were entered into prior to the start of hostilities.17 As one may recall, the 
German merchant marine represented an important market for British insurance firms in the 
pre-1914 period. The business sense of forthrightness in this instance was obviously at 
odds with the government's interests, especially in the event of an Anglo-German war.
At the height of the July crisis, the pacifist attitude of the British financial, 
commercial and industrial circles should hardly have been surprising. David Lloyd George, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is said to have stated on 31 July: 'All the bankers and 
commercial people are begging us not to intervene.’ According to him, Lord Cunliffe, the 
Governor of the Bank of England, 'with tears in his eyes’ pleaded with him, 'Keep us out 
of it. We shall all be ruined if we are dragged ini’18 Arguing against intervention at that 
day’s cabinet, John Morley, Lord President of the Council, and John Simon, the Attorney- 
General, cited the pacific opinion of the industrial centres of the north and the banking and 
commercial circles of London. On 31 July also, the day on which the London Stock 
Exchange closed, City bankers were pleading with Asquith not to bring Britain into a 
European war.19 Morley later confirmed that Lloyd George 'informed us that he had been 
consulting the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, other men of light
and leading in the City, also cotton men, and steel and coal men, etc., in the North of 
England, in Glasgow, etc., and they were all aghast at the bare idea of our plunging into 
the European conflict’.20 Sir Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, complained that commercial opinion was 'generally timid, and apt to follow 
pusillanimous counsels'. So irked was he by this apparent irresoluteness that he blamed the 
City's anti-interventionist stance on 'the deliberate acts of German financial houses', 
alleging that they were 'notoriously in daily communication with the German Embassy'.21 
As Haldane's correspondence suggests, the acuteness of the financial crisis was keenly 
appreciated by the City's interests and the government which they sought to lobby. As 
Haldane noted on 1 August: 'We have had the Governor of the Bank of England & the 
City Bankers with us. The financial crisis is serious & we are taking strong measures.'22 
Up north, in Manchester for example, business opinion was similarly 'overwhelmingly in 
favour of neutrality'. Sir Charles Macara, president of the International Federation of 
Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Association, argued publicly on 31 July for 
non-intervention. On 1 August the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, speaking on behalf 
of Manchester’s mercantile community, addressed a telegram to Asquith urging him to 
preserve Britain's neutrality in the European conflict.23
The attitude of the commercial classes during those last days of peace certainly 
puts into clearer perspective their subsequent attempts to maintain 'business as usual* in 
wartime, even to the extent of preserving indirect?trade links with Germany through neutral 
countries. In October 1914 the Chamber of Commerce Journal could enthusiastically 
express its 'hope that our overseas trade may not only be maintained, but even substantially 
increased'.24 But after the first six months of war, with the onset of state economic 
intervention and a severe loss of the British export trade, that attitude was to be tempered 
by an increased hostility towards governmental interference.25 The businessmen's 
unwillingness to subordinate the pursuit of profit completely to the government's war effort
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was to be a cause for concern at Whitehall.
During the July crisis, the commercial interests found cohorts in the academic 
community. It should be remembered that Norman Angell had, during the prewar period, 
gone to great lengths to underscore the economic counter-productiveness of a European 
war. During those last days of peace in July 1914, he organized the British Neutrality 
League and was joined in this venture by C.P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester 
Guardian, and J.J. Thomson, Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge.26 
Incidentally, Thomson was also one of four Cambridge dons who spearheaded a public 
protest in The Times against British intervention in a war against Germany. On 1 August 
1914, the day on which Germany declared war on Russia, a letter signed by nine academics 
appeared in the paper under the heading 'Scholars' Protest against War with Germany'. 
These scholars argued that Germany was 'a  nation leading the way in Arts and Sciences' 
and 'so near akin to our own'. In their opinion, 'War upon her in the interest of Servia and 
Russia will be a sin against civilization.'27 Hence, racial imagery was evoked again, and 
Germany presented as an epitome of civilization, related by blood ties to Britain. By the 
morning of 5 August, however, these academics had been overtaken by events and their 
arguments rendered irrelevant.
During those last days of peace, Liberal academics such as the eminent social 
scientist Graham Wallas, G. Lowes Dickinson, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and 
the 'Norman Angellite' Leonard Hobhouse, also attempted to keep Britain out of the war.
At about the same time as Angell was setting up his Neutrality League, Wallas, along with 
the Radical economist John Hobson and Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald, was organizing 
the British Neutrality Committee. Its membership included Bertrand Russell, A.G.
Gardiner, J.L. Hammond, the historians G.M. Trevelyan and Basil Williams, and Gilbert 
Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. As might be expected, this committee, in 
advocating neutrality, expressed Russophobic and Germanophile opinions, with the racial
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theme appearing dominant. Its manifesto of 3 August referred to Russia as 'only partly 
civilized', governed by 'a  military autocracy largely hostile to Western ideas of political 
and religious freedom' and, if victorious in the European war, liable to become 'the dictator 
both in this continent and in Asia'. Germany, on the other hand, was deemed to be 'highly 
civilized' and 'racially allied to ourselves and with moral ideals largely resembling our 
own'.28
It was also on 3 August that Grey gave his 'very remarkable, moving and 
powerful'29 address to the Commons, stating the case for intervention. Reflecting the 
futility of these neutralists' efforts, Hobson wrote on that very evening: 'I f  there is war 
tomorrow, as seems pretty certain, our Neutrality Committee will drop that name, and lie 
low as a watching Conciliation Committee, ...'30 Murray, seeing that Germany 'has plainly 
run amok', in a similarly defeatist manner 'says he finds it difficult to resist Grey's case'.31 
Outpaced by the alacrity of events, the Neutrality Committee held its first meeting only in 
the afternoon of 4 August. By eleven o'clock that night, of course, Britain was already at 
war. On 5 August the Neutrality Committee was dissolved. Angell's Neutrality League 
was to suffer the same fate.32
Concluding Remarks
If the First World War took Britain by surprise, that was largely because the 
European situation was widely considered to be peaceful. Alluding to the 'distinct feeling 
of optimism' prevailing in Britain then, Winston Churchill recalls that: 'The spring and 
summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional tranquillity.'33 Indeed, the 
Balkan crises of 1912-13 had passed and there was little expectation of an impending 
conflagration. In January 1914 Lloyd George could optimistically state that 'Never has the 
sky been so perfectly blue.'34 Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, declared in May 1914: 'Since I have been at the Foreign Office I have not
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seen such calm waters.'35 Looking back at the summer of 1914, a contemporary observer 
would later recall: 'That July was like any other July that had gone before it. ... Life was 
jogging on as it had done for ten or twenty years and might do for ten or twenty years to 
come.'36 Thus as C.W. Hughes, an art master at Marlborough College at the outbreak of 
war, would subsequently attest: 'The European situation, the trouble between Austria and 
Servia, seemed at first too remote to bother about1.37 This lack of attention to Balkan 
affairs, particularly the recent events, was hardly atypical. Reflecting on his undergraduate 
days at Oxford before the war, E.L. Woodward could testify to the students' general 
ignorance of international politics. As Woodward writes, '... no one bothered much about 
anything which happened after the Battle of Waterloo. ... I had only a vague and inaccurate 
knowledge of European history after the Napeolonic wars, and I could not have drawn even 
an outline map of the contemporary frontiers of the European states.'38
Additionally, Anglo-German relations were probably on a better footing in 1914 
than they had been for many years. Though there remains disagreement over whether 
London and Berlin achieved a genuine rapprochement between 1912 and 1914, it is 
generally accepted that a detente was attained and that 'a  certain optimism had returned to 
Anglo-German relations' by the summer of 1914.39 Subsequent to the Agadir crisis and the 
Radical revolt against Grey in 1911 - which witnessed the 'Grey must go' campaign in the 
Commons - Whitehall's relations with Germany saw a gradual improvement, marked by 
attempts to secure a political agreement (the Haldane mission), cooperation during the 
Balkan wars of 1912-13, and an accord on Portugal's African colonies and the Baghdad 
railway. The naval rivaliy had also ceased to be a source of friction between the British 
and German governments, with Berlin having shifted its attention in 1913 to its military 
buildup on land. In effect, the Anglo-German naval race was over.
Thus by 1914, the Foreign Office's 'long distrust' of Germany 'was sensibly 
modified'.40 Reflecting the health of Anglo-German relations, the British fleet visited Kiel
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in June during the Kiel Regatta Week. Describing those scenes heralding the last days of 
peace in Europe, Churchill paints a picture of an idyllic summer setting in which the 
German and British navies met. He observes:
There were races, there were banquets, there were speeches. There was 
sunshine, there was the Emperor. Officers and men fraternized and 
entertained each other afloat and ashore. Together they strolled arm in arm 
through the hospital town, or dined with all goodwill in mess and 
wardroom.41
Reporting on the British fleet's visit, the British naval attach^ in Berlin, Captain Wilfred 
Henderson, attested to its 'great success1 and praised the German naval officers' attitude as 
being 'the very opposite of that insincere toadyism and sickly sentimentality1 often 
associated with them. According to him, the German newspapers, viewing the British visit 
approvingly, had been apt to mention 'the blood-relationship between England and 
Germany' and to see the two nations as 'the leaders of modem culture’. Citing a German 
officer's joke about the brotherhood of 'the two "white" nations', Henderson remarked: 'It is 
in the subtle meaning of that word "white" that the interpretation of their feeling towards us 
is to be found.'42 Obviously, the racial theme was a binding factor in the Anglo-German 
naval officers' relations. «
The Anglo-German 'antagonism' as a cause of the First World War indeed should 
not be overstated. The post-Agadir detente cannot be overlooked and it was certainly 
discernible by contemporaries, among them Michael Sadler. As he noted in his journal in 
June 1912, recounting a recent conversation with Frank Lascelles:
There has been great danger but things for the time are better. Hamack
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who last year refused to come to England because he believed that England 
had nearly attacked Germany, has changed his views & is willing to come 
again. That is symptomatic.43
In June 1914 the British Charge d1 Affaires in Darmstadt related to Grey the Russian 
perception that Britain was 'now on such friendly terms with Germany1.44 On 23 July, the 
day of Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, Lloyd George, sharing this overall optimism 
about Anglo-German relations, declared in the Commons that 'the points of co-operation 
[between Britain and Germany] are greater and more numerous and more important than 
the points of possible controversy1.45 Reminiscing on that summer, Prince Lichnowsky, the 
German ambassador in London from 1912 to 1914, recounts that Germany's relations with 
Britain 'manifested a warmth and cordiality that had hitherto been conspicuously absent'.46 
Clearly, on the eve of war, Anglo-German relations were not characterized by mutual 
antagonism.
It is easy to suppose that the prewar invasion scares, naval and commercial rivalry, 
and German bogeys, had primed the British population for Armageddon in July 1914. But 
as James Headlam suggested soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the expectation of a war 
with Germany during that summer had not been particularly acute. As he noted: 'The 
stories of German hostility seemed too crude and stupid: this was not the sort of stuff that 
sensible people troubled about.' The British public might have in fact become inured to the 
war scares. The repeated warnings of impending doom, Headlam argued, had 'lost their 
effect'. As he explained: 'We were getting tired by prophecies of the coming of war. 
Armageddon had been vulgarised'.47
Ironically, the improved state of Anglo-German relations may have inadvertently 
contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914 by 'fostering a set of misperceptions' between 
London and Berlin.48 Because of the detente, the British government, Grey especially, may
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have unwittingly placed an inordinate amount of faith in German goodwill and Berlin's 
willingness to rein in the Austrians during the early phases of the July crisis. The German 
leaders, meanwhile, could have been mistakenly led to believe that, provided Germany did 
not appear to be the agent provocateurs. Britain would stay out of the European conflict, at 
least during its early stages. As Sean Lynn-Jones proposes:
In Britain, the detente produced false belief that the July 1914 crisis could 
be resolved through Anglo-German cooperation. British leaders did not 
want to appear to provoke Germany and thus failed to take early steps to 
deter German moves that led to war. The detente also fostered false 
German hopes that Britain would remain neutral in a continental war, 
thereby encouraging Germany to adopt policies fraught with the risk of 
such a conflict.49
There is certainly evidence that Grey was guided by the premise that Berlin would 
again cooperate with Britain and take on the pacifying role which it had adopted in the 
previous Balkan crisis. As Grey stated on 9 July: 'I would continue the same policy as I 
had pursued through the [previous year’s] Balkan crisis, ... The greater the risk of war, the 
more closely would I adhere to that policy1.50 Grey's misjudged reliance on the Germans to 
restrain Vienna was thus based on the previous pattern of Anglo-German cooperation in the 
Balkans.51
The German government's expectations o f British neutrality certainly cannot be 
dismissed. Whether or not the German leadership confidently counted on British 
neutrality52 or merely hoped for it, it cannot be denied that keeping Britain out of the 
anticipated European war constituted an important calculation in German decision-making 
in July 1914. So concerned was Berlin with preventing Britain's intervention that it went
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to great lengths to avoid any action that would arouse London.33 Indeed, throughout the 
crisis, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's overriding consideration was to make the war 
appear to be a provocation by Russia and France. By that device, he hoped, British 
neutrality could be secured and Germany’s entry into the war presented as ’defensive’ in 
nature. So keen were the Germans on British non-intervention that in the evening of 24 
July, Ballin met with Churchill in Cassel's house, apparently on 'a  fishing expedition’ for 
the Kaiser to gauge London’s attitude towards a European war.54 Count Ladislaus 
Szogyeny-Marich, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, reported in early July that 
'Germany feels that she need no longer fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain’.55 On 26 
July the German Secretary of State, Gottlieb von Jagow, could claim that 'we are sure of 
England's neutrality'.56 Years after the war, Lichnowsky wrote of 'the strong sympathy for 
Germany* which he believed existed in the British government in July 1914.37 In short, the 
German leaders' confidence in securing British neutrality during the July crisis 'reflected 
the German belief that a detente had emerged between Berlin and London’.58
The significance of British neutrality to Bethmann Hollweg's calculations was 
revealed during the night of 29-30 July, after Berlin had received Grey's warning that 
Britain would not stand aside in a European war involving France. The effect of the news 
on the German leadership was immediate. Hoping to 'reverse the wheels of German 
policy',39 the Chancellor sent a flurry of telegrams to Vienna during that night in an attempt 
to restrain the Austrians.60 Incensed at what he regarded to be a betrayal by Britain, the 
Kaiser released a blustering tirade against 'perfidious Albion'61 and 'that mean crew of 
shopkeepers', calling Grey's warning the 'most scandalous piece of English pharisaism that 
I ever saw!’62 The German leadership's reaction consequent to the 'misunderstanding' of 1 
August is further suggestive of its attitude. On that day Grey first offered British neutrality 
in return for a German pledge not to invade France, and then proposed British neutrality 
even in the event of Germany going to war against France and Russia. On receiving news
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of Grey’s proposal, the Kaiser in his elation ordered the champagne bottles to be opened - a 
celebration which was, however, short-lived.63 But as much as the Germans were keen on 
having one fewer Great Power, along with its navy, against which to contend, their attempt 
to secure British neutrality can also be seen as reflecting a lack of a desire to engage in 
hostilities with Britain. Although Bethmann Hollweg from the outset hoped for a localized 
Balkan conflict and for Russia to stay out, the prospect of a war with France and Russia 
was part of the 'calculated risk' which he was willing to take in July 1914.64 A war with 
Britain, however, was greeted with a greater degree of reluctance. In short, British 
intervention may have entered Berlin's calculations as a contingency that had to be dealt 
with when it arrived, but the German government did not actively seek to wage a conflict 
with Britain in July 1914.
The evidence appears quite convincing that Grey's non-interference with Berlin 
during the early stages of the crisis, and the Germans' overly optimistic expectation of 
British neutrality, were rooted more in recently improved bilateral relations than in the rise 
of hostility. Although the background of Anglo-German relations influenced both London's 
and Berlin's decisions for war in 1914, the Anglo-German 'antagonism' should be viewed 
in its proper context. It was by no means the driving force for war in July 1914.
The First World War, therefore, did not originate as an Anglo-German quarrel, and 
it certainly was not triggered by a German attack on, or hostile action against, Britain. It 
should be noted that the Schlieffen Plan was aimed at France and Russia; there was no 
German plan to invade Britain in 1914. Similarly there existed no British intent to start a 
war with Germany, despite the many years of naval and commercial 'antagonism'.
*  *  *  *
In conclusion, the academic community had only a negligible role to play in the 
British government's decision-making during the July crisis. Whatever attempts were made
318
by the intellectuals to prevent Britain's entry into the war proved to be too little and too 
late. Though some of the academics were to retain their anti-war convictions during the 
course of the war, many others who had evinced Germanophile attitudes before were swept 
along by the tide of patriotic fervour that swelled up after 4 August 1914. A significant 
number of British historians, as already discussed, joined the anti-German propaganda 
campaign in support of Crown and country.
This turn toward anti-Germanism after 4 August 1914, as has already been 
demonstrated, marked a significant break from prewar patterns. The change in the manner 
in which the British historians treated Germany in their writings after the outbreak of 
hostilities must indeed be duly noted. One purpose of this thesis has been to contribute 
knowledge in this area which has heretofore been largely overlooked by the secondary 
literature.
Our analysis of the prewar history texts confirms the favourable views of, and 
respect for, Germany which the historical branch of the British academic establishment 
propagated before August 1914. The historians' Germanophilism is understandable, given 
the prestige of German universities and scholarship before the war. The German 
connection in British education has further been probed in this thesis through the 
examination of Imperial College, the King Edward VII British-German Foundation and the 
German Rhodes Scholarships. This connection was only reflective of the broader influence 
of German thought in British academic life which’was exemplified not just in history but 
also in theology, philosophy and the sciences. The excellence of German technical 
education in providing the impetus for the founding of Imperial certainly cannot be 
underestimated. But the German 'influence' in the three examples examined can be seen 
not only by way of intellectual trends and organizational methods, but also through the 
personal ties that connected the business with the educational sector. As pointed out, the 
financial support of Wemher and Beit was central to the establishment of Imperial.
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German money, in this instance being provided by Cassel, another prominent City banker, 
was also important in the founding of the King Edward VII Foundation, itself symbolizing 
Cassel's close ties with the British monarch and an attempt at promoting Anglo-German 
friendship and cultural exchange. Meanwhile, the German Rhodes Scholarships reflected 
no less their founder's fondness for the German people and his personal ties with the 
German Emperor. Wemher, Beit, Cassel and Rhodes, all of whom sought to foster Anglo- 
German ties before the war, also had in common a connection with the South African 
diamond business. In this interconnected grouping one can detect the linkage of business 
interests with the academic community, inspired by Germanophile views and attitudes.
The German link in British education as exemplified by Wemher, Beit, Cassel and 
Rhodes was, however, relatively weak and not sufficiently strong to prevent the rupture in 
Anglo-German relations that came in August 1914. Ultimately, the geopolitical forces that 
brought on the war proved far stronger than the cultural and educational ties that bound. 
These men's endeavours in education, especially those of Cassel and Rhodes, should 
nevertheless be noted for being part of a non-governmental effort aimed at promoting 
Anglo-German friendship during the prewar period.
As shown by the example of Rhodes, who was motivated in large part by his belief 
in the kindredness of the Anglo-Saxon and German races, the idea of shared Anglo-German 
heritage certainly represented a significant and enduring basis for British prewar 
Germanophile attitudes. The numerous evocations of Anglo-German racial kinship and 
references to the likeness of the British and German peoples have already been cited in this 
thesis and need no repetition here. It is important to note, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that 
the Anglo-German 'rivalry' was widely viewed at the time as being a quarrel between 
blood relations sharing similar traits, rather than one between die-hard foes. Much as 
notions of race might be a divisive force and provide the seeds for extreme right-wing 
ideological movements, they may also act as a binding factor in international relations.
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One aim of this thesis is to underscore the importance of racialist ideas as a source of 
Anglo-German friendship before the First World War, and as a component of prewar 
Germanophile attitudes in Britain.
The articulation of the two-Germanies conception after the outbreak of war in 1914 
can be explained by the continued relevance of this belief in common Anglo-German racial 
origins and by the persistence of prewar Germanophile attitudes among the British 
historians. As has been mentioned, these academics, even while acting as propagandists 
and pouring out anti-German invectives after the start of hostilities, still tended to 
differentiate between the German people and their government. Typical were Charles 
Herford, who chose to separate Germany into two 'alien hosts’, and George Prothero, who 
saw the war as 'a  sort of civil war*. While not a historian, Gilbert Murray expressed the 
essence of the two-Germanies idea when arguing that: 'We abominate their [the Germans’] 
dishonest Government, ... But not the people in general.’65
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, British business and trade links with Germany were 
quite extensive before the war and a substantial portion of British business opinion tended 
to regard Germany in a positive light. The attitude of British business and finance during 
the July crisis could easily have been foreseen. A European war in itself would have been 
sufficiently unsettling for British business, but a war with Germany in particular would 
have had an even more disastrous impact on important sectors of the British economy. The 
British business classes' aversion to a war against Germany was thus understandably based 
on the practical dictates of profit-making.
Despite their relentless efforts, the financial and commercial circles encountered 
limits to their ability to force the government to stay out of the conflict. A European war 
might be highly unprofitable to some of these economic elites but the war nevertheless 
came and, when it did, was accepted with resignation, despite the massive disruption of 
normal business patterns - not to mention the substantial losses which were to be endured
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for the next four years. The commercial interests' lack of decisive influence over official 
policy can be viewed as confirming the validity of Clausewitz's dictum that war, being a 
political instrument, is 'a  continuation of political activity by other means'.66 Ultimately, 
the British decision to go to war in August 1914 was essentially a political decision and not 
an economic one, though doubtless economic considerations had to be taken into account 
and the decision itself had profound economic and social ramifications for the country. 
Even if the economic blockade was to be used as an instrument of war, the conflict was 
fought essentially for political, not economic, goals. The British national interest, in 
defence of which the political leadership intervened in August 1914, was grounded on vital 
geopolitical factors: the maintenance of the European balance of power and with it the 
corollary that France should not be wiped out as a Great Power, and preventing the Low 
Countries from falling into hostile hands. Being a political act, therefore, the Liberal 
government's decision to intervene was one in which private economic interests could have 
but a secondary voice. This study, it is hoped, will contribute to our understanding of the 
primacy of politics in Anglo-German relations in the early twentieth century.
To sum up, this thesis has examined non-governmental links between Britain and 
Germany before the First World War. Focusing on Germanophile activities and attitudes in 
Britain, it has identified a group of individuals such as Cassel, Beit, Wemher and Rhodes, 
spanning both the business and academic communities, who sought to promote Anglo- 
German linkage and detente during the prewar period. The prewar Germanophile views of 
British historians have also been analysed. Though overwhelmed during the July crisis, 
these 'pro-German' forces were certainly present and reasonably active before August 1914. 
Having discussed how they failed to prevent the Anglo-German rupture in August 1914, 
this thesis suggests that further study is needed of the balance of power between the 'pro- 
German' and 'anti-German' forces in Britain during the prewar period as well as the July 
crisis.
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In closing, we might argue that even though the 'pro-German' non-governmental 
groups proved unable to prevent Britain from intervening in the European conflict, the 
driving force behind the British decision for war was also not provided by either elite or 
popular anti-German sentiment. The cabinet decision for war, based on the national 
interest and balance-of-power considerations, came from the top and was spearheaded by a 
small group of ministers, who took the lead in mobilizing Parliament and the people. 
Private interest groups were effectively sidelined in the decision-making process. Instead 
of steering the government, 'public opinion' was led by it in July 1914. Popular anti- 
German fervour, which was whipped up with the aid of historians, among others, after the 
outbreak of hostilities, was largely lacking before 4 August 1914. Anti-Germanism was 
thus more a consequence than a cause of the war. The prewar limits to Anglo-German 
antagonism should be duly appreciated.
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